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ABSTRACT
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by Trung Dong Huynh
Trust and reputation are central to eﬀective interactions in open multi-agent sys-
tems (MAS) in which agents, that are owned by a variety of stakeholders, contin-
uously enter and leave the system. This openness means existing trust and repu-
tation models cannot readily be used since their performance suﬀers when there
are various (unforseen) changes in the environment. To this end, this thesis devel-
ops and evaluates FIRE, a trust and reputation model that enables autonomous
agents in open MAS to evaluate the trustworthiness of their peers and to select
good partners for interactions. FIRE integrates four sources of trust information
under the same framework in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of an
agent’s likely performance in open systems. Speciﬁcally, FIRE incorporates inter-
action trust, role-based trust, witness reputation, and certiﬁed reputation, that
models trust resulting from direct experiences, role-based relationships, witness
reports, and third-party references, respectively, to provide trust metrics in most
circumstances. A novel model of reporter credibility has also been integrated to
enable FIRE to eﬀectively deal with inaccurate reports (from witnesses and ref-
erees). Finally, adaptive techniques have been introduced, which make use of
the information gained from monitoring the environment, to dynamically adjust
a number of FIRE’s parameters according to the actual situation an agent ﬁnds
itself in. In all cases, a systematic empirical analysis is undertaken to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of FIRE in terms of the agent’s performance.Contents
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Introduction
Trust is pervasive in human societies. Everyday, from the moment a person
wakes up, trust plays an important role in each of his actions. For example, when
his doorbell rings in the morning, he can open the door to an unknown postman.
He trusts that the school bus driver will take his children safely to their school.
Moreover, he trusts not only in people, but also in inanimate objects, systems, and
institutions. For instance, when he turns the tap on, he expects the water to ﬂow
and it is of the required drinking standards. He trusts that his paper money is
exchangeable for goods and services whenever he needs them. Without the trust
he places routinely everyday, his life would be unbearable. For a company or an
organisation, trust is of no less importance. Every company trusts in the legal
systems when carrying out all of its (legal) business transactions. It also trusts
that their employees and their partners will not betray them if they are oﬀered
a chance. From these examples, it can be seen that the existence of trust helps
humans and organisations be conﬁdent about the behaviour of those they rely on.
In short, trust is essential for any decision which makes an entity dependent on
any other one.
Until recently, trust was viewed as a concept that is applicable for human beings
only. In computer science, the word ‘trusted’ was used mostly in the area of
security and was usually associated with the meaning of ‘known to be safe’ [Abrams
and Joyce, 1995; Jøsang et al., 2006]. This is, however, a very limited view of the
concept of ‘trust’ in the real world. In contrast, work in the area of agent-based
computing (amongst others) has made trust a relevant research topic for computer
scientists [Castelfranchi and Tan, 2001; Ramchurn et al., 2004]. The reason is that
computer software agents with their emphasis on autonomous actions and ﬂexible
1Chapter 1 Introduction 2
interactions are now expected to exhibit behaviours that are more akin to those
found in human societies than has hitherto been the case in computer systems.
For example, a wide range of agents have been developed to conduct business in
electronic environments such as the Internet (see [He et al., 2003] for a review). In
such situations an agent can participate in online auctions (e.g. monitoring bids,
and making bids), or they can negotiate on behalf of their owners (e.g. negotiating
for the best price possible, or making business commitments such as payments and
contracts). Having such levels of delegation, agents are also able to make certain
decisions themselves, including decisions not to uphold their commitments. In
such scenarios, the risks of traditional commerce come to the fore (e.g. fraud,
unfulﬁlled commitments, and services/products of low quality). Moreover, the
risks may even be intensiﬁed by the speed and the reach of the new technologies.
Therefore, trust, which is essential in human social relations, needs to be re-created
and maintained in new forms of computer supported collaboration and computer
(agent) mediated communities.
In general, the term ‘trust’ can have various meanings depending on the context,
as well as the trusting and trusted parties (see [Dasgupta, 2000] for a review).
However, for the interacting entities in the context of agent communities, trust
can be understood as the expectation or the belief that a party will act benignly
and cooperatively with the trusting party [Dasgupta, 2000; Gambetta, 2000a].
Evaluating this expectation before making interactions is important because it
can help an agent to estimate the trustworthiness of each potential partner and
thus to decide whether the partner is reliable enough to interact with. There-
fore, the existence of a trust measure in agent communities provides a mechanism
to help agents identify reliable partners and avoid potential risks resulting from
interactions with less reliable ones.
Since the ﬁrst attempt of computationally modelling trust for agents by Marsh
[1994], there has been a signiﬁcant amount of research on trust for various com-
puter environments and applications (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3 for more details).
In recent years, however, open multi-agents systems (MAS), with their distributed
nature, independent entities having rich reasoning capabilities, and their standard-
ised communication infrastructure (see Section 1.1), have emerged as a natural
model for computer communities. There are already a wide range of computer
communities that are modelled as open MAS. Well-known examples are the Grid
[Foster et al., 2001], the Semantic Web [Berners-Lee et al., 2001], Virtual Organ-
isations (VO) [Norman et al., 2004], the CoABS Grid [Kahn and Cicalese, 2002],
the Open Agent Architecture [Cheyer and Martin, 2001; Martin et al., 1999], var-Chapter 1 Introduction 3
ious electronic commerce environments (see reviews in [Guttman et al., 1998] and
[He et al., 2003]), and Peer-to-Peer sharing networks such as Gnutella, MFTP
(eDonkey2000), and FastTrack (Kazaa). However, there has not been any trust
model designed speciﬁcally for this type of computer community and models that
have been developed for other contexts are not readily adaptable (see Chapter 2).
Given the increasing ubiquity of open MAS, a trust model devised for them will
beneﬁt a wide range of agent applications that need a means to assess the trust-
worthiness of agents to operate eﬀectively. Against this background, this thesis
presents just such a model—FIRE1 an integrated trust and reputation model for
agents in open MAS.
1.1 Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Before delving into a further discussion on trust, we ﬁrst identify the main building
blocks of open multi-agent systems. To this end, this section introduces the basic
concepts of agency and multi-agent systems, which will be used throughout this
thesis. First we consider the notion of agency.
An agent is an encapsulated computer system situated in some environ-
ment that is capable of ﬂexible, autonomous action in that environment
in order to meet its design objectives [Jennings, 2001].
From this deﬁnition, there are a number of properties of agents that require elab-
oration. Agents are [Jennings, 2001]:
• clearly identiﬁable problem-solving entities with well-deﬁned boundaries and
interfaces,
• situated (embedded) in a particular environment over which they have par-
tial control and observability—they receive inputs related to the state of
their environment through sensors and they act on the environment through
eﬀectors,
• designed to fulﬁll a speciﬁc role—they have particular objectives to achieve,
1FIRE is from ‘ﬁdes’ (Latin for ‘trust’) and ‘reputation’. In the Ramayana legend of India,
Sita proved the purity of her character by passing through the raging ﬁre ﬂames.Chapter 1 Introduction 4
• autonomous—they have control both over their internal state and over their
own behaviour, and
• capable of exhibiting ﬂexible problem-solving behaviour in pursuit of their
design objectives—being both reactive (able to respond in a timely fashion
to changes that occur in their environment) and proactive (able to oppor-
tunistically adopt goals and take the initiative).
In this research, all agents are additionally assumed to be rational; meaning for
each possible percept sequence, they should do whatever action is expected to max-
imise their performance measure, on the basis of the evidence provided by the per-
cept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has [Russell and Norvig,
1995]. Irrational agents have unpredictable behaviours, and thus it is impossible
to have any expectation about their actions. Hence, irrational agents are placed
outside the remit of this research.
When adopting the agent approach to problem solving, it soon becomes apparent
that most problems require or involve multiple agents: to represent the decen-
tralised nature of the problem, multiple loci of control, multiple perspectives or
competing interests [Jennings, 2001]. Hence, a multi-agent system is one that is
composed of multiple interacting agents that work together to solve problems that
are beyond the individual capabilities or knowledge of each agent (adapted from
Jennings et al., 1998). It should be noted from this deﬁnition that the agents in
a MAS are designed to work together towards some common goals of the system.
In contrast, an open MAS allows agents from various sources to join and operate.
Thus, the agents in an open MAS may work towards diﬀerent, or even contrary,
goals because of diﬀerent ownerships. In other words, an open MAS is an open
society of agents, where they can operate and obtain some beneﬁts from the in-
frastructure and other agents in the society. In general, the two main features of
an open MAS are:
1. Agents can freely join and leave at any time.
2. Agents are owned by various stakeholders with diﬀerent aims and objectives.
From these two main features, other characteristics of an open MAS can be derived
as follows (adapted from [Barber and Kim, 2002]):
• The environment in an open MAS is dynamic: Agents providing services
might become unavailable and new agents oﬀering new services might comeChapter 1 Introduction 5
online. This means that the environment will change over time as the system
operates.
• The number of agents is unbounded, given that agents can join an open MAS
at any time.
• An open MAS is insecure: There may be incompetent, unreliable or even
malicious agents in the system.
• No agent can know everything about its environment: It is not practical
for agents to rely on access to complete information about the environment
that they are in. Given the typical scale of an open MAS, the computa-
tional cost required to create such a world view will exceed any performance
improvements (if it is even possible).
• Due to diﬀerent ownerships in an open MAS, there is no central authority
that can control all the agents. In addition, it is assumed that agents are
self-interested.
Against this background, in order to show the importance of trust in open multi-
agent systems, the next section presents a scenario for the domain of electronic
commerce in which the various occurrences of trust are identiﬁed and their roles
are analysed.
1.2 An Example Trust Scenario
The scenario in this section is an example of future online transactions that are
mediated by agents. In particular, this scenario outlines the interactions that may
be involved in a car purchasing transaction. In the scenario, James intends to
buy a new BMW 760i to replace his old car. He assigns his personal (software)
agent to ﬁnd a suitable deal on the Internet. The parts where trust is involved are
emphasised in italics.
1. James instructs his personal agent to look for a good car retailer in the region.
He also tells the agent the desired model and his available funds.
2. James’ agent contacts an online directory service to fetch a list of local car
retailers.Chapter 1 Introduction 6
3. James’ agent then contacts James friends’ personal agents to ask them to rate
the service of those in the retailer list that they have had experiences with.
It collects the ratings, aggregates them, giving high priorities to ratings from
those with high experience in cars, then ﬁlters the original list into a list of
potentially good retailers.
4. James’ agent begins to contact these retailers, asking them about their oﬀers
on the speciﬁc model 760i of BMW, and at the same time asks them to
provide ‘authorised dealer’ certiﬁcates from BMW UK.
5. A problem arises when no oﬀer falls within range of the available funds.
James’ agent suggests some cheaper models to him, and also makes him
aware of the fact that the retailer X oﬀers ﬁnance options. James still insists
on a BMW 760i and instructs his agent to negotiate with X on a particular
ﬁnance option.
6. In order to consider the ﬁnance option request from James’ agent, the agent
of retailer X contacts an established credit reference agency to obtain the
credit history of James. After having assessed James’ ﬁnancial status against
its ﬁnance policy, the agent of retailer X agrees to sell the car with the
requested ﬁnance option.
7. James’ agent returns to him with a purchasing contract. He checks the terms
and signs it digitally. The signed contract is then presented to the retailer’s
agent by James’ agent along with an electronic payment as the deposit. The
two agents negotiate to set an appointment when James can come to collect
his new car. James’ agent also records in its diary future payments according
to the ﬁnance terms agreed.
The model of an open MAS (as described in Section 1.1) ﬁts well this scenario
since the participating agents here are owned by various stakeholders (e.g. personal
agents, retailers’ agents, and the credit agency’s agents) and they all have their
own aims and objectives (e.g. selling cars for proﬁts, buying the required car at
a good price with the limited available funds). To James’ agent, the environment
in the scenario is dynamic and uncertain because it cannot be sure whether the
other agents are reliable. For example, a car retailer might sell illegally imported
products which do not qualify for the manufacturer’s guarantee; or a credit agency
can be incompetent and might produce unreliable credit reports. Against all these
uncertainties, thanks to the various trust relationships, a transaction can still be
carried out. As the highlighted text shows, trust appears in every decision takenChapter 1 Introduction 7
in the transaction (those of James, his agent, and the retailer X). Its occurrences
in the scenario can be generally classiﬁed into four main categories:
• Trust in information sources: This covers trust in information credibility, as
well as the suﬃciency of the sources. For example, in step 2, when asking
for a list of local car retailers, James’ agent trusts that the directory service
it contacts has a list of car retailers with correct and suﬃcient information
allowing it to proceed to later steps.
• Trust between agents: This covers the expectation that another agent will
have desirable behaviours. That is the belief that when oﬀered a chance, the
other agent is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to the trusting
agent. This is the kind of trust that individuals in a society have in their
family, friends, and close partners. In step 3, James’ agent trusts agents
belonging to James’ friends and believes that they will provide their ratings
honestly. Trust between agents is usually built on the relationship between
the two agents and evolves along with the development of their relationship.
It should be noted that when choosing which car retailer to contact, James’
agent depends on the honesty of agents of James’ friends. Consider the
case that an agent W receives commission from introducing customers to
the retailer X. Since agents are assumed to be rational and self-interested,
agent W can report falsely about retailer X’s performance despite the trust
of James’ agent. However, if James’ agent knew about the relationship
between the retailer X and agent W it would treat the ratings from W with
respect to the retailer X with doubt and care. Therefore, when trust is
built on information obtained from others, the possibility of lying or false
information should always be taken into account.
• Trust in the internal characteristics of an agent: This covers understanding
the capabilities of an agent and its interests in carrying out a delegated task.
When James instructs his agents to ﬁnd a potential car retailer (step 1) or to
negotiate a ﬁnance option (step 5), he believes that his agent is suﬃciently
competent to deal with these tasks. More importantly, he believes his agent
will do its best to serve his interests (rather than those of the retailer X).
In other words, he knows his agent’s characteristics and trusts it in those
speciﬁc tasks providing these characteristics. The same applies to the retailer
X when it delegates its agent to negotiate and settle deals.
• Trust in the environment: Here the environment consists of all the externalChapter 1 Introduction 8
conditions that aﬀect the agents’ operations (e.g. the environment’s infras-
tructure, rules, and so on). Knowing about the external conditions that
can make an action successful or reduce the probability or the damage of
its failure helps an agent be more conﬁdent when taking that action. This
knowledge helps an agent to proceed when facing a potential risk of loss. In
the above scenario there are various types of external conditions that aﬀect
the agents’ decisions. These include:
– Technology: The digital certiﬁcate presented by X’s agent (step 4) as-
sures James’ agent about the origin of its ‘authorised dealer’ certiﬁcate;
or the digital signature presented by James’ agent (step 7) assures the
retailer’s agent about the validity of the contract signed by James.
– Institutions of electronic commerce: Both agents and their owners (i.e.
James and the retailer X) trust the digital contract and the electronic
deposit payment (step 7). They believe that both parties will obey
the agreed terms and, therefore, they trust each other. They are also
conﬁdent that if a party breaks the contract it will be punished by an
authority and the resulting loss will be compensated for.
– Norms in a society: When consulting a credit reference agency (step 6),
X’s agent expects that it will receive complete and impartial information
because it believes the norm that the agency will do that to uphold the
reputation of its service.2
It should be noted that the trust behaviours in this scenario are very close to those
in human societies (as discussed at the beginning of this chapter). For example, in
step 3, James’ agent gives more attention to the ratings of those who know a lot
about cars. It is also the case that trust research usually attempts to model trust in
a manner that is as close as possible to some particular trust relationships in human
societies. This is due to the belief that trust in human societies is essential and
eﬀective in enhancing relationships and promoting cooperation among individuals
[Gambetta, 2000a], and, thus, should be replicated. Now, having analysed the
trust scenario and identiﬁed the main trust categories, in the next section, we
turn to determining the speciﬁc goals for our research in building a trust model
for application in open MAS.
2The belief also involves trust in the motives (internal characteristics) of the credit reference
agency that it wants to keep up its reputation to attract more customers. This will, in turn,
increase its proﬁts. This belief can be viewed as a norm in business.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
1.3 Research Goals
As we can see in the scenario of Section 1.2, trust exists and plays an important
role in many of the decisions of the agents and their owners. The existence of these
various types of trust allows the transaction to happen despite the potential risks
that exist in that scenario (e.g. being lied to or being deceived by the other party).
Against this background, we believe it is important to have computational models
of trust and to bring this into the arena of agent-based systems. This belief has
also led to a signiﬁcant body of work on trust in recent years (see [Falcone et al.,
2001, 2003; Jensen et al., 2004] for some examples and [Ramchurn et al., 2004] for
reviews). However, because trust is so ubiquitous and comes in many forms, it is
essential that the scope of this research is clearly deﬁned.
To this end, the main goal of this research is to create a trust model for open
MAS. Therefore, it will study trust relationships between software agents only.
This means that trust between humans, or trust of humans in agents/systems
is outside the scope of this research (but see [Gambetta, 2000b] for more details
of these areas). Since delegation of tasks to other agents is the main means to
achieve bigger and more complicated goals in MAS [Zambonelli et al., 2001], task
delegation in open MAS is here chosen to be the context for trust evaluation.
However, trust relationships between agents may fall in any of the four main
categories of trust identiﬁed in Section 1.2. Hence, it is necessary to consider
which types of trust will be studied and which will not.
Trust in internal characteristics of an agent is made up of two components: trust
in the capabilities of an agent and trust in that agent’s goals or interests. The
latter depends on the capability of agents to build up suﬃcient knowledge about
the mental states (i.e. goals and interests) of another agent. So far, only the
works of Castelfranchi and Falcone [1998, 2001] have analysed this type of trust
(see more details in Section 2.1). However, they did not show how the mental states
of an agent can be discovered and modelled. In general, this task is particularly
diﬃcult in open MAS due to the diversity of agents (recall the characteristics of
an open MAS in Section 1.1). Since agents can have very diﬀerent tasks, domains
and designs, it is almost impossible to develop a general method to model the
mental states of every agent in an open MAS. Therefore, in this research, trust
made up from the mental states of an agent will not be considered. The former,
trust in the capabilities of an agent, is a prerequisite for the decision to delegate
a task to an agent. In MAS, there are several diﬀerent mechanisms that allow an
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providing (e.g. Middle-Agents or Matchmakers in [Decker et al., 1997; Klusch and
Sycara, 2001], and Service Directory Service in FIPA Architecture [FIPA, 2002]).
However, there is still no mechanism for verifying that an agent can actually do
what it has advertised. Since an agent must know a partner’s capabilities before
delegating any task, it is desirable that an agent has a way to verify the partner’s
capabilities. This motivates one of the aims of this research: to study how trust
in the capabilities of a particular agent can be established.
Trust in the environment is a broad category. Since the conditions of the environ-
ment that aﬀect an interaction vary depending on the nature of that interaction, it
is impossible to provide a generic model for this type of trust. Some of the condi-
tions have been studied well such as security, platforms, and so on (see [Grandison
and Sloman, 2000] for examples), including some speciﬁcally for agents (e.g. auc-
tion protocols in [Brandt, 2002] and [Hsu and Soo, 2002]; and security in [Wong
and Sycara, 2000]). However, these conditions are chosen by the agents’ design-
ers, not by the agents themselves. Hence, agents trust the environment and its
conditions because they are trusted by the agents’ owners or designers. At the
current time, agents have no capability to perceive the conditions imposed by the
environment or to judge about its trustworthiness. These capabilities require the
environment to have a standardised way of advertising the conditions in eﬀect and
their impacts. This is currently unavailable. Therefore, it is currently impossible
to model trust in the environment for agents. This research therefore will ignore
this type of trust and leave it open for future work.
Trust between agents: In the relationships between agents, knowing that a partner
is able to carry out a task is usually not suﬃcient. Each agent has its own interests
and will act according to those interests. It is also true that agents have degrees of
freedom to disappoint others. Hence, the belief of an agent that a partner will do
a delegated task in a desirable manner is a determinant factor when it considers
task delegation to that partner. This belief is called service provision trust. In
open MAS, it is possible that there are malicious agents trying to exploit na¨ ıve
ones (those who believe blindly what others say). Thus, the risk of being deceived
by an unknown agent is higher than in traditional MAS (where all the agents are
designed to work together). Therefore, this type of trust is especially important
in open MAS. Having a trust measure will help agents in open MAS to identify
unreliable agents and to gain conﬁdence when dealing with reliable ones. Hence,
this research will study how service provision trust can be modelled in order to
provide a trust measure for agents in open MAS.Chapter 1 Introduction 11
Trust in information sources. Information sources in an open MAS can always
be treated as agents providing an information service. Then, trust in informa-
tion sources means trust in those information providing agents, and, thus falls
into the category of trust between agents discussed above. However, there are a
number of traditional information sources that operate as information databases
without agent-like behaviours (e.g. contact/email directories, image databases,
map/weather services). Although it is still possible to view them as very simple
agents, there are criteria that are more relevant in evaluating the quality of these
information sources than their general trustworthiness. Those criteria include in-
formation credibility, information provenance, or the correctness and suﬃciency of
information provided (see more in [Barber and Kim, 2002; Hertzum et al., 2002;
McGuinness and da Silva, 2003]). Generally speaking, they are of a diﬀerent area
to that of trust in the target of study (i.e. information sources), and, thus, will not
be covered in this research. Whenever information sources are treated as agents,
service provision trust will be used.
In summary then, the goals of this research are:
1. To model trust relationships between agents in open MAS. This covers ser-
vice provision trust and trust in the capabilities of an agent.
2. To provide a trust measure for agents in open MAS that helps them to
identify reliable partners. This includes providing mechanisms to build and
to maintain trust among agents.
In particular, we envisage that our trust model should satisfy the following re-
quirements (here listed as R1, R2,...and subsequently reﬁned to R1a, R1b, etc.
in Chapter 2):
• R1: Be able to provide a trust measure in all situations that an agent may
be in by making use of a variety of potential sources of information that can
be used to derive the trustworthiness of a partner.
• R2: Be suitable for open MAS given their characteristics as discussed in
Section 1.1. This includes the ability to cope with the distributed and ‘no
central authority’ nature of an open MAS, the possible large number of
agents that may be present, as well as the dynamic nature of the environment
in an open MAS (e.g. agents come and leave, change their relationships with
others, and/or change their behaviours).Chapter 1 Introduction 12
• R3: Be adaptable to diﬀerent domains of applications.
• R4: Be robust against possible cheating and defecting (i.e. lying or false
information).
These desiderata for our trust model are general and at a high level. More speciﬁc
requirements for the trust model will be derived from an analysis of the approaches
to modelling trust in Chapter 2.
1.4 Research Contributions
By accomplishing the objectives set out in the previous section, this research
advances the state of the art in the following ways:
• Although trust has been investigated in a signiﬁcant amount of research,
trust for agents in open MAS has not been explicitly addressed within the
ﬁeld of MAS to date. Most work in the area has tackled the problem of
modelling trust in very speciﬁc or narrow contexts. This research, however,
studies trust in the more general context of an open MAS (see Section 1.1),
which has been used as a model for a wide variety of agent applications.
FIRE’s trust mechanisms are then built in a generic way such that they do
not depend on any application-speciﬁc information to operate eﬀectively (as
those of most existing trust models do). Therefore, it can enjoy a much
wider applicability than the current trust models in an open MAS.
• This research extends the current work on trust based on an agent’s direct
experiences, its relationships, and witness reports by adapting them to the
context of open MAS and by integrating them into a coherent framework.
Being more precise, this research devises new normalised reliability measures
for these types of trust, allowing them to be aggregated into a single trust
measure, but still taking into account their individual situations using con-
ﬁgurable parameters. Adopting this framework means agent designers have
the ability to evaluate trust from various perspectives (i.e. using various
sources of trust information). It also allows them to adjust the trust model
to suit their domain of application by changing various parameters of FIRE
(e.g. the inﬂuence of each type of trust on the overall trust measure, and
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level of conﬁdence based on the set of ratings taken into account). No such
trust framework has been developed in the current literature.
• This research formalises the notion of third-party references into a type of
trust information that can be use to derive the trustworthiness of an agent.
This allows an agent to actively present the references about its past perfor-
mance to potential interaction partners in order to establish trust relation-
ships with them. This type of trust is here called Certiﬁed Reputation. By
using references, an agent can prove its capabilities to other agents (to gain
the trust in its capabilities), while the other agents do not have to look for rel-
evant trust information themselves. Certiﬁed Reputation is highly available
since agents can typically collect a large number of references themselves and
they are incentivised to present these to establish new trust relationships.
The idea of Certiﬁed Reputation has not been developed in other work on
trust. However, there are a few cases where somewhat similar concepts
are presented such as trust policy management engines (e.g. PolicyMaker
[Grandison and Sloman, 2000], Trust-Serv [Skogsrud et al., 2003])—which
grant rights to an agent based on its self-presented certiﬁcates of its iden-
tity according to predeﬁned policies or endorsements [Maximilien and Singh,
2002]—certiﬁcates endorsing that a service (provider) is trusted and pre-
ferred by their issuers. Nevertheless, they address a diﬀerent problem in the
case of trust policy management engines (i.e. granting rights in the secu-
rity area), and the real beneﬁts of using endorsements have not been fully
demonstrated.
• Third-party information (used for deriving an agent’s reputation) is typically
prone to inaccuracy. To this end, this research develops a novel credibility
model that allows FIRE to assess the reliability of information providers
(i.e. reporters) and to weight, or to ﬁlter out, their information accordingly.
More speciﬁcally, using our credibility model, an agent rates the credibility
of a reporter based on the diﬀerence between the reports it receives and the
actual interaction result it observes later. Hence, reporters’ credibility is not
objectively assessed based on how honest they are in revealing the interac-
tion result they received, but rather it is subjectively judged based on their
capability to give reports close to the actual results that a particular agent
would receive. By so doing, an agent can detect not only inaccurate/false
reports, but also honest, but useless, reports that result from the diﬀerent
views of the reporters. For example, one reporter may receive preferential
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ratings about this provider. Such ratings, though honest and accurate (in
the view of that reporter), are not useful for other agents because they would
receive only normal treatment from that provider. By taking an agent’s indi-
vidual situation (i.e. the actual performance it receives during interactions)
into account, our credibility model can deal with cases similar to the one
in this example appropriately. Hence, our credibility model is better suited
for applications in open MAS than the existing solutions in that it takes the
individual view of an agent into account and, more importantly, that it does
not require additional application domain knowledge to work.
• This research shows how learning about an agent’s environment can be in-
corporated into the agent’s reasoning model to adapt FIRE (by adjusting its
various parameters) to the current situation of a changing environment in a
ﬂexible manner. No such work has been done before for any trust model.
In terms of publications, the following contributions has been made:
1. Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, T. Dong Huynh, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Trust
in multi-agent systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 2004, provides
a survey of the current work on trust in agent systems.
2. T. Dong Huynh, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Nigel R. Shadbolt. FIRE:
An integrated trust and reputation model for open multi-agent systems.
In Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence
(ECAI), 2004, presents FIRE and the idea of certiﬁed reputation.
3. T. Dong Huynh, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Nigel R. Shadbolt. Developing
an integrated trust and reputation model for open multi-agent systems. In
Proceedings of the 7th Int Workshop on Trust in Agent Societies, 2004, ex-
tends the results in the previous paper further more by showing that FIRE
also performs well in dynamic environments.
4. T. Dong Huynh, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Nigel R. Shadbolt. On Handling
Inaccurate Witness Reports. In Proceedings of the 8th Int Workshop on
Trust in Agent Societies, 2005, presents our model of credibility that can be
used to detect and ﬁltered out inaccurate witness reports.
5. T. Dong Huynh, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Nigel R. Shadbolt. An Integrated
Trust and Reputation Model for Open Multi-Agent Systems. In Journal of
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2006, presents in detail howChapter 1 Introduction 15
FIRE is constructed and why it is constructed that way with a comprehensive
evaluation on its performance.
6. T. Dong Huynh, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Nigel R. Shadbolt. Certiﬁed
Reputation: How an Agent Can Trust a Stranger. In Proceedings of the
5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, 2006, presents Certiﬁed Reputation as an independent trust model
and shows how it deals with inaccurate references.
1.5 Thesis Structure
This thesis presents the FIRE model, designed to realise the objectives outlined
in Section 1.3. The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 gives a discussion on the current approaches to modelling trust
in agent systems. It also reviews the current state of the art in the area and
summarises the open issues.
• Chapter 3 presents FIRE—the trust model devised in this research for
agents in open MAS.
• Chapter 4 describes the methodology and the test domain characterising
an open MAS which will be used for evaluating FIRE.
• Chapter 5 shows an empirical evaluation of FIRE’s performance in the test
domain. Particular attention is given to determining the contribution of each
of FIRE’s components to its overall performance and also to evaluating its
performance in situations where various changes in an open MAS take place.
• Chapter 6 extends FIRE to deal with situations in which witnesses/refer-
ees produce inaccurate reports about the behaviour of agents (either because
they have a diﬀerent perspective or because they seek to gain a strategic ad-
vantage by so doing). It also includes a detailed evaluation of the credibility
model’s performance in handling inaccurate witnesses and referees.
• Chapter 7 implements a number of learning techniques in order for FIRE
to adapt its parameters to suit the environment in which it is operating and
shows how these techniques improve FIRE’s adaptivity through empirical
evaluations.
• Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and outlines the directions for future work.Chapter 2
Trust and Reputation in Agent
Systems
This chapter introduces the concepts of trust, direct trust and reputation in
agent systems. It starts with a discussion about the deﬁnitions and a classiﬁcation
of these concepts in Section 2.1, followed by a review on the main approaches to
modelling direct trust (Section 2.2) and reputation (Section 2.3) in agents. The
two sections break the task of modelling direct trust and that of reputation into
subproblems and review the current approaches to solve each subproblem. Then
Section 2.4 presents generic problems (which have not been discussed in the two
previous sections) that may inﬂuence the eﬀectiveness of a trust model in open
MAS. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes this chapter by pointing out open issues that
needs to be addressed and the speciﬁc requirements for the trust model in this
research.
2.1 Trust Paradigms and Classiﬁcation
To date there has been little consensus in the literature on exactly what trust is,
although its pervasive importance has been recognised. Traditionally, there are
two main views of trust. First, the cognitive view [Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2001]
models trust as made up of underlying beliefs. That is, trust is a function of the
values of these beliefs. Second, the probabilistic view ignores the role of underlying
beliefs and uses a (scalar) metric to model a subjective probability with which an
agent will perform a particular action [Yu and Singh, 2002]. Each of these views
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will now be dealt with in turn.
The cognitive view of trust is mainly from the work of Castelfranchi and Falcone
[1998, 2001]. The context they choose is that of task delegation where an agent a
wishes to delegate a task to agent b. In so doing, agent a needs to evaluate the
trust it can place in b by considering diﬀerent beliefs it has about the motivations
of b1. They claim the following beliefs of a are essential to determine the amount
of trust to be put in b2:
• Competence belief: a should believe that b can actually do the task.
• Willingness belief: a believes that b has decided and intends to do what it
has proposed to do.
• Persistence belief: a believes that b is stable enough about its intention to
do what it has proposed to do.
• Motivation belief: a believes that b has some motive to help a, and that
these motives will probably prevail over other motives negative to a in case
of conﬂict.
In order to devise the level of trust that it can place in b, a would need to take
all these beliefs into account. However, the evaluation of these beliefs requires
modelling agent b’s mental states. This task is generally complicated and impre-
cise in open MAS since there is no general way to model another agent’s mental
states given the great diversity of agents in both their origins and their domains.
Therefore, we believe that the cognitive approach to modelling trust, although
providing a natural view of trust from socio-psychological work, is not suitable for
open MAS in general.
On the other hand, the probabilistic view ignores the beliefs about intentions of
the other agent. In this approach, trust is quantiﬁed based mainly on agents’
experiences (e.g. the outcomes of their interactions), which are observable to
the involved agents. The main idea is that past experiences about an agent’s
behaviours can be used in predicting the future behaviours of that agent. In
particular, they can be used for calculating the probability that the agent will show
a particular behaviour. Obviously, an agent can always record past behaviours of
1From this point, we use a to denote the trust evaluating agent, and b the target agent being
evaluated.
2The beliefs presented have been adapted and summarised from Castelfranchi and Falcone
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those that it has interacted with. This ability allows agents to calculate trust
values without the need of modelling mental states of other agents. Thus, in open
MAS, this approach is more practical.
This research follows the probabilistic approach for the reasons noted above and
uses the following deﬁnition (adapted from [Gambetta, 2000a]):
Trust is a measurable level of the subjective probability with which an
agent a assesses that another agent b will perform a particular action
in a favourable way to a, both before a can monitor such action (or
independently of its capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a
context in which it aﬀects its own action.
In this deﬁnition, the trust of a on b is a subjective probability because a can only
have a limited view on b’s behaviour; it cannot reason certainly what are b’s next
actions, but can only calculate the probability of b’s possible actions based on its
limited knowledge, which might not be true (hence subjective). A particular action
is used in a deliberately broad sense to include any delegated tasks, including
making payments, delivering goods, recommending other agents, and so on. A
favourable way to a is also deliberately understood broadly to include honesty,
security, safety, reliability, and timeliness. The context mentioned includes the
external conditions of the environment such as the business context, the relevant
agreements, the technology infrastructure, the legislative, and regulatory systems
that may apply. This deﬁnition of trust is also agreed and used in various of the
work on trust that adopt the probabilistic approach (e.g. [Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes, 2000], [Dimitrakos and Bicarregui, 2001], [Mui et al., 2002], [Teacy et al.,
2006], and [Yu and Singh, 2002]).
In a human society, the trust that an individual places on another can be built
from two main sources:
1. Private information that it obtains from its direct relationships with the
other.
2. Public reputation of the other, which can be obtained from other individuals
in the society.
Similarly, trust in agent communities can also be built in the same manner. In
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of information. A trust measure which is built on both direct relationships and
reputation information is here called composite trust. The trust resulting from the
direct relationships is now called direct trust in order to be distinguishable from
the composite one. The direct trust that an agent a places in another agent b
is derived from a’s knowledge that ensues from evaluating its direct relationships
with b. Therefore, direct trust reﬂects the subjective opinion of the judging agent
(i.e. a). On the other hand, reputation is a collection of subjective opinions about
an agent from other agents in the same society. It represents the view of the
society about a member. Reputation of an agent is formally deﬁned as follows
(adapted from [Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 2000]):
The reputation of an agent is an expectation of its behaviours based
on other agents’ observations, or information, about the agent’s past
behaviours.
Since reputation information is from the subjective view of its provider, it is usu-
ally less reliable than information that an agent can observe and judge by itself
(i.e. direct trust). Thus, the direct trust usually has a larger inﬂuence on the com-
posite trust than reputation. However, in the case that an agent does not have
enough information to calculate direct trust3, it will have to depend on reputa-
tion information to evaluate trust. Since reputation information is obtained from
other agents in the society and agents are free to lie, the reliability of reputation
information should be taken into account.
In summary, a trust model should make use of both direct trust and reputation in
order to be able to cover situations where one of them is unavailable or unreliable.
In addition, making use of both brings more experiences into trust evaluations than
using only one source of trust information. This should enhance a trust model’s
accuracy. Thus the trust model in this research will be built on both direct trust
and reputation (recall the desideratum R1). These are then the two dimensions
of trust that an agent can use to evaluate another agent in task delegation in this
work. When combining the two dimensions of trust, the reliability of the trust
measure in each dimension should be available in order to calculate the inﬂuence
of each dimension on the ﬁnal composite measure. The two next sections will
discuss, in detail, about modelling these two dimensions of trust in agents.
3This is the case when two agents have not had any direct relationship or interaction. Thus,
they do not know about each other directly. Or their relationship is too weak (e.g. too few
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2.2 Direct Trust
Direct trust, which only involves two agents, is calculated based on direct rela-
tionships between the two agents. This research focuses on two main types of such
relationships:
1. Role-based relationships that stem from the social roles of the two agents
(e.g. owned by the same organisation, relationships derived from links be-
tween the agents’ owners in real life such as friendship or relatives, relation-
ships between a service provider agent and its registered consumer agents),
and
2. Relationships that result from direct interactions between two agents.
Relationships of the ﬁrst type have not been studied much in modelling direct trust
since there is no general way to computationally quantify trust based on them.
The reason is that the number of social roles and the relationships between them
may vary greatly depending on particular domains of application. Direct trust
from role-based relationships, here called role-based trust, is thus left open to be
deﬁned by particular applications. The usual approach to this problem is using a
rule-based (or policy) system to map relationships to trust values (see [Grandison
and Sloman, 2000] for a comprehensive review). For example, an agent should
have a high degree of trust in information provided by another agent that is from
the same organisation, or a seller agent always has a tendency to increase the
product price and to lower the product quality when possible4. These rules are
speciﬁed for each agent and are used to map the role of an agent to a predeﬁned
trust value when evaluating role-based trust. Since the rule-based approach is
fairly simple and adequate for modelling role-base trust, more eﬀort is put on
studying the latter. Thus, the remainder of this section focuses on reviewing the
main approaches to modelling direct trust based on direct interactions, here called
interaction trust.
Consider the context where an agent a wishes to delegate a task to another agent b
and it is evaluating the trustworthiness of b to decide the task delegation. The most
accessible source of information about b is past experiences of a from interactions
with b, or a’s interpretation of the results of past interactions with b. These
observations reﬂect a’s subjective view of b’s behaviours and they can help a
4This rule reﬂects a norm in the relationship between a seller agent and an ordinary buyer
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predict the future behaviours of b. Therefore, this information is used to calculate
the expected behaviours of b when it carries out the delegated task. However,
there are two problems that need to be solved in modelling interaction trust:
1. How to represent interaction trust?
2. How to calculate the amount of trust from past interactions?
In most existing work, trust is represented as a single numerical value which shows
the degree of expectation of agent a about a desirable action of agent b [Mui et al.,
2002; Sabater and Sierra, 2001; Teacy et al., 2006; Yu and Singh, 2002; Zacharia
and Maes, 2000]. The higher the trust value for agent b, the higher the expecta-
tion/probability that b will carry out that action in a’s view. This also makes it
easy to compare the trust values of two or more potential partners to select one
from them. However, a number of models do use diﬀerent representations. For
example, the trust model of Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [2000] uses a set of ordered
labels for trust degrees: ‘Very Trustworthy’, ‘Trustworthy’, ‘Untrustworthy’, ‘Very
Untrustworthy’. However, it is always possible to convert this type of represen-
tation back to an equivalent numerical representation for the ease of calculations
and comparisons. Hence, numerical representation will be used for the trust model
of this research.
With respect to the second problem, in order to calculate a trust value for b, trust
models initially require agent a to gather its observations about b’s behaviours.
Without these observations, the interaction trust of a to b does not exist as a
has no knowledge about b. For each interaction in a similar context to the task
being considered, a gives ratings to the performance of b (i.e. a rates how good
the result of each interaction is). This can be accomplished by comparing the
outcome of a transaction (i.e. the quality of an action in the trust context being
considered) against predeﬁned criteria (e.g., b tells the truth or not [Schillo et al.,
2000], whether b fulﬁlls the contract with a [Teacy et al., 2006], or how good are
the quality of the products purchased from b [Sabater and Sierra, 2001]). Then the
ratings will be aggregated into a single value that shows the level of performance
that a expects from b. This is the main idea of trust models in [Mui et al., 2002]
and [Sabater and Sierra, 2001]. However, the contexts where trust is calculated
in some work are very simple in that they consider the performance ratings of an
agent to be simply a value of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’ (e.g. [Mui
et al., 2002], [Schillo et al., 2000], [Teacy et al., 2006]), or a single performance
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rating systems limit the applicability of these models in real world situations since
realistic interactions in an open MAS often involve various valuations (e.g. qual-
ity, timeliness, reliability). In contrast, Regret [Sabater and Sierra, 2001] gives a
richer semantics to ratings, and, thus, it allows more complex trust contexts. For
example, an agent can give a rating of −0.5 for late delivery of some good, and
+1 for the quality of the same good. Moreover, Regret introduces the capability
of rating on more abstract aspects by incorporating the ontological structures of
these aspects into its model. For example, a rating of ‘good seller’ may be cal-
culated from ratings about delivery date, price, and quality of the goods in the
same interaction (see Figure 2.1). This favours Requirement R3 of adaptivity in
that this rating system can be reused for various types of agents from diﬀerent
domains (with diﬀerent criteria in performance rating). This is particularly useful
in an open MAS where there may be a great diﬀerence in the application domains






Figure 2.1: An example of ontological structure for ratings.
After having rated relevant observations, most models aggregate the ratings using
some form of arithmetic mean function. In addition, to simulate the phenomenon
that recent experiences aﬀect trust more than older ones, Regret introduces re-
cency as a weight in its mean function. It uses a time dependent function that
gives higher values to the observations that are closer to the time that they are
being considered. The function is then used as a weight value for the rating given
for the corresponding observation. Thus, the recency of observations serves as
the relevance factor of those observations5 (see Appendix A.2 for more details).
The aggregated value of ratings then becomes the value for the interaction trust.
It should be noted that this trust value corresponds to the criterion that is used
for rating. In binary rating systems (i.e. ratings have two values, such as ‘coop-
erate/defect’), the trust value is the probability that an agent will perform the
action that was rated (e.g. to cooperate or to defect). In single-criterion rating
systems, the trust value is the expected performance of an agent with respect to
the criterion being rated. In multiple-criterion rating systems (such as Regret),
5There are many psychological studies that support recency as a determinant factor [Karlins
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each criterion will have a corresponding trust value which shows the expected per-
formance in terms of that criterion in a future similar interaction. For example,
in the context of buying a product, we will have the expected performance of an
agent in terms of product price, delivery, and product quality in future selling
actions of that agent. A notable class of trust models based on binary rating sys-
tems is those that calculate trust values using probability density functions (PDFs)
[DeGroot and Schervish, 2002]. TRAVOS [Teacy et al., 2006] is such an example.
Using binary ratings allows TRAVOS to make use of the beta family of PDFs to
model the probability of having a successful interaction with a particular given
agent. This probability is then used as that agent’s trust value.
As discussed in Section 2.1, each trust measure should have a reliability measure in
order to model its inﬂuence on the composite trust measure. For interaction trust,
only Regret and TRAVOS introduce a reliability measure. Speciﬁcally, Regret
uses the number of observations available and their deviation to determine the
reliability of trust values calculated from those observations. The principles are:
the more observations are available, the more reliable the resulting trust is until
the number of observations exceeds a predeﬁned threshold; and the greater the
deviation in the observations, the less reliable the resulting trust. As for TRAVOS,
given an acceptable margin of error and using PDFs, it calculates the probability
the actual rate of successful interactions with b lies within the margin of error about
b’s trust value and this is then used as the reliability of b’s trust values. Although
PDFs provides a sound theoretical foundation for calculating trust values and
their reliability, its dependence on binary rating systems signiﬁcantly hampers its
application in open MAS (because binary ratings are far more limited in terms of
their expressiveness compared to the other types of ratings).
Comparing the models reviewed above, Regret provides the most complete frame-
work for modelling interaction trust. It allows future adaptation to diﬀerent do-
mains (with a ﬂexible rating system), as well as providing facilities for combining
with other dimensions of trust (by providing a reliability measure). Hence, this
research will not devise a new model for interaction trust, but will reuse the inter-
action trust part of Regret (the subjective reputation, as termed by Sabater and
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2.3 Reputation
Reputation, as deﬁned in Section 2.1, is built on observations about an agent’s
past behaviours. In order to build up a reputation measure, an agent needs to
consult other agents in the society to collect their observations about the target
agent (i.e. the agent whose reputation is currently being evaluated). Here, the
observations are usually in the form of ratings, in which other agents in the society
show how they value an agent after an interaction. These valuations, after being
collected and properly aggregated, can be used to represent the reputation of other
individuals [Sabater and Sierra, 2001]. Hence, the main tasks of a reputation model
are to deﬁne how to collect observations about a speciﬁc agent from other agents in
a society, and how to combine them to represent the reputation of that agent such
that it is as close as possible to its actual trustworthiness.6 It should provide a
mechanism by which individual agents within their society can obtain information
about other agents without, or prior to, direct interaction.
Reputation and interaction trust have a close relationship. The interaction trust
that an agent places in another after an interaction is reﬂected by the correspond-
ing ratings of that agent. Since reputation of an agent is built based on the ob-
servations (i.e. ratings) of other agents, it can be said that the reputation of that
agent is built from the interaction trust it receives from other individuals in the
society (provided it is being reported accurately). On the other hand, interaction
trust between agents can be seen as reputation at the individual level (as is the
case with Regret). In the case that two agents have no previous experiences with
each other, thus they do not trust each other, reputation is a source of information
that can be used to establish the initial trust between them.
Similar to modelling interaction trust, modelling reputation has the following basic
problems that need to be addressed:
1. How to represent reputation?
2. How to gather observations about a speciﬁc agent?
3. How to aggregate the collected observations to represent the reputation of
that agent?
6Because each member in a society has a particular point of view, each member may record a
diﬀerent rating from the same interaction. This means that each agent has a diﬀerent perception
of the reputation of a given entity and, therefore, that reputation is linked to subjectivity [Sabater
and Sierra, 2001]. One of the goals of reputation models is to provide a reputation measure that
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The last two questions are the main research foci when modelling reputation.
Their issues will be presented in subsequent sections. Regarding the ﬁrst question,
most researchers tend to reuse the same representation as they used for trust (see
discussion in Section 2.2) for reputation. This makes it easier to combine direct
trust and reputation values later into a composite trust measure.
Since reputation is a social concept, besides the basic problems listed above, mod-
elling reputation often needs to obtain information about the relationships between
the involved agents. As there is no guarantee about the honesty of other agents
in providing observations, information about relationships often helps an agent to
evaluate the reliability of the observations that have been collected. Hence, the use
of social relationships in modelling reputation will also be outlined and reviewed
in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Collecting observations
Observations about an agent’s behaviours can only be obtained from those who
have had direct interactions with it (i.e. witnesses). Depending on a particular
model, an observation may be in one of the following forms:
1. Raw result of an interaction. This is the most basic and most useful form
of observation since the receiving agent will be able to make its own ratings
about the performance of the participating agents without being aﬀected by
the subjective view of the providing witness. However, in practice, it is not
widely used because it is not suitable when the nature of the interaction is
too complicated7 or when the witness—one of the participants—has privacy
concerns about disclosing raw results of its interactions.
2. Interaction trust value of the witness toward the target agent. This form
of observation provides the view of the witness on how the other agent will
perform. This is clearly subjective because other agents have no clue how
the interaction trust value of the witness is derived. However, it is still useful
in some cases when only simple opinions are needed. For example, in step 3
of the scenario in Section 1.2, James’ agent only asks for the general opinions
about some car retailers’ service, not details of the interactions with them.
7That is the case when the raw results contain a large set of data that is not relevant for per-
formance assessment; or other agents cannot make judgments from the provided results without
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3. Rating of an agent’s performance in a particular interaction. This is the
middle approach of the two forms of observations above. Though it is still
from the subjective view of the witnesses, it provides more information about
how the other agent performs in an interaction. For example, using the rating
system of Regret, an agent can learn about various aspects of an interaction.
In the example of Regret provided in Section 2.2, an agent can learn about
how the other agent performs in terms of the price, the quality of product,
and the delivery date of the same transaction. The witness can provide to
the evaluating agent several ratings of diﬀerent interactions with the target
agent, rather than only one trust value as in the second form of observation.
Each form of observation suits a speciﬁc type of application, depending on the level
of information required. However, in our opinion, the third form can suit a wider
range of applications as it provides richer information for reputation calculation.
Another reason in its favour is that it provides a level of abstraction over raw
interaction results, overcoming the possible limitations of raw results regarding
privacy and overly complicated data (as discussed in the ﬁrst point above). Thus,
given the diversity of agents in open MAS, we believe the third form is the most
suitable for a general trust model (Requirement R3). In addition, the rating
system of Regret, which is used for modelling interaction trust, can be reused for
exchanging observations in this research.
The next question is how to ﬁnd the right witnesses and collect their observations
about the target agent. There are a number of approaches to this problem:
• Centralised approach: Observations are reported and then stored in a central
database. The reputation system—usually the database itself—will use
information in the observation database to calculate the reputation of an
agent when asked. This approach is used in the reputation systems of online
auction sites, such as eBay8 and Amazon9, and SPORAS [Zacharia and Maes,
2000]. These reputation systems oﬀer a mechanism that allows their users
to rate each other’s general trustworthiness after a transaction and to report
the ratings to the systems. The reputation of a user is then updated by the
systems according to the new ratings. For example, eBay reputation is the
sum of all ratings a user has received in the last 6 months. SPORAS extends
the reputation model of eBay by introducing a new formula to calculate
8eBay site: www.ebay.com.
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the amount of change of the reputation value according to the new rating
value. It also devises a reliability measure for reputation values based on
rating values’ deviation (see Appendix A.1 for more details). However, the
centralised approach is not suitable for open MAS as the agents are typically
widely distributed. The cost of reporting ratings to a central database and
asking reputation information from it might therefore become a problem as
the number of agents become larger. Moreover, this approach assumes that
the rating (reputation) system is accepted and trusted by all the individuals
that join the system. This will not be the case in open MAS as there is
no ultimate authority for all agents. Thus, agents from various sources may
well question the trustworthiness of a reputation service and may not use it.
Hence, this approach cannot fulﬁll Requirement R2.
• Distributed approach: Observations are stored locally at the agent who makes
the observations. When an agent a wants to ﬁnd out about the reputation
of an agent b, it will look for agents that interacted with b (i.e. witnesses)
then ask them for their observations about b. The searching process used
is a distributed search through a’s neighbours, forming chains or a graph of
agents from a to b’s witnesses. The distributed approach overcomes the main
limitations of the centralised approach as they occur in distributed environ-
ments. Speciﬁcally, the task of calculating reputation is now carried out by
each individual. This provides a level of freedom to the agents in choosing
the method of calculating reputation which they believe will produce a re-
liable reputation measure. Besides collecting observations and calculating
reputation, each agent also chooses the witnesses by itself. This provides
more conﬁdence for each agent on the resulting reputation value compared
to the centralised approach. This approach is thus compatible with the
open MAS’s distributed and no central authority nature (Requirement R2).
Given the increasing popularity of environments modelled as open MAS,
most recent research on reputation adopts this approach for their reputation
models (e.g. [Mui et al., 2002], [Sabater and Sierra, 2002], [Yu and Singh,
2002]). However, a basic degree of cooperation in locating witnesses and
providing observations is still needed between agent a and other agents in
the process of a distributed search.
There is a variation of the distributed approach in which agent a only asks
its neighbours or friends about their general trust evaluations about b (e.g.
[Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 2000]). Hence, there is no distributed search
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this approach, the agents provide their general views about b, which are not
necessarily from direct interactions with it. In this case, the agents provid-
ing observations are sometimes called recommenders [Abdul-Rahman and
Hailes, 2000]. The problem with this variation is that an agent’s neighbours
may not have the information about the target agent b. Given the possibly
large number of agents in an open MAS, there is a high possibility that a
may not be able to ﬁnd any information about b if it does not perform a
distributed search. Thus, this variation is not suitable for an open MAS.
• Hybrid approach: As its name suggests, this approach is both centralised
and distributed in nature. More speciﬁcally, broker agents are used to pro-
vide reputation services. They centralise reputation information but are
distributed in a system. For example, the trust model by Jurca and Faltings
[2003] is one that follows this approach. It deﬁnes a set of broker agents
(called R-agents) to buy and sell reputation information. There are no syn-
chronisation requirements among diﬀerent R-agents. Hence, some R-agents
may possess more accurate information than others. Other agents have to
contact an R-agent to buy any reputation information they need. There-
fore, it is also necessary that they are equipped with an ability to learn
and value the service of R-agents to avoid bad ones (which appears similar
to interaction trust with R-agents). Although this approach is compatible
with distributed environments, there is still no guarantee on the quality of
service provided by R-agents. Other agents might suspect the objectiveness
of R-agents and refuse their reputation service. Moreover, the number of
agents in an open MAS may again cause a problem in ﬁnding R-agents that
have reputation information about the target agent b. The two shortcomings
mentioned make this approach unsuitable for open MAS.
The analysis of the approaches in this section has led to the following reﬁned list
of requirements which are derived from the requirement R2:
• R2a: Because of the no central authority nature of open MAS, in order
to have the necessary degree of conﬁdence in reputation values, each agent
should collect observations and calculate reputation values for itself.
• R2b: The trust model should be scalable to the large number of agents
that might be present in open MAS. The number of agents that the trust
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be equipped with a distributed search method that can locate witnesses
eﬀectively in possibly “large” agent societies.
For the above reasons, we will follow the distributed approach for collecting obser-
vations in open MAS. Among the models that adopt this approach, Regret and the
model of Mui et al. assume that the network (graph) of agents from the judging
agents to the witnesses is already available and just use this information in their
models. Thus, they do not show how the information can be obtained. Yu and
Singh [2003b] also follow this approach but they make an attempt to build a graph
of agents (called the referral network) to locate witnesses based on the expertise of
each agent in the graph. They develop a mechanism to locate information sources
(i.e. witnesses) based on individual agents’ knowledge and help (through each
agent’s contacts) without relying on a centralised service (see Sections 2.3.3 and
3.5 for more details). Hence, this approach is well suited for applications in an
open MAS which is distributed by nature. Due to the diversity and the distributed
nature of agents in open MAS, we believe that the task of locating witnesses should
be treated with more attention as it is an essential part in modelling reputation.
Therefore, we will survey the referral network introduced by Yu and Singh and its
applicability in locating witnesses and collect observations in open MAS.
2.3.2 Aggregating observations
After collecting observations about an agent, the next step is to calculate its
reputation from these observations. Because of the various forms of observation
and the various ways of collecting them, there are a similarly large set of methods
for aggregating the observations that have been collected. However, since the
distributed approach (in the previous section) has been chosen for the reputation
model of this research, we will limit our discussion to those methods that are used
for the distributed approach.
The simplest way is averaging all the observations (e.g. [Schillo et al., 2000]),
or better, averaging the observations weighted by the relevance/reliability of the
observations’ sources (e.g. [Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 2000], [Mui et al., 2002],
[Sabater and Sierra, 2002]). In [Abdul-Rahman and Hailes, 2000], for example,
an agent assigns weights according to the trust it places upon the sources (recom-
menders). In [Mui et al., 2002], as each observation belongs to a chain of agents
(see Figure 2.2) from agent a to a witness of agent b, Mui calculates the weight of
an observation by taking the product of all the weights of each link in the chain.Chapter 2 Trust and Reputation in Agent Systems 30







Figure 2.2: The chains of agents to witnesses in Mui’s model.
reliability measure of the link where wxy is equal to 1 if the number of encounters
between x and y exceeds a deﬁned threshold m. Otherwise wxy is the proportion
of that number to m. The Regret model takes a diﬀerent approach using fuzzy
rules to determine the weight based on the social relationship between b and the
witness (w). For example, a possible rule would be: ‘If the level of cooperation
between w and b is high then the trustworthiness of the information coming from
w related to b is very bad’ because b may be able to aﬀect w’s ratings. This ap-
proach requires modelling the social relationships (see Section 2.3.3) of the agents
involved in reputation calculations.
In the work presented above, weights are chosen to reﬂect the inﬂuence of each
witness on the ﬁnal reputation of the target agent. Obviously, the reliability
(i.e. honesty, completeness) of observations is an important factor that aﬀects the
reliability of the aggregated reputation value. However, none of the methods of
selecting weights above has been proved to be better than the others. Therefore,
further empirical study is needed to evaluate the performance of each method.
Intuitively, the method of Mui et al., which is based solely on the number of
encounters, is too simple. In our opinion, the reliability of a witness should be
based on additional factors, such as the witness’s trustworthiness in providing
observations, or the social relationships between the witness and the target agent
(as suggested by Abdul-Rahman and Hailes and Sabater and Sierra respectively).
Given its inﬂuence on the eﬀectiveness of the reputation model being devised, we
believe that the issue of selecting weights for the observations collected needs more
careful study.
In contrast to other models, the model of Yu and Singh [2002] uses the Dempster-
Shafer theory [Kyburg, 1987] to model trust. The main beneﬁt of this theory is
that it can model the case of uncertainty. Following Marsh [1994], their model
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lating the trustworthiness of b, performance ratings from direct interactions with
b are categorised into trust, distrust, and uncertainty based on the two thresh-
olds; and then are used to calculate the probabilities of the trust, distrust, and
uncertain belief about b. These three probabilities, whose sum is 1, will be used
as an observation about b (observations in the form of interaction trust—see Sec-
tion 2.3.1). Such observations are collected from witnesses and combined with
the current beliefs of a about b into a new set of beliefs of a using Dempster’s
rule of combination. Then the diﬀerence in trust and distrust beliefs about b is
used as its reputation value. While Yu and Singh claim that this approach, which
handles the case of uncertainty explicitly, is better than using a scalar value for an
agent’s belief, there is no apparent improvement in terms of the reliability of the
reputation value calculated. Thus, in their paper [Yu and Singh, 2002], there is no
evidence presented about the advantages of their method compared to others. In
another aspect, their method is much more complex than those presented above; it
also requires that observations be in the form of interacting trust, which provides
less information than the two other forms of observations. Thus, we believe that
there is no reason to use the Dempster-Shafer theory for aggregating observations.
In summary, we choose weighted mean of observations as our method of aggre-
gating observations. However, focus should be placed on how the weights can be
chosen to reﬂect the reliability of each observation.
2.3.3 Social relationships in modelling reputation
Since reputation is a social concept, social relationships are also one of the factors
that aﬀect an agent’s reputation. For example, the fact that an agent belongs
to a government oﬃce may imply high trustworthiness of the information that it
provides. As seen above in Regret, the nature of the social relationship between
agents can be used to determine the reliability of reported observations. In ad-
dition, being equipped with an eﬀective method to model the social relationships
between individuals, an agent can ﬁnd witnesses quicker (as in the case of Yu and
Singh’s referral network described below). Hence, studying social relationships of
agents is needed to make a reputation model more eﬀective.
In recent work (e.g. [Mui et al., 2002], [Sabater and Sierra, 2002], [Yu and Singh,
2003b]), social relationships are usually captured in a graph where its nodes denote
the agents and the edges denote the social relationships between them. Attributes
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of the corresponding relationships (e.g. cooperation, competition). Such a graph
is called a social network or sociogram [Sabater and Sierra, 2002]. As discussed in
Section 2.2, there are two main types of relationships in open MAS: role-base rela-
tionships and relationships emerging from direct interactions between two agents.
Some of the former are assigned to an agent by its owner or designer. They may
reﬂect the initial roles, position, or membership of an agent in an organisation (e.g.
company employee, or friend relationships). This type of relationship usually gives
an agent an initial image of the society that it is about to join which, in turn, lets
it know who it can trust initially. The latter type of relationship appears when an
agent interacts with other agents in its society. Regular interactions between two
agents can reﬂect a close relationship (e.g. a regular buyer). Relationships of this
type can be selected to extend the initial social structure of role-based relation-
ships. The more information an agent’s social structure stores, the more the agent
has learned about its environment, and the more useful it is when the agent comes
to the questions such as who to trust (e.g. organisational relationships) and who
to ask for recommendations (e.g. agents that have interacted with many others).
There are several researchers who have studied social relationships and how to
use them in modelling trust. Sabater and Sierra use a social structure (called
a sociogram) to identify witnesses in calculating reputation. They also use the
information about the nature of the relationship between a witness and the agent
being considered in the social structure to determine the possibility of lying, and
thus, the reliability of the information provided from that witness. However, they
assume that each agent already has a social network about other agents and they
did not show how such social network can be obtained. Yu and Singh propose
a method of representing a social network (based on their referral network) and
provide techniques to gather information through the network. In more detail,
in this system, agents cooperate by giving, pursuing, and evaluating referrals (a
recommendation to contact another agent). Each agent in the system maintains
a list of acquaintances (other agents that it knows) and their expertise. Thus,
when looking for a certain piece of information, an agent can send the query to a
number of its acquaintances who will try to answer the query if possible or, if they
cannot, they will send back referrals pointing to other agents that they believe
are likely to have the desired information (based on those agents’ expertise). Yu
and Singh’s referral system uses a vector space model [Salton and McGill, 1983]
to model agents’ expertise. An agent’s expertise is then used to determine how
likely it is to have interaction with or to know witnesses of the target agent. The
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network and update its knowledge about the expertise of unknown agents.
2.4 Generic Issues of a Trust Model
Besides the basic issues of building an interaction trust measure and a reputa-
tion measure presented in the previous sections (Sections 2.2 and 2.3), there are a
number of generic issues that can aﬀect the performance of a trust model. These
include: bootstrapping, dynamism in open MAS, inaccurate reports, and corre-
lated evidence. They are going to be discussed in turn in subsequent subsections
(Sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.4).
2.4.1 Bootstrapping
Newly joined agents who have no acquaintances will face various diﬃculties in join-
ing the community. Typically, a new agent should have an initial set of contacts
to establish its ﬁrst interactions, as well as to collect reputation information about
some initial potential partners. In addition, new agents may ﬁnd themselves not
accepted by some service providers because of their low initial reputation. How-
ever, this problem is ignored in most of the research in this area. We believe that
solving the bootstrapping issue is necessary so that agents will be able to make
use of a trust model in any situations (desideratum R1). Therefore, we add a new
requirement for our trust model:
R1a: The trust model should be able to deal with the bootstrapping issue of
newly joined agents.
2.4.2 Dynamism in open MAS
As discussed Section 1.1, due to its openness, the environment in an open MAS
will change continually. Possible types of changes include:
• The agent population. Existing agents leave the environment and new ones
join on a continual basis. This means that an agent might have to repeatedly
learn about new agents since its previous interaction partners may no longer
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• Agent behaviour. Since agents are owned by diﬀerent stakeholders, their goals
and motivations may change over time. In addition, an agent’s situation may
also change. Now all of these will result in agents’ changing their behaviours.
For example, an honest agent may become a liar, or an agent may reduce its
service quality due to less resources available to it.
• Relationships between agents. Agents may break old relationships and make
new ones depending on their situations and needs. For example, virtual
organisations can be automatically formed or disbanded according to the
participants’ capabilities and goals [Norman et al., 2004]. Hence, the rela-
tionships, and thus the trust, between them are also changed over time.
Given such a wide range of changes that can happen in an open MAS, a trust
model for such an environment should reasonably maintain its normal eﬀective
operations under these types of changes. However, none of the existing trust
models explicitly take such dynamism into account and none of them has been
demonstrated to cope well with it. Therefore, in order for a trust model to be
suitable for open MAS (Requirement R2), it should reasonably maintain its normal
eﬀective operations in situations where various changes in an open MAS take place
(here called Requirement R2c).
2.4.3 Inaccurate reports
As agents in open MAS are self-interested, they may lie when being asked for
their observations if they can gain some beneﬁts from so doing (see [Schillo et al.,
2000] for an example). In an attempt to solve this problem, the model of Schillo
et al. shows how witness information can be reliably used to reason eﬀectively
against lying. However, the model greatly simpliﬁes direct interactions (e.g. coop-
erate/defect in the disclosed Prisoner’s Dilemma), thus, it is not useful in realistic
settings.
To help overcome this problem, Jurca and Faltings [2003] presented a model in
which agents pay for reputation information. When an agent needs to ﬁnd rep-
utation information, it contacts an R-agent to buy the information. Agents also
receive money when reporting their observations to R-agents, but only after the
veriﬁcation of their reports. In this context, a mechanism is devised to determine
the speciﬁc amount for each payment so that the agents that report truthfully will
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will gradually lose their money until they do not have enough to buy reputation
information. This mechanism makes it rational for an agent to report its obser-
vations honestly. However, the idea of side payment may not be feasible in an
open MAS. For example, in order to have the rational property mentioned above,
the model of Jurca and Faltings requires that the currency for side payment is
unexchangeable with the currency used in ordinary transactions. In open MAS,
devising a new currency system that is diﬀerent from the traditional ones, to be
accepted by the agents from various origins is not practical.
Regret uses fuzzy rules to classify the reliability of the witnesses based on their
relationships with the target agent (see Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3). In this
way, they also take into account the possibility of a witness lying based on fuzzy
rules. However, this approach is a preventive measure and is based on social
information, which is not always available in every situation. In our opinion, the
trustworthiness of a witness in reporting its observations should also be taken
into account. The reason for this is that the experiences with the witness (i.e.
interaction trust) or the relationships between the witness and the collecting agent
(i.e. role-based trust) are more reliable than social information.
In order to determine the accuracy of third-party ratings, Whitby et al. [2004]
assume that the “true” rating of an agent is deﬁned by the majority’s opinions.
In particular, they model the performance of an agent as a beta PDF which is
aggregated from all witness ratings received. Then a witness is considered unre-
liable and ﬁltered out when the reputation derived from its ratings is judged to
be too diﬀerent from the majority’s (by comparing the reputation value with the
PDF). Since this method bases it decisions entirely on PDFs of witness reports,
if these reports are scarce and/or too diverse it will not be able to recognise lying
witnesses. Moreover, it is possible that a witness can lie in a small proportion
of their reports without being ﬁltered out. To rectify this, TRAVOS provides a
probabilistic method for ﬁltering out the opinions of inaccurate reputation sources.
Reputation is shared in the form of frequencies of successful and unsuccessful con-
tracts that the reputation source has had with the trustee, which after interacting
with the trustee itself, the truster compares with its own observations. By this
means, the truster calculates the probability that the reputation source’s informa-
tion supports the true behaviour of the trustee within a reasonable margin of error,
and uses this probability to weight the impact of the reputation source’s opinions
on future decisions made be the truster. However, TRAVOS’s dependence on its
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Yu and Singh propose a similar approach to that of Whitby et al. Speciﬁcally, they
use a weighted majority algorithm to adjust the weight for each witness over time.
Although the weights of the deceitful agents are reduced, these agents are never
disregarded completely. Several successful applications of this approach have been
demonstrated, but only for agent populations where deceitful agents are in the
minority and are balanced between agents that falsely exaggerate their friends’
performance and those that defame other agents.
In summary, all the proposed approaches above are limited in that they require
additional domain knowledge or make unrealistic assumptions about the environ-
ment. In order to fulﬁll the Requirement R4 of robustness, an eﬀective mechanism
is needed to deal with inaccuracy reports (here called Requirement R4a).
2.4.4 Correlated evidence
This problem happens when the opinions of diﬀerent witnesses are based on the
same event or when there is a considerable amount of information shared among
a group of agents that make their opinions similar to each other. In both cases,
the reliability of the information should not be as high as the number of similar
opinions suggests [Sabater and Sierra, 2002]. Sabater and Sierra use graph anal-
ysis techniques to address this issue. The process starts with identifying graph
components of a domain dependent sociogram. Then an agent in each component
will be selected to be the representative agent for all agents in the component.
Witnesses will be selected from those representative agents only. However, a node
that deems to be representative for a component in a sociogram is not necessarily
able to give a full witness’ account for all the agents in the component and, there-
fore, choosing only one agents from those in a component may discard possible
unique witness reports of the rest. Moreover, the approach is based on heuristics
and there is no empirical result presented to show its capabilities. The problem
of correlated evidence aﬀects the eﬃciency and robustness of a reputation model
and should be dealt with (here called the requirement R4b).Chapter 2 Trust and Reputation in Agent Systems 37
Requirements
R1 The trust model should be able to provide an eﬀective trust
measure that can
R1a deal with the bootstrapping issue of newly joined agents.
R1b make use of role-based trust, interaction trust, and wit-
ness reputation when the required information for these
dimensions of trust is available.
R2 The trust model should be suitable for open MAS. In particu-
lar,
R2a each agent should be able to collect observations and cal-
culate the reputation values by itself.
R2b the trust model should be scalable to a large number of
agents that might be present in open MAS.
R2c the trust model should reasonably maintain its normal
eﬀective operation in situations where there are various
changes in its environment.
R3 The trust model should be adaptable to diﬀerent domains of
applications that an open MAS may have.
R4 The trust model should be robust against
R4a possible lying from agents.
R4b the correlated evidence problem.
Table 2.1: The requirements for a trust model in open MAS.
2.5 Requirements for Trust and Reputation Sys-
tems in Open MAS
In the previous sections, it has been shown that a composite trust measure can
be built from a number of trust measures: role-based trust, interaction trust, and
reputation from witnesses (here called witness reputation from now on). However,
the information required for each type of trust might not all be available at the
same time. Therefore, we believe all three types of trust should be modelled so
that an agent can have a trust measure in all situations (Requirement R1). This
is speciﬁed in a new requirement:
R1b: The trust model should be able to make use of role-based trust, interaction
trust, and reputation when the required information for these dimensions of trust
is available.
Through reviewing the current trust/reputation model, we have identiﬁed a num-
ber of core issues in building a trust model for open MAS. In order to address
these issues, our original requirements (Section 1.3) have been reﬁned into more
speciﬁc ones. These are summarised in Table 2.1. In order to provide an overviewChapter 2 Trust and Reputation in Agent Systems 38
of the trust models reviewed in this chapter, a comparison of them against our
reﬁned requirements is presented in Table 2.2.
The meanings of the symbols used in the Table 2.2 are as follows:
• Empty box: the model does not satisfy the corresponding requirement.
• −: the model attempts to solve the related problem(s) and has partly satis-
ﬁed the corresponding requirements.
• +: the model satisﬁed the corresponding requirements.
• N/A: the corresponding requirement is not applicable.
Other notes for Table 2.2:
• The requirement R1b is split in the three dimensions of trust (i.e. role-based,
interaction trust, and witness reputation). In order to satisfy this require-
ment in each dimension, a trust model has to implement the corresponding
trust component and provide a reliability measure for the corresponding
trust measure. The reliability measure is needed for combining that trust
measure with the others.
• An empty box in the column of R2b means that the corresponding model
provides no proof nor evidence about its scalability; and/or the number of
agents that was run in the empirical study was small (e.g. 100 agents as in
Yu and Singh [2002]).
As we can see from Table 2.2, Regret is the only model that provides an Interaction
Trust component and satisﬁes the requirement about adaptivity in open MAS
(R3). Therefore, the interaction trust component of Regret will be reused in
FIRE with minor adaptations so that it can be ﬁt with the other trust components.
Hence, FIRE will also inherit the rating system with the rich semantics of Regret.
It then allows adaptivity in the other trust dimensions, as well by oﬀering the same
rich semantics for sharing ratings and modelling complex trust contexts based on
ontologies.
With respect to the witness reputation dimension, none of the models reviewed
fully meets the requirements for a trust model in an open MAS. This analysis
suggests the following issues that need to be addressed in this research:Chapter 2 Trust and Reputation in Agent Systems 39
• R1a: The bootstrapping issue.
• R2a: Most of the current witness reputation models show how agents can
calculate a reputation measure from the observations collected from wit-
nesses. However, it is not clear how agents can locate the right witnesses
in a distributed and open environment (such as an open MAS) except for
the model of Yu and Singh. Therefore, their the referral network (see Sec-
tion 2.3.3) will be used in this work as the method to ﬁnd the needed wit-
nesses.
• R2b: The scalability of the trust model in an open MAS.
• R2c: The ability of the trust model to cope with the dynamism of an open
MAS.
• R4a and R4b: The problems of lying and correlated evidence.
Against this background, we developed FIRE to address the remaining issues and
to satisfy the requirements for a trust model in open MAS. The next chapter
presents FIRE and discusses its various design decisions. In particular, it deals
with Requirements R1a, R2a, R2b, R2c, and R4b. The problem of lying (Re-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter formalises the basic FIRE model of trust and reputation developed
in this research. This basic model is then subsequently extended in Chapter 6
to deal with situations in which witnesses produce inaccurate reports about the
behaviour of agents (either because they have a diﬀerent perspective or because
they seek to gain a strategic advantage by so doing). Chapter 7 further extends
FIRE by making a number of its parameters adaptive to various changes in the
environment.
In more detail, this chapter is organised as follows. First, it discusses various
sources of trust information and how they can complement one another in produc-
ing a comprehensive trust measure, especially when some of them can be missing
or anomalous (Section 3.1). Then Section 3.2 shows how a trust value is calculated
from a set of evidence (i.e. ratings). Sections 3.3 to 3.6 present, in turn, the four
components of FIRE—Interaction Trust, Role-based Trust, Witness Reputation,
and Certiﬁed Reputation. Section 3.7 shows how trust values produced by these
components can be combined into a single overall measure. Finally, a summary of
the chapter is provided in Section 3.8.
3.1 Sources of Trust Information
As can be seen in the previous chapter, trust can come from a number of informa-
tion sources: direct experience, witness information, rules or policies. However,
due to the openness of a MAS, the level of knowledge of an agent about its envi-
ronment and its peers is likely to vary greatly during its life cycle. Therefore, at
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a given time, some information sources may not be available, or adequate, for de-
ducing trust. For example, the following situations may (independently) happen:
• An agent may never have interacted with a given target agent and, hence,
its experience cannot be used to deduce how trustworthy/reliable the target
agent is.
• An agent may not be able to locate any witness of the target agent (because
of a lack of knowledge about the target agent’s society) and, therefore, it
cannot obtain witness information about that agent’s behaviours.
• None of the current set of rules to determine the level of trust matches the
role of this particular target agent.
In such scenarios, trust models that use only one source of information will fail to
provide a trust value of the target agent. For that reason, FIRE adopts a broader
base of information than has hitherto been used for providing trust-related infor-
mation. Although the number of sources that provide trust-related information
can vary greatly from application to application, we consider that most of them
can be categorised into the four main sources as follows:
• Direct experience: The evaluator uses its previous experiences in interacting
with the target agent to determine its trustworthiness. This type of trust is
called Interaction Trust.
• Witness information: Assuming that agents are willing to share their direct
experiences, the evaluator can collect the experiences of other agents that
interacted with the target agent. Such information will be used to derive
the trustworthiness of the target agent based on the views of its witnesses.
Hence this type of trust is called Witness Reputation.
• Role-based rules: Besides an agent’s past behaviours (which are used in the
two previous types of trust), there are certain types of information that can
be used to deduce trust. These can be the various relationships between
the evaluator and the target agent or its knowledge about its domain (e.g.
norms, or the legal system in eﬀect). For example, an agent may be preset
to trust any other agent that is owned, or certiﬁed, by its owner; it may trust
that any authorised dealer will sell products complying to their company’s
standards; or it may trust another agent if it is a member of a trustworthyChapter 3 The FIRE Model 43
group1. Such settings or beliefs (which are mostly domain-speciﬁc) can be
captured by rules based on the roles of the evaluator and the target agent to
assign a predetermined trustworthiness to the target agent. Hence this type
of trust is called Role-based Trust.
• Third-party references provided by the target agents: In the previous cases,
the evaluator needs to collect the required information itself. However, the
target agent can also actively seek the trust of the evaluator by presenting
arguments about its trustworthiness. In our model, such arguments are
references produced by the agents that have interacted with the target agents
certifying its behaviours2. However, in contrast to witness information which
needs to be collected by the evaluator, the target agent stores and provides
such certiﬁed references on request to gain the trust of the evaluator. Those
references can be obtained by the target agent (assuming the cooperation
of its partners) from only a few interactions, thus, they are usually readily
available. This type of trust is called Certiﬁed Reputation.
Now FIRE integrates all four sources of information and is able to provide trust
metrics in a wide variety of situations. Certiﬁed Reputation, in particular, greatly
enhances FIRE in this respect since the evaluator does not have to obtain this type
of information itself (as is the case with other types of trust). Hence, the addition
of Certiﬁed Reputation decreases the possibility that the evaluator fails to evaluate
the trustworthiness of the target agent due to a lack of information. Our working
hypothesis here is that integrating these various sources will also enhance the
usefulness of the trust model. This will be veriﬁed subsequently in our empirical
evaluation (see Chapter 5). Speciﬁcally, each type of trust information is processed
by a particular component of FIRE: Interaction Trust (IT), Witness Reputation
(WR), Role-based Trust (RT), and Certiﬁed Reputation (CR) components; and
the resulting trust values are combined into an overall trust value (see Section 3.7)
to beneﬁt from all the available information.
It should be noted that the WR and CR components depend on third-party infor-
mation (witness experiences and references) and, therefore, they are susceptible
1This belief is similar to the neighbourhood reputation in Regret, which calculates the repu-
tation of an agent from the reputation of the agents that it is connected to.
2The arguments can also be the target agent’s identity, its certiﬁcations (e.g. ‘authorised
dealer’, performance awards), its sources of products (to guarantee their quality), and so on.
However, deducing trust (or the expected performance) of the target agent from such information
requires knowledge about the application domain. This is dealt with in Role-based Trust based
on rules encoding an agent’s beliefs. Therefore, we only consider third-party references here
because they can be quantiﬁed and computationally aggregated in a standardised way as we
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to unreliable information. Since agents in an open MAS are self-interested, they
may provide false ratings to gain unwarranted trust for their partners. However,
in this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, the basic FIRE model is presented with
the temporary assumption that all agents are honest in exchanging information.
Although this is unrealistic for an open MAS, our aim now is to ascertain that
our philosophy and trust components are actually eﬀective before extending them
to more complex scenarios later in this thesis. Speciﬁcally, the problem of various
sorts of disinformation in reporting ratings are considered and dealt with in Chap-
ter 6, where FIRE is extended to detect and ﬁlter out unreliable reports. Hence,
in addition to the characteristics of an open MAS, we have made a number of
assumptions about the agents and their environment. Before going on to discuss
FIRE, we state these assumptions:
Assumption 1 Agents are willing to share their experiences with others (as wit-
nesses or as referees).
Assumption 2 Agents are honest in exchanging information with one another.
In FIRE, except for the RT component which deduces trust based on rules, the
other components deduce trust from information about the target agent’s be-
haviour. Here we use ratings to capture this type of information. Speciﬁcally,
then, a rating is the evaluation about an agent’s performance given by its partner
in an interaction between them. For instance, consider an example where agent
a subscribes to a news service provided by agent b. Each time a receives a piece
of news from b, it can evaluate the news provided in terms of topicality, quality,
and honesty. From its evaluation, agent a may give ratings about agent b’s ser-
vice in those terms for that particular interaction. Ratings are thus tuples in the
following form: r = (a,b,c,i,v), where a and b are the agents that participated in
the interaction i, and v is the rating value a gave b for the term c (e.g. topicality,
quality, honesty). The range of v is [−1,+1], where −1 means absolutely negative,
+1 means absolutely positive, and 0 means neutral.
Each time agent a gives a rating, it will be stored in the agent’s local rating
database. Ratings in this database will be retrieved when needed for trust evalua-
tion or for sharing with other agents. However, an agent does not need to store all
ratings it makes. As the environment of an open MAS is dynamic, old ratings usu-
ally become out-of-date due to changes in the environment. In addition, since each
agent has limited resource (i.e. memory), storing all ratings about various agents
is not necessarily an option. Therefore, each agent will only store at maximum theChapter 3 The FIRE Model 45
H latest ratings given to another agent. Here H is called the rating history size.
This parameter is adjustable according to a particular agent’s situation.
3.2 Trust Formula
In order to calculate the trust value of a target agent, the components of FIRE will
have to collect relevant ratings about that agent’s past behaviour. The subsequent
sections will deﬁne how and which ratings are collected by each component. This
section describes how the set of ratings each component collects is used to estimate
the target agent’s future behaviour, or more speciﬁcally, the expected rating value
that agent is likely to receive in a future interaction. It is also viewed as the target
agent’s trust value. Now, a common way to estimate that value is to calculate it
as the arithmetic mean of all the rating values in the set. However, these ratings
are usually not equally relevant when estimating the expected rating value. For
example, some ratings may be older than others and, thus, are deemed to be out-
of-date; some may come from a more reliable source that suggests a higher level
of credibility compared to others. Therefore, we devise a rating weight function
ωK for each component of FIRE3 which calculates the relevance of each given
rating. K is thus one of I, R, W, and C standing for interaction trust, role-based
trust, witness reputation, and certiﬁed reputation respectively. Then instead of
considering all ratings equally, the trust value is calculated as the weighted mean








where TK(a,b,c) is the trust value that agent a has in agent b with respect to term
c, which is calculated by the component K; RK(a,b,c) is the set of ratings collected
by component K for calculating TK(a,b,c); ωK(ri) is the rating weight function that
calculates the relevance or the reliability of the rating ri (ωK(ri) ≥ 0); and vi is
the value of the rating ri. In short, the trust value is calculated as the sum of all
the available ratings weighted by the rating relevance and normalised to the range
of [−1,1] (by dividing the sum by the sum of all the weights). The rating weight
3Since each component of FIRE collects ratings from a diﬀerent source, it also needs a diﬀerent
way to calculate the relevancy of ratings. For example, the WR component may have information
about witness credibility to take into account when weighing ratings, while this information is
not relevant to the IT or RT components.
4We choose the weighted mean method here because it allows us to take the relevance of each
rating into account. Other aggregation methods could equally well be used if desired.Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 46
function ωK(ri) is later deﬁned for each component.
As we have discussed, the trust value given above lets an agent know the expected
performance of the target agent. However, the trust value alone is not very useful
for making task delegation decisions. For example, a trust value of +1 calculated
from only 1 rating or from 10 ratings may have diﬀerent eﬀects on an agent’s
decision. Therefore, an agent usually also needs to know how likely it is that the
target agent will perform at that expected performance (similar to the expected
value and deviation measures in statistics). In other words, apart from the trust
value, its reliability should also be provided by a trust model. Here, we deﬁne
a reliability measure that reﬂects the conﬁdence of the trust model in producing
each trust value given the data it took into account. This is given in the form of
a reliability value that ranges in [0,1], where 0 represents complete uncertainty
and 1 total conﬁdence. The reliability value is given based on the two following
measures:
• Rating reliability: Since the rating weight function ωK gives us the rele-
vancy—in other words, the quality or the reliability—of each rating taken
into account, the sum of all rating weights reﬂects the reliability of the rat-
ing set taken into account in computing TK(a,b,c) in Equation 3.1 above.
Therefore, we devise a rating reliability measure based on this sum:




where ρRK(a,b,c) is the reliability value of the rating set RK(a,b,c) and γK
is a parameter used to adjust the slope of the reliability function to suit
the rating weight function of each component (see Figure 3.1). Since each
component has its own rating weight function, it also has a rating reliability
function of its own—ρRK. As above, K is one of I, R, W, and C. R in
ρRK stands for ‘rating reliability’. Intuitively, the rating reliability should
increase proportionally to the sum of the rating weights. However, since
this sum is not limited, we choose the (increasing) function 1−e−x in order
that the resulting reliability value is limited in [0,1]. This normalisation is
required because the trust and reliability values of FIRE’s components will
be combined later on in Section 3.7. Moreover, since each rating weight
function is deﬁned diﬀerently and may have a diﬀerent range to that of
another component’s weight function, the parameter γK is introduced in
order to adjust the rate of the rating reliability (Equation 3.2) according
to each rating weight function’s range. This means the rating reliabilityChapter 3 The FIRE Model 47
















Figure 3.1: Rating reliability function ρRK (a,b,c)
function ρRK (a,b,c) gradually increases from 0 (the lowest reliability) to 1
(the highest reliability) when the sum of rating weights increases from 0 to
+∞.
• Deviation reliability: The greater the variability in an agent’s past behaviour
(which is reﬂected by its rating values), the more volatile it is likely to behave
in future interactions. Therefore, the deviation in the rating values is also a
metric that reﬂects a trust value’s reliability:









where ρDK(a,b,c) is the deviation reliability value of the trust value TK(a,b,c).
Here, D in ρDK stands for ‘deviation’. Basically, Equation 3.3 calculates
the deviation of ratings’ values in the set of ratings RK(a,b,c) around the
‘expected’ value (i.e. the trust value); the calculated deviation is then nor-
malised to [0,1]. Intuitively, when there is no deviation in the rating’s value
(i.e. the target agent performs consistently), the deviation reliability is 1
(i.e. the most reliable); and it decreases proportionally to 0 (i.e. the least
reliable) when the deviation increases.
In order to take both of these reliability factors above into account, the relia-
bility value of the produced trust value, denoted by ρK(a,b,c), is deﬁned as the
combination of the rating reliability and the deviation reliability measures:
ρK(a,b,c) = ρRK(a,b,c) · ρDK(a,b,c) (3.4)Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 48
3.3 Interaction Trust
As introduced in Section 3.1, Interaction Trust is built from the direct experience
of an agent. It models the trust that ensues from the direct interactions between
two agents. Here we simply exploit the direct trust component of Regret (see
Appendix A.2) since this meets all our requirements for dealing with direct ex-
periences. In more detail, each agent rates its partner’s performance after every
transaction and stores its ratings in a local rating database. When calculating the
IT value for agent b with respect to term c, agent a has to query its database for
all the ratings that have the form (a,b,c, , ), where the ‘ ’ symbol can be replaced
by any value. We call the set of those ratings RI(a,b,c).
Since older ratings may become out-of-date quickly, we use recency of the ratings
as a rating weight function to give recent, and likely more up to date, ratings
more weight than older ratings in IT evaluation. However, as pointed out in Ap-
pendix A.2, Regret’s method of calculating rating recency has several undesirable
characteristics. Therefore, we devise a new rating recency function based on the
time diﬀerence between the current time and the rating time since this metric
reﬂects precisely how old (i.e. how recent) a rating is. In order to make our rating
recency function adjustable to suit the time granularity in diﬀerent applications,
the parameter λ, called the recency scaling factor, is introduced in the function (to
scale time values). Our rating recency function, which is also used as the rating





where ωI(ri) is the weight for the rating ri (used in Equation 3.1) and ∆t(ri)
is the time diﬀerence between the current time and the time when the rating
ri is recorded. In our model, analogously to human perception, we view the
time diﬀerence of two recent events as more signiﬁcant than the same one of two
older events (see Footnote 2, page 133 for an example). Hence, the exponential
function above is chosen for rating recency because its shape over time ﬁts our
view on how the recency of ratings should aﬀect an agent’s decision about trust
(see Figure 3.2). Our intuition is that new ratings are deemed to reﬂect the
target agent’s current performance more accurately than old ratings, and our
recency function here is to help FIRE adapt quickly to any changes in that agent’s
performance. In Equation 3.5, the parameter λ is hand-picked for a particular
application depending on the time unit used. For instance, if the time unit used
is day and we want a rating obtained ﬁve days earlier to only have half the eﬀectChapter 3 The FIRE Model 49





















Figure 3.2: Rating weight function of interaction trust component.
of a new rating obtained today (i.e. rating weights of 0.5 and 1 respectively;
∆t(ri) = 5) then λ = − 5
ln(0.5).
Given the rating set RI(a,b,c) and the rating weight function ωI(ri) as speciﬁed
above, the IT value TI(a,b,c) and its reliability ρI(a,b,c) are calculated using the
general trust formula as deﬁned in Equations 3.1 and 3.4 (Section 3.2).
3.4 Role-Based Trust
Role-based trust models the trust resulting from the role-based relationships be-
tween two agents (e.g. owned by the same company, a service provider and its
registered user, friendship relationship between their owners). Since there is no
general method for computationally quantifying trust based on this type of rela-
tionship, we use rules to assign RT values. As previously discussed, those rules are
used to encode knowledge about the trust dynamics in the application domain.
Therefore, they are usually domain-speciﬁc and must be speciﬁed by an agent’s de-
signer or its owner. In other words, this component provides the means of adapting
FIRE to a particular environment and, thus, making it perform better in that en-
vironment. Here, rules are tuples of the following form: rul = (rolea,roleb,c,e,v),
which describes a rule that if rolea and roleb are the roles of agent a and b re-
spectively, then the expected performance of b with respect to the term c in an
interaction with a is v (v ∈ [−1,1]); e ∈ [0,1] is the level of inﬂuence of this rule on
the resulting RT value or the belief strength of agent a on the rule. For example,
possible rules may be:
rul1 = (buyer,seller,quality,0.3,−0.2),
rul2 = ( ,government-seller,quality,0.8,0.0),
rul3 = ( ,team-mate,honesty,1.0,1.0).Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 50
Thus, rul1 expresses an agent’s belief that an ordinary seller will usually sell a
product of slightly lower quality than agreed, but the reliability of this belief is
low (0.3); rul2 expresses a stronger belief that an agent can expect a governmental
seller to do what is agreed in terms of product quality; and rul3 tells an agent to
expect total honesty from its team mate (e.g. agents of the same owner). Here,
rul1 and rul2 encode norms of the environment, while rul3 is the belief based on
an arrangement between agents. Such rules are given to the agent by its owner.
Additional rules can naturally be added during an agent’s life cycle.
Each agent has its own set of rules which are stored in a (local) rule database. In
order to determine the RT of agent b with respect to term c, agent a looks up the
relevant rules from its rule database. We call the set of those rules RR(a,b,c). Since
the form of a rule is very analogous to that of a rating, the general trust formula in
Equation 3.1 can be used to calculate the RT of b, which is denoted by TR(a,b,c),
from this set. Here, the level of inﬂuence of each rule is used as the weight for that
rule: ωR(ri) = ei. Therefore, it should be noted that in case there exist conﬂicts
in the applicable rules (i.e. contradicting expected performance values), all these
rules will be taken into account but the deviation measure reliability (ρDK) of the
resulting trust value will be low (because of the high deviation of the rules used).
This, in turn, will result in a low reliability of the RT trust value, which shows
that the RT trust value has a low predictive power and so it will be weighted
accordingly in calculating the overall trust value (see Section 3.7).
3.5 Witness Reputation
The witness reputation of a target agent b is built on observations about its be-
haviour by other agents (witnesses). In order to evaluate the WR of b, an agent a
needs to ﬁnd the witnesses that have interacted with b. Here, it is assumed that
agents in open MAS are willing to share ratings that they made and to help others
search for witnesses. In order to ﬁnd relevant witnesses, we implement a variant of
Yu and Singh’s referral system without using the VSM model5. Instead, our sys-
tem assumes that each agent has a measure of the degree of likeliness with which
an agent can fulﬁl an information query about witness information and witness
5As pointed out in Yolum and Singh [2004], the VSM model does not support hierarchy
in expertise types, which can be better represented by service graphs. In this respect (i.e.
modelling expertise), there is no universal model for all applications. Therefore, we leave the
choice of expertise model to end users as they can evaluate which method is best suited to their
particular applications.Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 51
locating. This measure needs to be deﬁned in an application speciﬁc manner. For
example, in our testbed (described in Chapter 4), an agent is assumed to know lo-
cal agents (those that are adjacent to it) better and, therefore, we use the physical
distance between an acquaintance and the target agent as the knowledge measure.
Thus the nearer to the target agent, the more likely the acquaintance is to know it.
This measure is used in the referral process to help locate witnesses. However, it
should be noted that the resources available to each agent are limited (in terms of
its memory and communication cost) and the evaluator (agent a) usually has lim-
ited time for trust evaluation (before it has to initiate an interaction). Thus, the
process of locating witnesses should typically be limited according to an agent’s
time constraints, though this may result in no witnesses being found (even though
appropriate agents are available in the system). Here, the parameters nBF (called
the branching factor [Yu and Singh, 2003b]) and nRL (called the referral length
threshold, or the depth of referral graphs in [Yu and Singh, 2003b]) are introduced
for that purpose. Speciﬁcally, nBF is used to limit the number of acquaintances to
which a query is forwarded and nRL to limit the length of referral chains. Besides
restricting the search range of agent a due to time constraints, the referral length
threshold also helps an agent not to waste its eﬀort querying too distant agents
because, intuitively, the further the witness is from a (in terms of the length of the
referral chain to the witness from a), the less reliable/relevant its information. At
present, nBF and nRL need to be hand-picked according to the an agent’s resource
constraints and its environment’s acquaintance networks.
Speciﬁcally, the process of evaluating WR is as follows:
1. When agent a assesses the WR of agent b with respect to term c, denoted
by TW(a,b,c), it sends out a query for ratings of the form ( ,b,c, , ) to nBF
acquaintances that are likely to have relevant ratings on agent b and term c
(see Figure 3.3, where nBF = 2).
2. These acquaintances, upon receiving the query, try to match it to their own
(local) rating databases. If they ﬁnd matching ratings, it means they have
had interactions with b, they will return the ratings found to a.
3. If they cannot ﬁnd the requested information, they will return referrals iden-
tifying their nBF acquaintances that they believe are most likely to have the
relevant ratings to the query (based on the knowledge measure) so that a
can look further.Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 52
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Figure 3.3: Referral process.
4. This process continues until a ﬁnds suﬃcient witnesses or the length of its
referral chains reach the deﬁned threshold nRL.
It should be noted here that in this process we implicitly assume that agents in
a’s referral network are willing to help a ﬁnd the required witness ratings. This
is not a trivial assumption and needs to be guaranteed for this referral process
(as for any mechanism based on third-party information) to work, especially in
open MAS where agents are self-interested. However, we do not consider how
such a guarantee can be obtained in this thesis because that task would very
much depend on the particular application domain being considered. Thus, end-
users who wish to make use of WR need to provide necessary measures for this
willingness assumption to hold (e.g. obtaining an agreement between agents on
sharing witness information or paying for any information request).
The set of ratings collected from the referral process, denoted by RW(a,b,c), is
used to calculate the WR of agent b (i.e. TW(a,b,c)) following Equation 3.1. Here,
the rating weight function for WR ωW(ri) is intended to reﬂect a witness rating’sChapter 3 The FIRE Model 53
quality which also includes the rating’s credibility (since in realistic environments
agents may give false/inaccurate ratings). However, as we currently assume all
agents are honest, only the recency of ratings is temporarily used as per Section 3.3
(i.e. ωW(ri) = ωI(ri), see Equation 3.5). A model of witness credibility is described
and incorporated into FIRE in Chapter 6.
3.6 Certiﬁed Reputation
Certiﬁed reputation of a target agent b comprises certiﬁed references6 about its
behaviour from third-party agents. Such information is obtained and stored by the
target agent itself and made available to any other agent that wishes to evaluate its
trustworthiness for further interactions (somewhat like a reference when a person
is applying for a job). The references are in the form of ratings given by agent
b’s partners about its performance in (past) interactions between them. These
ratings allow agent b to prove its achievable performance as viewed by its previous
interaction partners and then to gain the trust of its potential partners. However,
since it can choose which ratings to put forward, a rational agent will only present
its best ratings. Therefore, it should be assumed that CR information probably
overestimates an agent’s expected behaviour. Thus, although it cannot guarantee
agent b’s minimal performance in future interactions, the CR information does
reveal a partial perspective on agent b’s capabilities (which is certainly useful for
trust evaluation in the absence of other sources of information).
Though CR may have lower predictive power than the other types of trust/repu-
tation (where all bad and good ratings can be collected), it is useful because of its
wide applicability. With the cooperation of its partners, agent b can obtain their
references from just a small number of interactions7. From our evaluation, for in-
stance, in a society where 100 agents provide a service to 500 others, agents using
direct experience to evaluate trust require more than 100 interactions to achieve a
reasonable level of performance, which is still less than what is achieved by agents
using CR after 5 interactions (see Section 5.3 for more detail). In addition to its
6It is assumed that some form of security mechanism (such as a public-key infrastructure)
is employed to ensure that the provided references cannot be tampered with. For instance, all
references could be accompanied by digital signatures from the issuers using their private keys
[Zimmermann, 1995]. By so doing, any change to a reference will be easily detected. Digital
signatures are also a means to verify the references’ origins.
7In many scenarios, such as those in the Internet, established service providers (e.g. news
services or online merchants) usually have high volumes of interactions (at any time). Therefore,
if they adopt the CR process outlined here, we can reasonably expect that such providers will
have an abundance of performance ratings readily available.Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 54
high availability, since references are stored by the target agent and provided di-
rectly to the evaluator, CR has a very low running cost (i.e. time, communication,
processing cost) compared to witness reputation. Since CR information comes
from the target agent, the CR component complements the other components of
FIRE, which use information collected by the evaluator, reducing the chances that
they may fail to calculate trust due to lack of input (see Section 3.1). Thus, in-
corporating the CR component makes FIRE able to provide a trust value in most
circumstances.
In more detail, the process of CR is as follows:
• After every transaction, agent b asks its partners to provide their certiﬁed
ratings about its performance from which it can choose the ratings to store
in its (local) rating database.
• When agent a contacts b to express its interest in using b’s service, it asks b to
provide references about its past performance with respect to an interested
term c.
• Agent a receives the set of certiﬁed ratings of b from b, which we call
RC(a,b,c) (C to denote this set is obtained via the CR mechanism), and
calculates the CR of b based on this set.
In this process, since agent b relies on its interaction partner’s cooperation to get
references, agents may refuse to give out their ratings (as in the case of witness rep-
utation). However, this is a much smaller problem than that in witness reputation
because this information is requested far less frequently (each referee is requested
to give its rating only once). Moreover, giving such information could be made a
standard part of any agreement for task allocation and so agents could be forced
to give it. The most notable point in this process is that when agent a makes the
trust evaluation, it only involves agents a and b. Since the certiﬁed ratings about
b are stored by b itself, they are immediately available to a as in the case when
a uses its own experience. It should also be noted that when a referee provides
references to an interaction partner, it surrenders its privacy with respect to how
it values that partner’s performance. This may lead to various possible reactions
of that partner (e.g. it may retaliate against the referee for a bad reference or it
may treat the referee diﬀerently the next time to get a better reference). However,
due to the vast number of possibilities in the reactions of both agents (i.e. the
referee and the referred agent), we do not consider the eﬀects of giving up privacy
in CR here and defer it to future work.Chapter 3 The FIRE Model 55
Having obtained the references of b, a can calculate the CR value of b using the
formula in Equation 3.1. However, since there is no guarantee about the honesty
of agents in an open MAS, we need measures to prevent or to minimise the adverse
eﬀects of lying (e.g. collusion between the target agent and its referees in producing
falsely inﬂated references). Here, we use the rating weight function ωC(ri) to reﬂect
the credibility of a reference (i.e. rating). Again, since we are not considering the
problem of lying in this chapter, the rating weight function for CR is deﬁned
based only on the recency of ratings as per Section 3.3 (i.e. ωC(ri) = ωI(ri)). The
value of CR, TC(a,b,c), and its reliability, ρC(a,b,c), are calculated as deﬁned in
Section 3.2.
3.7 An Overall Value
When using FIRE to evaluate trust, an agent can decide which components it
will use for trust evaluation according to its needs and situation. However, as
each component produces trust values from a separate source of information, we
believe that in combining the four components, and eﬀectively the four information
sources, it will in most cases yield a higher level of performance (as conﬁrmed by
the empirical evaluation in Section 5.3). Thus, we recommend combining all the
aforementioned trust values into a single composite measure to give an overall
picture of an agent’s likely performance. As all trust values in FIRE come with
reliability values, instead of averaging the trust values from the four components,
we again use the weighted mean method to calculate the composite trust value,
denoted by T (a,b,c)), to take each trust value’s reliability into account:
T (a,b,c) =
P




where wK = WK ·ρK(a,b,c), and WI, WR, WW, WC are the coeﬃcients correspond-
ing to the IT, RT, WR, and CR components. Here, the composite trust value
is calculated from the four component trust values and each of them is weighted
by both its reliability (as given by ρK(a,b,c)) and the corresponding component
coeﬃcients (i.e. WK). These coeﬃcients are set by end users to reﬂect the im-
portance of each component in a particular application. For instance, one can set
WI and WR to be the highest in the four coeﬃcients since the IT and RT use an
agent’s own information and should be the most reliable components; WC can be
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exaggerate the target agent’s performance. However, these coeﬃcients can be au-
tomatically set according to changes in an agent’s environment by implementing
the adaptability extension of FIRE as shown in Chapter 7.
The composite trust value also has a corresponding reliability value, denoted by
ρT (a,b,c), which is calculated from the components’ reliability values weighed by








This chapter has described the basic FIRE model for trust evaluations in open
MAS. The model itself is composed from four trust and reputation components:
Interaction Trust, Role-based Trust, Witness Reputation, and Certiﬁed Reputa-
tion. Each component derives trust values from a separate source of information
and then the component trust values are combined to provide an overall picture
of an agent’s trustworthiness. Thus, reviewed against our requirements for a trust
model in open MAS (Section 2.5), FIRE satisﬁes the requirement R1b by making
use of IT, RT, and WR. FIRE also introduces CR, a novel type of reputation, that
addresses the inherent shortcomings of interaction trust (the lack of direct experi-
ence) and witness reputation (the diﬃculty in ﬁnding witness reports). Combining
all the four trust/reputation components not only allows FIRE to produce more
useful trust values than using fewer components (as conﬁrmed from our evaluation
in Section 5.3), but also makes it serviceable in the absence of some of the sources
of information. In this respect, CR is particularly relevant because it greatly en-
hances the serviceability of FIRE by transferring the task of collecting third-party
ratings (i.e. references) to target agents, who are more capable than evaluators
and incentivised to do so. Therefore, an agent that newly joins an environment
can evaluate the trustworthiness of others from their references even when it has
not had previous experience with them and cannot ﬁnd any witness for them.
Thus, FIRE satisﬁes the requirement R1a by addressing the bootstrapping issue
of newly joined agents8.
8Obviously, there are still cases when FIRE cannot produce a trust value. Speciﬁcally, those
are when a service provider newly joins the system. Hence, it does not have references about
its performance and other agents do not have past experience with it. However, in a realistic
scenario, in order to promote its service, that provider can join a (popular) scheme/organisation
that provides quality assurance about its members’ service. For example, a car dealer can obtainChapter 3 The FIRE Model 57
In order to be compatible with the distributed nature of open MAS, FIRE is
designed such that an individual agent can make trust evaluations itself without
having to rely on a central authority (Requirement R2a). Various mechanisms
are provided so that an agent can collect trust information about its peers and
aggregate such information to derive trust values. Therefore, the reliability of
those trust values is guaranteed (in contrast to the case where trust values are
provided from a third-party). Although we have not done an analysis on the
scalability of FIRE, in our experiments where 500, 1000, and 1500 agents using
FIRE are deployed (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), it is observed that the execution time of
those experiments varies linearly to the number of agents deployed. Thus, given
its decentralised nature, we believe that FIRE is scalable to the large number of
agents that may be present in an open MAS (Requirement R2b). The process of
CR (Section 3.6) is also beneﬁcial in this respect since it makes trust information
(i.e. references) highly accessible in most circumstances. As for the adaptability
requirement (Requirement R3), the required trust information in our model (i.e.
ratings, rules) is deﬁned in such an abstract manner that it can be applicable in
various application domains. The behaviour of FIRE is also parameterised and can
be ﬁne tuned for a particular environment or application if desired. Finally, since
FIRE uses only ﬁrst-hand evidence of agent interactions (i.e. ratings produced
by the participating agents), the problem of correlated evidence (Section 2.4.4,
Requirement R4b) is avoided.
In summary, the basic FIRE model satisﬁes all the requirements for a trust model
in open MAS that we outlined in Section 2.5, except that it has not considered the
problem of inaccurate third-party reports (Requirement R4a). FIRE is extended
in Chapter 6 to address this problem. In the next phase of our research, we aim to
evaluate the eﬀectiveness of FIRE in evaluating trustworthiness by helping agents
select good interaction partners and, in addition, how it performs in dynamic
situations (Requirement R2c, see Section 2.4.2). Before doing this, however, we
need to describe the evaluation methodology that we use. This is detailed in the
next chapter.
the title ‘authorised dealer’ from a car manufacturer. Such (popular) membership (and inherently
its quality assurance) can be recognised by other agents (via rules in FIRE’s RT component)
and thus helps the provider to sell its service.Chapter 4
Evaluation Methodology
In order to employ a formal and systematic evaluation of the work in this thesis, a
set of experiments has been designed to evaluate FIRE’s performance. In this work,
since trust is an abstract and multi-faceted concept, there is no base for analytic
evaluation. Instead, empirical evaluation is used as the method of measurement
because it allows us to assess the performance of a trust model in terms of how
much beneﬁt it can bring to its users (which can serve as a measure to justify
its use). In addition, there are a number of internal variables which control the
behaviour of FIRE, as well as external variables which deﬁne the environment in
which our model is being used (see Section 4.2). These variables are interrelated
and need to be considered in a broad range of situations. Empirical techniques
allow us to manipulate these variables, conduct the experiments, and analyse
the results. Thus, they are suitable for our evaluation purpose. In particular,
the evaluation technique we use is called hypothesis testing [Cohen, 1995, pg.
106]. With this method, hypotheses are formed to express the intuitions about
FIRE’s performance under a variety of situations. Experiments are then conducted
and their results are used in statistical inference to either accept or reject the
hypotheses.
This chapter explains in detail the procedure of hypothesis testing (Section 4.1),
the testbed in which the experiments are carried out (Section 4.2), and how they
are set up (Section 4.3). Finally, a summary is provided in Section 4.4.
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4.1 The Methodology
As discussed above, we will evaluate FIRE’s performance in terms of how much
beneﬁt an agent may gain by using it. In the context of this thesis, the aim of
the trust model is to help agents distinguish good interaction partners from bad
ones (Section 1.3) and, thus, to allow them to avoid losing utility by choosing
not to interact with bad agents. Therefore, the diﬀerence between the utility
gained1 by an agent using a trust model and that gained by another agent using
no trust model in choosing interaction partners can be interpreted as the added
value of that trust model (or more concisely the performance of that trust model).
Henceforth, the performance (i.e. the utility gain) of an agent using, say, FIRE is
used interchangeably with the performance of FIRE. In order to be able to do so,
we have to exclude all other factors than trust models that can aﬀect an agent’s
performance; these include domain knowledge, negotiation issues, and planning
(see Section 4.2). By removing such extraneous factors, the trust model is left as
the only diﬀerentiating factor in an agent’s capability (e.g. agents using no trust
model, using FIRE, or using another model). This then allows us to objectively
compare the performance of trust models by making comparisons between the
performance of the corresponding agents using them.
In more detail, it is desirable that FIRE is evaluated in all possible situations
in order to make sure that it will always behave properly. However, since the
environment of an open MAS is both complex and dynamic, there are uncountably
many factors that can aﬀect FIRE’s performance. For instance, it can be aﬀected
by the population of the agents in an open MAS, the interactions and relationships
between them, and their behaviours. These are all unbounded external variables
to FIRE. Therefore, it is impossible to exhaustively explore all the environment
space in order to comprehensively evaluate FIRE. To combat this, we introduce
randomness into the testbed we use to evaluate FIRE (see Section 4.2 for more
details) to make it similar to a continually changing environment of an open MAS.
In addition, a group containing a large number of agents (typically 500) using FIRE
are evaluated at the same time, in which each agent has a particular situation
deﬁned by the environment’s randomness. In so doing, FIRE is evaluated under a
wide range of situations and its performance can reasonably be measured as the
mean performance of all the agents in the group.
1Since agents are typically designed to select their actions based on the expected utility gained
from those actions in order to maximise their own utility [Wooldridge, 2002], it is implicitly
assumed here that the utility an agent gains from an interaction can be quantitatively measured.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 60
In our evaluation, we are interested in answering the question:
‘How do agents using FIRE perform in comparison to agents using no
trust model and to other trust models?’
This requires us to compare FIRE’s performance with that of another model. We
are also interested in experiments showing how FIRE performs with and without a
particular component because such results help us to conﬁrm/reject our intuitions
and to justify our design decisions. Speciﬁcally, this requires us to compare the
performance of groups of agents using FIRE with diﬀerent conﬁgurations. How-
ever, a mere comparison of the mean performance of two groups of agents does
not allow us to conclude that one group performs better than the other in all
the cases. The reason is that the population of possible situations is inﬁnitively
large and the results from one experiment are only from a small sample of that
population and, moreover, it might not be a typical result for the population.
Given this, statistical inference techniques should be used since they allow us to
draw a conclusion about an unseen population given a relatively small sample.
Thus, to the extent that a sample is representative of the population from which
it is drawn, statistical inference permits generalisations of conclusions beyond the
sample [Cohen, 1995, pg. 105]. In our experiments, we use a statistical inference
method called hypothesis testing, which allows us to answer a yes-or-no question
about the population and assess the probability that the answer is wrong2.
Now suppose we need to determine whether the performance of agents using FIRE
is better than the performance of agents using no trust model. Since trust models
typically learn about its user’s environment and gradually improve its performance
through interactions (Section 2.2), it does not make sense to compare the perfor-
mance of models after diﬀerent periods of use. Therefore, we need to choose a test
period and compare the performance of models after that same period (say, ﬁve
interactions3).
2In analysing (experimental) data about two populations, say their income levels, the fact
that the means of the two sample groups’ incomes are diﬀerent does not always indicate that
the two populations have diﬀerent levels of income if randomness can aﬀect sample selection.
Thus, it is possible that the means of these two particular samples are diﬀerent, but the means
of the two populations’ incomes are not. Hypothesis testing methods allows us to conﬁrm with
a predeﬁned conﬁdence level whether the diﬀerence of the two means actually indicates that one
group has higher income than the other, eliminating the random factor in selecting the samples
(see [Cohen, 1995] for more detail).
3Test periods can also be chosen in other time units (e.g. 5 minutes or 100 generated clock
ticks). However, since we are using the mean performance of a group of agents employing FIRE
as the performance measure and in a timed period each of the agents may complete a variedChapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 61
Term Deﬁnition
FIRE The name of the group of agents using FIRE
NoTrust The name of the group of agents using no trust model
n The number of ﬁnished interactions chosen as the test period
NFIRE The number of agents in group FIRE
NNoTrust The number of agents in group NoTrust
µFIRE The population mean performance for FIRE; the mean performance
obtained by measuring the utility gain of an inﬁnitive number of
agents using FIRE in their nth interaction and in all possible envi-
ronments.
µNoTrust The population mean performance for NoTrust, obtained as above.
P FIRE The mean performance of a sample of agents using FIRE after their
nth interaction
P NoTrust The mean performance of a sample of agents using no trust model
after their nth interaction
sFIRE The variance of the performance sample of FIRE
sNoTrust The variance of the performance sample of NoTrust
Table 4.1: Terms used in the hypothesis testing example.
With the terms deﬁned in Table 4.1, the procedure of hypothesis testing used in
our experiments is as follows (adapted from [Cohen, 1995]):
1. Formulate a null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis, denoted H0 and
H1, respectively:
H0: µFIRE = µNoTrust;
H1: µFIRE > µNoTrust.
2. Gather a sample of performance (i.e. utility gain) of agents in FIRE and
NoTrust in their nth interaction, and calculate the mean performance of each
group, denoted by P FIRE and P NoTrust. Call NFIRE and NNoTrust the number
of samples in group FIRE and that in group NoTrust respectively.
3. Assuming the null hypothesis is true (i.e. there is no diﬀerence between the
performance of FIRE and NoTrust), calculate the probability of obtaining the
sample means P FIRE and P NoTrust. This probability is given by the two-sample
t-test function that takes into account P FIRE, P NoTrust, NFIRE, NNoTrust, and
number of interactions depending on its operation, the performance measure after such a period
can greatly ﬂuctuate between experiment runs. This is because the performance of a trust model
depends on the amount of information it learns after each interaction and, thus, a varied number
of interactions will result in a varied level of a speciﬁc performance. Therefore, the number of
ﬁnished interactions is a more suitable basis than time unit for choosing test periods. From the
view point of an individual agent, it also allows the performance measure to show how quickly a
trust model learns roughly in terms of an individual agent’s cost (i.e. interaction cost, possible
loss because of bad bootstrapping performance of the trust model), which is more relevant to
the agent than how much time it has been operating in its environment.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 62
the sample variances of the two groups (see [Cohen, 1995, pg. 127] for more
details).
4. If this probability is lower than 0.05, reject the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternative hypothesis. This means that we can conclude with a conﬁdence
level of 95% that H1 is true, or the performance of FIRE is (statistically)
signiﬁcantly better than that of NoTrust.
For example, after an experiment, assume the following data is obtained at n = 5:
• Group FIRE: P FIRE = 6.3627, NFIRE = 500, and sFIRE = 3281.2384.
• Group NoTrust: P NoTrust = −1.0543, NNoTrust = 500, and sNoTrust = 4641.8361.
Assuming H0 is true, the probability of obtaining this data given by the two sample
t test is 2.81×10−242. Therefore, we can conclude that the performance of FIRE is
indeed signiﬁcantly better than that of NoTrust (in this case with the conﬁdence
level of nearly 100%).
The hypothesis testing procedure above can determine that, for instance, using
FIRE will yield a better utility gain than using no trust model at the 5th inter-
action. However, it is not clear exactly how quickly FIRE can achieve that level
of performance. Moreover, we are also interested in whether FIRE can maintain
the same level of performance at later interactions. Thus, instead of choosing a
ﬁxed test period, in each experiment we carry out the hypothesis testing procedure
for every test period from the 1st interaction to the 200th one4. Thus, the mean
performance of each group of agents in terms of utility gain (UG) is plotted on a
chart to show the trend of performance change (see Figure 4.1 for an illustration).
Now, since showing the actual hypothesis tests will include many (uninteresting)
numbers, we will show only the result of the tests on the chart using the second y-
axis (on the right). For example, with the result for n = 5 above, we assign rank 2
to FIRE and rank 1 to NoTrust. This is to show that the corresponding hypothesis
test concludes that FIRE outperforms NoTrust and that the performance diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (using the conﬁdence level of 95%). The rank lines are
named using the group names but preﬁxed by R. If at some interactions the rank
4It is shown in all our experiments that the performance of all the models tested are stable
by around the 200th interaction, or, put another way, that the interesting trends of performance
change can be observed in this period. In our experiments, most agents make about 300–400
interactions. However, given this stability, we choose to show only the results from the ﬁrst 200
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Figure 4.1: Hypothesis testing example chart.
lines are collapsed into one line, it means that at the corresponding test period
the probability that H0 is true is greater than 0.05. This means that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis and can only conclude that the performance diﬀerence
between the two groups is not statistically signiﬁcant for that test period.
4.2 The Testbed
Having deﬁned the evaluation methodology, we need a testbed to run the experi-
ments on. This section describes the testbed we use and discusses various design
decisions that aim to ensure it captures the key characteristics of open MAS (as
detailed in Section 1.1). In particular, the testbed domain setup is described in
Section 4.2.1, and then Section 4.2.2 presents the factors of randomness introduced
into the testbed to simulate the dynamism in an open MAS.
4.2.1 The testbed domain description
The testbed environment for evaluating FIRE is a multi-agent system consisting of
agents providing services (called providers) and agents using those services (called
consumers). We assume that the performance of a provider (and eﬀectively its
trustworthiness) in a particular service it provides (e.g. news services) is generally
independent from that in another service (e.g. weather services or banking ser-
vices). Therefore, without loss of generality, and in order to reduce the complexity
of the testbed’s environment, it is assumed that there is only one type of service in
the testbed. Hence, all the provider agents oﬀer the same service. However, theirChapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 64
performance (i.e. the quality of the service) diﬀers. The agents are situated ran-
domly on a spherical world whose radius is 1.0 (see Figure 4.2). Each agent has a
radius of operation (ro —depicted by a dotted circle around an agent in Figure 4.2)
that models the agent’s capability in interacting with others (e.g. the available
bandwidth or the agent’s infrastructure) and any agents situated in that range
are the agent’s acquaintances. In the case of a provider, its radius of operation
serves as the normal operational range in which it can provide its service at its full
capability without loss of quality. For consumers outside that provider’s normal
operational range, the quality of service they receive from it gradually degrades.
This simulates the phenomenon that each agent usually has particular circum-
stances (here its location) which aﬀect service delivery. For example, two distant
agents may experience signiﬁcant network latency during their interactions, or a
seller agent in the UK may charge another agent extra for shipping goods abroad
and the goods may arrive much later than usual.
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Figure 4.2: The spherical world and a path from consumer C1 (through C2
and C3) to provider P based on neighbourhood.
Simulations are run in the testbed in rounds (of agent interactions). Events that
take place in the same round are considered simultaneous. The round number is
used as the time value for events. In each round, if a consumer agent needs to use
the service it can contact the environment to locate nearby provider agents5 (in
terms of the distance between the agents on the spherical world). The consumer
agent will then select one provider from the list to use its service. The selection
5This is to simulate a situation in which only a portion of the provider population is available
to a given agent. For example, a retail banking agent can only serve customers in its country. In
addition, as the degradation of service quality is proportional to the distance between a provider
and its consumer, providers that are too distant may not be useful.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 65
process relies on the agent’s trust model to decide which provider is likely to be the
most reliable. Consumer agents without a trust model randomly select a provider
from the list. On the other hand, an agent with a trust model selects a provider
as follows:
1. It evaluates the trustworthiness of all the providers in the list. Providers
whose trustworthiness cannot be determined (due to no available rating) are
placed in the set NoTrustValue. The rest, whose trustworthiness has been
determined, are placed in the set HasTrustValue.
2. There can be up to two options available to the agent:
(a1) select the provider with the highest trust value in the set HasTrustValue,
which according to the trust model is likely to yield the highest UG; and
(a2) select a random provider from the set NoTrustValue, allowing it to learn
about the performance of an unknown provider (i.e. exploring the provider
population).
3. Obviously, if the set HasTrustValue is empty, it can only choose (a2); if the
set NoTrustValue is empty, it can only chose (a1).
4. Otherwise, it needs to determine which action it should take. Choosing
(a2) allows it to explore more about the provider population although it
may risk losing utility if it encounters a bad provider. In contrast, choosing
(a1) can somewhat guarantee the expected UG. However, it may not be
the optimal performance the agent can get because it has not learnt enough
about the provider population. This exploit-vs-explore dilemma is addressed
in this work by using a standard Boltzmann exploration strategy [Kaelbling
et al., 1996]. Using this strategy, an agent tends to explore its environment
ﬁrst and then gradually move its stance towards exploitation when it learns











where ER(ai) is the expected return from choosing action ai, and T is a pa-
rameter that is set to decrease over time to decrease exploration (termed the
temperature parameter in [Kaelbling et al., 1996]). In brief, the probability
that an action ak is selected is biased by the expected return of that action.
Moreover, when an agent’s level of exploration is decreased (by decreasing
T over time) the action with the highest expected return is more likely to beChapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 66
selected (i.e. the agent is more likely to exploit the knowledge it has learnt
about the performance of provider agents). Here, the expected return for
(a1) is the expected UG of the highest trusted provider as calculated from its
trust value, and that for (a2) is the average UG of the provider population
that has been observed by the consumer agent.
Having selected a provider, the consumer agent then uses its service and gains
some utility from the interaction (i.e. UG). The value of UG is in [−10,10] and
depends on the level of performance of the provider in that interaction. A provider
agent can serve many users at a time. As in realistic situations, a consumer agent,
however, does not always use the service in every round. The probability it needs
and requests the service, called its activity level and denoted by α, is selected
uniformly randomly when the consumer is created. In other words, the activity
level of a consumer determines how frequently it uses the service6.
After an interaction, the consumer agent rates the service of the provider based on
the level of performance, or the quality of the service, it received. It records the
rating for future trust evaluations and also informs the provider about the rating
it made. The provider may record the rating as evidence about its performance
to be presented to potential consumers (as discussed in Section 3.6). Since the
basic FIRE, which is going to be evaluated, assumes that all agents exchange
their information honestly, an agent (as a witness or as a referee) provides its true
ratings as they are without any modiﬁcation. The testbed is extended to simulate
various types of disinformation later in Chapter 6.
So far, there is no diﬀerence between provider agents. However, in order to test
the ability of a trust model in helping a consumer select good providers, we need
to introduce diﬀerent types of provider agents with various levels of performance.
By so doing, the actual UG of a consumer agent from an interaction (which is
determined by the performance of the provider it selects) will reﬂect how good its
trust model is in evaluating the trustworthiness (i.e. the expected performance)
of the providers. Here, we consider four types of provider agents: good, ordi-
nary, bad, and intermittent. They are to simulate the cases in real world, where,
in a particular market, there are usually a (small) number of very good service
providers, many ordinary providers who cannot perform exceptionally as those in
the ﬁrst group, and some bad providers that cheat. The intermittent providers
6This is to simulate the phenomena that each agent has an individual frequency of requiring
a particular service. For example, an ordinary person may need to check the news once a day,
while a stock broker may do so once every hour.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 67
Proﬁle Range of µP σP
Good [PL GOOD,PL PERFECT] 1.0
Ordinary [PL OK,PL GOOD] 2.0
Bad [PL WORST,PL OK] 2.0






Table 4.2: Proﬁles of provider agents.
are introduced to simulate the cases of some online servers whose performance is
aﬀected by extraneous factors such as unreliable Internet connections or technical
diﬃculties so that they perform unpredictably, good in some instances and bad in
the others.
In the real world, it is rarely the case that one service provider can always maintain
a ﬁxed performance. There are usually always some (minor) ﬂuctuations of their
performance due to various reasons (e.g. late delivery due to traﬃc conditions,
varying food quality depending on weather). Therefore, it is unreasonable to set
a ﬁxed performance level for a provider agent in the testbed. Instead, we only set
a provider’s mean performance and later vary its actual performance based on a
random variable. The normal distribution is chosen for this purpose since it models
the random nature that we look for and also allows us to control the variation
range of the variable ﬂuctuations (by setting the standard deviation parameter).
Hence, good, ordinary, and bad providers are assigned a mean level of performance,
denoted by µP. Its actual performance then follows a normal distribution around
this mean. The values of µP and the associated standard deviation of these types
of providers, denoted by σP, are given in Table 4.2. Intermittent providers, since
we want to model intermittent behaviours, on the other hand, are set to yield
unpredictable (random) performance levels in the range [PL BAD,PL GOOD].
As in our example above, a consumer might experience a better service from a
provider in the same country than it does from those that are in a diﬀerent country.
Here, we use the distance between a consumer and a provider on the sphere world
to model the particular situations between them. If a consumer agent is situated
outside of the provider’s normal operational range (i.e. ro) the service quality of
that provider is then set to degrade in proportion to the distance between them.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 68
4.2.2 The dynamism factors
Although the testbed described in the previous section covers the basics of in-
teractions between agents in MAS, it does not reﬂect the continuously changing
nature of an open MAS (as discussed in Section 2.4.2). Therefore, in order to
verify that FIRE can cope with various changes that can happen in an open MAS
(Requirement 2c), dynamism is introduced into the testbed by changing a number
of its factors after each round7:
• The population of agents: In an open MAS, agents can come and leave the
system at anytime. This is simulated by removing a number of randomly
selected agents from the testbed and adding new agents into it. The num-
bers of agents added and removed after each round vary, but have an upper
limit of some predeﬁned percentage of the whole population. The population
change limits for the consumer and the provider populations are denoted re-
spectively by pCPC and pPPC. Since in the real world, providers are usually
more established than consumers, pPPC is set to be lower than pCPC in our
simulations. The proﬁle of the newly added agents are set randomly but
they are uniformly distributed over the initial agent populations (i.e. the
proportions of providers of diﬀerent proﬁles and that of consumers in diﬀer-
ent groups are maintained) in order to maintain the characteristics of the
population in which trust models are being tested.
• The locations of agents: During their life cycle, agents break old relation-
ships and make new ones (reﬂecting the notion of continual change that is
inherent in open MAS). In our testbed, this type of change is reﬂected by
the change in an agent’s location on the spherical world. When a consumer
changes its location, it will have a new set of acquaintances according to
its ro. In addition, the location of an agent in the testbed also reﬂects its
individual situation covering things such as its knowledge about other local
agents (see Section 3.5) and the service delivery between providers and con-
sumers (see Section 4.2.1). Therefore, changing an agent’s location changes
its relationships with others, as well as its individual situation. Speciﬁcally,
we use polar coordinations (r,ϕ,θ) for agent locations on the spherical world.
Then in order to change an agent’s location, amounts of angular changes ∆ϕ
and ∆θ are added to ϕ and θ respectively. In this case, ∆ϕ and ∆θ are se-
lected randomly in [−∆φ,+∆φ]. Thus, ∆φ limits the variability of agents’
7These factors are chosen based on the types of changes that were identiﬁed in Section 2.4.2.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 69
locations. Not every agent changes its locations every round and, in particu-
lar, pCLC and pPLC are used to denote the probabilities that a given consumer
or provider, respectively, changes its location in a round.
• The behaviour of the providers: In many environments, provider performance
may alter (for better or worse) over time. A provider may even change
its behaviour completely (e.g. a provider may take advantage of its good
reputation and decide to perform selﬁshly to obtain better utility). In our
testbed, the average performance of a provider (µ) can be changed by an
amount of ∆µ randomly selected in [−M,+M], and this happens in each
round with the probability of pµC. Moreover, after each round, a provider can
switch to a completely new provider proﬁle with a probability of pProﬁleSwitch.
The above changes to the testbed’s environment are applied only after each round
of interactions ﬁnishes. The nature and degree of dynamism vary depending on
the experiment and are therefore speciﬁed for each speciﬁc experiment. Now, in
some experiments where, because of their objectives, none of the above changes is
carried out, we call the testbed static.
4.3 The Experimental Setup
In each experiment, the testbed is populated with provider and consumer agents.
Each consumer agent is equipped with a particular trust model, which helps it
select a provider when it needs to use a service. Since the only diﬀerence among
consumer agents is the trust models that they use, the utility gained by each agent
through simulations will reﬂect the performance of its trust model in selecting
reliable providers for interactions. Therefore, the testbed records the UG of each
interaction along with the trust model used.
Before each experiment, the testbed is set up to simulate a particular environment
of interest using the parameters deﬁned in the previous sections. These param-
eters are called the experimental variables and their default values are presented
in Table 4.3. These default values will be used in all the experiments unless oth-
erwise speciﬁed. Although a ‘typical’ provider population may diﬀer in various
applications, the space of possibilities is vast and exploring it completely would
be impossible. Therefore, we choose provider populations which we believe are
more common than others for our experiments Here, a typical provider popula-
tion according to our view consists of about half proﬁtable providers (i.e. yieldingChapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 70
Simulation variable Symbol Value
Number of simulation rounds N 500
Total number of provider agents: NP 100
+ Good providers NPG 10
+ Ordinary providers NPO 40
+ Intermittent providers NPI 5
+ Bad providers NPB 45
Number of consumer agents in
each group
NC 500
Range of consumer activity level α [0.10,1.00]
Table 4.3: Experimental variables.
Parameters Symbol Value
Local rating history size H 10
IT recency scaling factor λ − 5
ln(0.5)
Branching factor nBF 2
Referral length threshold nRL 5
Component coeﬃcients:
+ Interaction trust WI 1.0
+ Role-base trust WR 1.0
+ Witness reputation WW 0.5
+ Certiﬁed reputation WC 0.25
Reliability function parameters:
+ Interaction trust γI −ln(0.5)
+ Role-base trust γR −ln(0.5)
+ Witness reputation γW −ln(0.5)
+ Certiﬁed reputation γC −ln(0.5)
Table 4.4: FIRE’s default parameters.
positive UG) and half exploiting providers (i.e. yielding negative UG, including
intermittent providers). However, good and intermittent providers are usually ex-
ceptional cases and, thus, they take only a small portion of each half. Except in
the experiments where we evaluate FIRE with diﬀerent provider populations, this
typical provider population is used throughout8.
Here, we also show the default parameters of FIRE set for the experiments in
Table 4.4. These parameters were introduced to allow end users of FIRE to cus-
tomise FIRE’s behaviour according to their own needs and application. For ex-
ample, here, we know that the IT component deduces trust from ratings in which
the agent does the rating itself and, thus, is more reliable than the WR and CR
components, which use information from third-parties. We expect the CR infor-
mation to exaggerate an agent’s true performance, hence, the CR component has
8We have explored with diﬀerent population mixes and we observe the same broad trends.Chapter 4 Evaluation Methodology 71
the lowest reliability. The RT component provides rules encoding knowledge and
beliefs about the agent’s environment to customise the trust model, so it should
also have a high reliability. Therefore, the component coeﬃcients are set to reﬂect
these beliefs. Likewise, since the performance of an agent may change quickly
from round to round and given the time unit used in the test bed (round of inter-
actions), we set the IT recency scaling factor such that a 5-round old rating has
half (0.5) the eﬀect of a new rating (1.0). It should be noted that the space of
possible parameter assignments is vast and comprehensively evaluating FIRE in
that space is impossible. Therefore, these parameters are chosen here on a reason-
able basis as explained above. In this regard, Chapter 7 investigates a number of
learning techniques so that some of these parameters can be adjusted dynamically
according to an agent’s actual situation.
4.4 Summary
This chapter has presented our evaluation methodology which is followed through-
out in evaluating FIRE. The two-sample t-test, a hypothesis testing method, is
used to ensure that our conclusions about the evaluation results are correct with
a minimum conﬁdence level of 95%. We also show in detail how our testbed is
constructed and set up to reﬂect the main features of open MAS as identiﬁed in
Chapter 1. The testbed and the evaluation methodology will be used in the sub-
sequent chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) to run and analyse various experiments
on FIRE’s performance.Chapter 5
Empirical Evaluation
Having presented the testbed and the methodology for FIRE’s evaluation in the
previous chapter, we now turn to the experiments themselves. In particular, we
concentrate on the two following questions:
1. How much is the beneﬁt (in terms of UG) of using FIRE for selecting inter-
action partners compared to not using a trust model and to other models?
2. How do FIRE’s individual components contribute to its overall performance?
The experiments in this chapter are designed to give the answers for the two
questions in a variety of environment types (e.g. static environments where there
is no signiﬁcant dynamism and dynamic environments where there are changes in
various factors in the testbed as described in Section 4.2.2). Experiments dealing
with the ﬁrst question are presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. The former shows
experiments with static environments, while the latter focusses on dynamic ones.
Subsequently, Section 5.3 presents experiments dealing with the second question.
A summary is then provided in Section 5.4
5.1 Performance in Static Environments
In order to evaluate the overall performance of FIRE, we compare it with the
SPORAS model (whose operation is described in Appendix A.1) and a group of
agents with no trust model. Hence, there are three groups of consumer agents:
FIRE, SPORAS, and NoTrust. SPORAS is chosen as the control benchmark for two
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Figure 5.1: Overall performance of FIRE in the typical provider population.
reasons. First, it is a successful independently developed trust model that several
other researchers have used for benchmarking (e.g. [Carbo et al., 2003], [Sabater
and Sierra, 2001]). Second, other than SPORAS, most other notable trust models
make assumptions that are incompatible with open MAS, or require additional
knowledge, and, thus, they will not operate as intended in our testbed.
Now, the ﬁrst thing to test is whether FIRE helps consumer agents select proﬁtable
providers (i.e. those yielding positive UG) from the population and, by so doing,
helps them gain better utility than without FIRE (i.e. the NoTrust group). In this
section, the testbed’s environment is static (as deﬁned in Section 4.2.1).
In more detail, Figure 5.1 shows that the NoTrust group, selecting providers ran-
domly without any trust evaluation, performs consistently the lowest (as we would
expect). On the other hand, both SPORAS and FIRE prove to be beneﬁcial to
consumer agents, helping them to obtain signiﬁcantly higher UG. This shows that
the tested trust models can learn about the provider population, and allow their
agents to select proﬁtable providers for interactions. However, the chart, as well
as the t-test ranking, also shows that FIRE outperforms SPORAS, the second rank,
throughout the interactions by about 40%1. This is despite the fact that SPO-
RAS, being a centralised model, gathers much more information than FIRE (a
decentralised model)2. The performance diﬀerence of FIRE and SPORAS is ac-
1Here, the average UG of the NoTrust group in an experiment (i.e. −1) is used as the baseline
performance. The UG of SPORAS and FIRE is then compared to this baseline performance to
show the beneﬁt of using SPORAS and FIRE.
2After every interaction, the consumer reports its rating about the provider’s service in that
interaction to SPORAS. Therefore, as a centralised service, SPORAS collects all the available
ratings from its users. In contrast, consumers employing FIRE only have ratings from a limited
set of witnesses (from the WR component) and those presented by providers (from the CR
component) in addition to their own ratings. Typically in our experiments, after the ﬁrst 10
rounds the average number of ratings taken into account in each trust evaluation request toChapter 5 Empirical Evaluation 74
Interaction: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SPORAS 0.20 0.85 1.80 2.96 3.53 3.42 3.42 3.52 3.58 3.62
FIRE −0.16 1.20 2.30 4.00 5.06 5.44 5.66 5.52 5.47 5.53
Table 5.1: The performance of SPORAS and FIRE in the ﬁrst 10 interactions
counted for by the fact that FIRE separates direct experiences from others’ expe-
riences (i.e. ratings) in trust evaluation, while SPORAS treats all types of ratings
equally. Therefore, SPORAS suﬀers from noise in ratings (resulting from diﬀerent
degrees of degradation of service quality due to diﬀerent provider-consumer dis-
tances). In contrast, FIRE reduces rating noise by giving more weight to direct
experiences (see Table 4.4), which are more relevant to an individual agent’s sit-
uation. Another noticeable point is that in the ﬁrst few interactions, FIRE can
learn about the providers quicker than SPORAS as the FIRE group achieves its
superiority from the ﬁrst interaction (see Table 5.1) despite much less information
being available to it. As we show in Section 5.3, this is achieved thanks to the
WR and, in particular, the CR components.
Having shown FIRE performs well in a mixed population, we now check whether
FIRE performs consistently with a particular type of providers. Therefore, we
re-ran the same experiment but with provider populations consisting of providers
of only one proﬁle (e.g. all good, all ordinary, all bad, and all intermittent).
Speciﬁcally, the experiment is run with 100 good providers, then with 100 ordinary
providers, 100 bad providers, and 100 intermittent providers. The result in the
case of intermittent providers is not shown here because the performance of all
three groups is indistinguishable; ﬂuctuating randomly in [−1,0] (this is expected
because of the random behaviour of intermittent providers). In the rest of the
experiments, we observe similar results (see Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4) to that in
our ﬁrst experiment with the typical provider population. FIRE maintains its
superiority in all the three types of provider population. This shows that FIRE
can work well in a wide range of provider population.
In sum, through the experiments on FIRE’s overall performance, we conﬁrm that
FIRE is beneﬁcial to agents in selecting interaction partners in a variety of types
of provider populations. In addition, despite being decentralised and having less
information than SPORAS, FIRE outperforms the model in all the cases thanks
to its diﬀerential treatment of each source of trust information.
FIRE is 3.28, and that to SPORAS is 15.55. After 20 rounds the corresponding numbers are
4.05 and 28.47 respectively. This suggests that FIRE may be advantageous in environments in
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Figure 5.4: Overall performance of FIRE – 100% bad providers.Chapter 5 Empirical Evaluation 76
5.2 Performance in Dynamic Environments
The environment of a realistic open MAS is always changing because of its open-
ness (as discussed in Sections 1.1 and 4.2.2). Hence, a trust model designed for
open MAS should be able to function eﬀectively in such a dynamic environment.
Given this, this section concentrates on testing the hypothesis that FIRE still
maintains its desirable properties (i.e. being beneﬁcial to agents in selecting inter-
action partners) in a changing environment. Similarly to the experiments in Sec-
tion 5.1, there are three groups of consumer agents in the experiments: NoTrust,
SPORAS, and FIRE. The provider population is the typical one. Each experiment
will test the hypothesis with only one dynamic factor in eﬀect (see Section 4.2).
Speciﬁcally, the same experiments will be run but with each of the following con-
ditions3:
1. The provider population changes at maximum 2% every round (pPPC = 0.02).
2. The consumer population changes at maximum 5% every round (pCPC =
0.05).
3. A provider may alter its average level of performance at maximum 1.0 UG
unit with a probability of 0.10 each round (pµC = 0.10, M = 1.0).
4. A provider may switch into a diﬀerent (performance) proﬁle with a proba-
bility of 0.02 each round (pProﬁleSwitch = 0.02).
5. A provider may move to a new location on the spherical world at a maximum
angular distance of π
20 with a probability of 0.10 each round (pPLC = 0.10,
∆φ = π
20).
6. A consumer may move to a new location on the spherical world at a max-
imum angular distance of π
20 with a probability of 0.10 each round (pCLC =
0.10, ∆φ = π
20.
These experiments are named Experiment 1 to 6, respectively, and their results
are shown in Figures 5.5 to 5.10. Since the NoTrust group still has the lowest
performance, we omit its results from the charts for reasons of clarity. A gen-
eral observation from all the results is that both FIRE and SPORAS still maintain
3These are what we consider to be reasonable values of variation. We have conducted similar
experiments with both greater and lesser degrees of dynamism and we see the same broad trends
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Figure 5.6: Experiment 2: Consumer population change: pCPC = 0.05.
positive UG from about 3.0 to 6.0 (except SPORAS in Experiment 4, Figure 5.8).
However, dynamism, as it introduces noise to the environments, adversely aﬀects
the performance of both of them in all the experiments reported here. Speciﬁcally,
and as we would expect, their performance is lower than that in the static envi-
ronment (Figure 5.1) and the performance plots also evolve diﬀerently over time.
Nevertheless, although having lower levels of performance than in a static environ-
ment, the shape of FIRE’s performance plots are generally maintained after they
reach their stable level in the ﬁrst few interactions in all the experiments. This
shows that FIRE is able to maintain a stable performance regardless of the various
types of changes in the environment. In other words, FIRE can learn about the
changes and adapt quickly to them.
In more detail, the experiments here can be put into two categories: (i) dynamism
on the consumer side (Experiments 2 and 6), and (ii) dynamism on the provider
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Figure 5.9: Experiment 5: Providers change their locations: pPLC = 0.10,
∆φ = π
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Figure 5.10: Experiment 6: Consumers change their locations: pCLC = 0.10,
∆φ = π
20.
show that SPORAS can cope well with these types of changes. This is because
SPORAS collects ratings centrally from all consumers and, thus, small changes
on the consumer side do not have a signiﬁcant impact on its performance as its
learned knowledge about the provider population is still useful. Particularly in
Experiment 2, where new consumers are added to the testbed, newly joined agents
using SPORAS take advantage of the existing knowledge of the centralised model
and perform well right from the start. In contrast, FIRE relies on the consumer
community for witness reputation and, thus, has a slightly lower performance than
that in the static environment. However, it still outperforms SPORAS in these
experiments.
The situation is somewhat diﬀerent in the experiments of the second category.
SPORAS’s performance is signiﬁcantly aﬀected when providers change their per-
formance levels (Experiments 3 and 4, whose results are shown in Figures 5.7 and
5.8), most noticeably in Experiment 4, where providers switch their performance
proﬁles completely. In this experiment, although FIRE is also aﬀected greatly by
the steep changes in the provider population, it still maintains a generally high and
stable performance, while SPORAS’s performance degrades disproportionately to
that of the NoTrust group. It should be noted that the trust models’ duty here is
to learn and predict the behaviour (i.e. the performance) of providers and, there-
fore, their performance in an environment where there are changes on the provider
side reﬂects their ability to adapt to such changes. Hence, the results suggest that
SPORAS can quickly learn about the environment (because of its centralised na-
ture), but has diﬃculty adapting to the continual changes of the providers. In
Experiments 1 and 5 (Figures 5.5 and 5.9), where the provider population changes
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Figure 5.11: Experiment 7: Performance of FIRE in an environment where
all dynamic factors are in eﬀect.
SPORAS are only slightly aﬀected. In general, FIRE performs consistently in all
these experiments. Its average UG is stable around 6.0 in Experiments 1, 3, and
5; and around 4.0 in Experiment 4 (which has the most abrupt changes). This
conﬁrms our intuition that the recency function of FIRE helps it adapt quickly to
changes in the environment.
Since a realistic open MAS usually has a combination of all the dynamic fac-
tors considered here, we also want to test how FIRE performs in such situations.
Therefore, we ran an additional experiment with all the dynamic factors active
at the same time. The result, in Figure 5.11, shows that although both FIRE
and SPORAS suﬀer from the continual changes of various types in the testbed’s
environment, FIRE manages to maintain a rather stable performance in the range
[4.0,5.0]. SPORAS, however, cannot cope with all the types of changes at the
same time and its performance degrades signiﬁcantly compared to its own perfor-
mance in a static environment and is near to that of the NoTrust group through
all interactions (see Figure 5.1). This again conﬁrms the adaptability of FIRE in
a complex dynamic environment.
In summary, the experiments in this section show that FIRE is able to perform
consistently in various dynamic environments, maintaining a high level of utility
gain for its agents (in all the experiments).Chapter 5 Empirical Evaluation 81
5.3 Impact of the Individual Components
In Section 3.1, we argued that each component of FIRE plays an important role in
exploiting trust information from a particular source and this, in turn, contributes
to the eﬀectiveness of the overall model. In order to conﬁrm this, here we bench-
mark FIRE with and without various components to evaluate the contribution of
that component to the whole model. However, since the IT component is mostly
reused from Regret, we will focus on evaluating the novel components (i.e. WR
and CR). Role-based trust is also not considered here because it is typically highly
domain speciﬁc. Experiments in this section evaluate the WR and CR components
with the typical provider population in a static environment.
First, we benchmark the WR component. In this experiment, there are two groups
of consumer agents. The ﬁrst one uses only the IT component4 (called the Control
group). The second makes use of the WR component in addition to the IT compo-
nent (called the WR group). This experiment’s hypothesis is that the performance
of the WR should be higher than that of the Control group.
The result of the experiment, presented in Figure 5.12, shows that the WR com-
ponent does substantially improve the performance of agents in the WR group
compared to that of those in the Control group. The t-test ranking conﬁrms this
by showing that agents using the WR component outperform agents using only
the IT component in all interactions, and, eﬀectively, also veriﬁes our hypothe-
sis. More importantly, however, the WR group achieves its higher performance
quicker than the Control group. This means that WR speeds up an agent’s learn-
ing about its environment by propagating trust in the agent’s community (here
the community of consumer agents is connected to one another via acquaintances).
In the next experiment we evaluate the CR component (using a similar setting).
Here, there are two groups of consumer agents. The Control group employs the IT
component, and the other employs the CR component in addition (called the CR
group). The hypothesis in this experiment is that the CR group, which additionally
makes use of the CR component, should outperform the Control group. The result
presented in Figure 5.13 shows a similar result to that of the previous experiment.
4It should be noted that if Regret is employed in our testbed, its performance will be similar
to that of FIRE’s IT component only. This is due to the fact that there is no information
about a social network of the agents in the testbed available for Regret. Therefore, other than
the direct trust component, the other components of Regret will not be able to work due to a
lack of supporting information (e.g. its witness reputation component will not be able to locate
witnesses, and the neighbourhood reputation component will not be able to locate neighbouring
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Figure 5.12: Performance of the WR component.
Hence, all of the claims made above for the WR component are still valid for the
CR component. However, the most noticeable thing about this experiment is its
execution time. Without having to look for witnesses as in the process of WR, the
process of CR is more direct, resulting in an execution time for this experiment
being about 15 times faster than that of the previous one. This conﬁrms our
intuition about the high serviceability of the CR component.
A subtler point shown in this experiment is the quick learning time of the CR
group. Comparing the ﬁrst interactions of the WR group in Figure 5.12 with those
of the CR group, Figure 5.13 shows that the CR group starts oﬀ better than the
WR group right from the ﬁrst few interactions. In order to verify this observation,
eliminating the random factor that may aﬀect the results of the two independent
experiments above, we ran another experiment to compare the performance of
FIRE with and without the CR component. In this experiment, there are also two
groups of consumer agents: the WR group employing the IT and WR components
and the FIRE group employing the IT, WR, and CR component. Our hypothesis
is that the addition of the CR component to FIRE is beneﬁcial, or, equivalently,
the FIRE group should outperform the WR group. The result in Figure 5.14 shows
that the performance of FIRE is indeed always higher than that of the WR group.
In more detail, Table 5.2 shows the FIRE group’s performance reaches its stable
level of around 6.0 in only 8 interactions, while that of the WR group only reaches
2.57 after 10 interactions. This shows that the CR process propagates trust in an
agent community more quickly than the WR process. Taking into consideration
its very quick execution time, compared to that of the WR component in the
previous experiments, the CR component is clearly useful in situations where an
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Figure 5.14: Performance of FIRE with and without the CR component.
WR information is scarce and diﬃcult to locate. We conclude that the addition of
the CR component to FIRE is beneﬁcial both in terms of its robustness (reﬂected
by its higher level of performance) and its serviceability.
In summary, it has been shown that taking various sources of trust information
into account not only helps FIRE be able to make trust evaluations in a wide
variety of situations, but also increases its usefulness; and that both the WR and
CR components contribute a signiﬁcant amount to its overall performance.
Interaction: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
WR −0.50 −0.39 −0.35 0.01 0.40 0.99 1.36 1.80 2.10 2.57
CR 0.71 2.08 2.94 4.38 5.02 5.34 5.67 5.92 5.99 5.89
Table 5.2: The performance of WR and FIRE in the ﬁrst 10 interactionsChapter 5 Empirical Evaluation 84
5.4 Summary
This chapter has presented various experiments to investigate the behaviour of
FIRE. These experiments were designed to assess the eﬀectiveness of FIRE in a
wide range of situations. Speciﬁcally, we showed that FIRE helps its users to
select appropriate partners for interactions. In terms of utility gain, agents using
FIRE outperform those using SPORAS, a centralised model, despite the fact that
SPORAS collects more information than FIRE. This result remains even when
FIRE is used in diﬀerent provider populations. More importantly, we showed that
FIRE copes well with various changes that are typically present in a realistic MAS.
It is able to learn changes in the environment quickly and to maintain a stable
and high performance.
In addition, we showed that the WR and CR components contribute highly to
FIRE’s performance and their mechanisms allow trust information to be propa-
gated quickly in an agent society. Particularly, FIRE with the CR component
achieves a signiﬁcantly higher level of performance than without it. Moreover, CR
also speeds up FIRE’s bootstrapping and has a very low running cost (in terms of
time and resources required for trust evaluations).
Overall, it was shown that FIRE is a robust trust model and that all its components
contribute signiﬁcantly to its performance. However, in the experiments reported
in this chapter we assumed that all agents are honest in exchanging information,
which is not realistic in open MAS (as noted in our requirements in Section 2.5).
In the next phase of our research, we extend FIRE with the ability to detect lying
and inaccuracy in third-party ratings. This allows FIRE to ﬁlter out inaccurate
ratings when evaluating trust based on WR and CR. The details of this are given
in the next chapter. Subsequently, Chapter 7 shows how learning techniques can
help to adapt FIRE’s parameters to an agent’s own situation.Chapter 6
Handling Inaccurate Reports
As we have shown in the previous chapter, third-party reports (i.e. witness
reports and certiﬁed ratings) propagate trust information in an agent society.
They are particularly useful in speeding up an agent’s learning about its peers’
behaviours and, in so doing, they help it gain high utility by choosing to interact
with appropriate partners despite its lack of direct experiences. However, a key
problem in this area, and one that is exacerbated in open MAS, is that these reports
can be inaccurate. This can happen because of the diﬀering views of the reporters
(e.g. ‘on-time good delivery’ may indicate an ‘excellent service’ for one person
but may only indicate a ‘satisfactory service’ to another, close business partners
may receive preferential services compared the normal services that other ordinary
customers receive). However, it can also happen due to the conﬂicting interests
that stem from the fact that there are multiple stakeholders (e.g. some reporters
may deliberately provide false information to serve their own interests). In both
cases, third-party reports that diﬀer from the actual performance an agent receives
are viewed as inaccurate and their inaccuracy1 is reﬂected by the magnitude of
the diﬀerences. Now, since these reports are central building blocks for reputation
systems, if their inaccuracy is not recognised and dealt with, it will adversely aﬀect
the function of these systems. Worse still, they may become a means for malicious
agents to gain unwarranted trust which may then allow them to beneﬁt to the
detriment of others.
Given its importance, there have been several attempts to tackle the inaccurate
1It should be noted that, in this context, inaccuracy is according to the view of the agent
receiving third-party reports. It does not reﬂect the true honesty/accuracy of a reporting agent.
Rather it should be viewed as the subjective measure of the usefulness of third-party information
provided by that agent which is assessed by another particular agent.
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reports problem (see Section 2.4.3), but none of them are well suited to open MAS.
In particular, in order to operate as intended, they typically make assumptions
about the target environment that are incompatible with the characteristics of
open MAS or they require additional domain knowledge that clearly limits their
applicability (see Section 2.4.3 for examples). To this end, we devise a credibility
model that can be used by trust and reputation models in open MAS to assess the
accuracy of a reporter. In so doing, we extend FIRE to deal with situations where
agents may provide inaccurate reports. Against this background, this chapter
describes our credibility model (Section 6.1) and provides an empirical evaluation
of its performance (Section 6.2).
6.1 Credibility Model
The credibility of a witness or a referee in reporting its ratings about another
agent can be derived from a number of sources. These include knowledge about:
• the relationships between the reporter and the rated agent (e.g. cooperating
partners may exaggerate each other’s performance, competing agents may
underrate their opponents, no relationship may imply impartial ratings);
• the reputation of the reporter for being honest and expert in the ﬁeld in
which it is doing the rating (e.g. a reputable and independent ﬁnancial
consultant should provide fair ratings about the services of various banks);
• the relationships between the reporter and the querying agent (e.g. agents
with the same owner should provide honest reports to one another);
• norms in the reporter’s society (e.g. doctors usually recommend a drug to
the beneﬁts of patients, rather than to the beneﬁt of its pharmaceutical
companies).
Unfortunately, however, these types of information are very application speciﬁc
and may not be readily available in many cases. Therefore, although they could
certainly be used to enhance the performance of a credibility measure, they are
not suitable as a generic basis (although they could complement a generic measure
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In contrast, in our credibility model, we view providing third-party reports as a
service an agent provides. Thus its performance (i.e. trustworthiness and reliabil-
ity) can be evaluated and predicted by a trust model. By so doing, the credibility
model can beneﬁt from a trust model’s (usually sophisticated) ability of learning
and predicting an agent’s behaviour (in this case, the behaviour of providing accu-
rate reports) without having to implement its own method. Here, we use FIRE’s
IT component for this purpose2. Although witness reports in WR and references
in CR are both third-party reports and their accuracy can be modelled in the
same way, an agent can take the roles of a witness and a referee at the same time
and behave diﬀerently in each role. This is because witness reports in WR are
only revealed to a selected set of agents, while references in CR are public as the
refereed agent can give its references to any other agents. Knowing this, an agent
may have diﬀerent lying strategies in each role. For example, it may lie more
when providing witness reports than when providing certiﬁed references because
there is more chance that it can get away with lying (since signiﬁcantly fewer
agents receive its witness reports). Therefore, we consider that it is necessary to
evaluate the credibility of an agent in terms of providing witness reports (called
witness credibility) and that in terms of providing references (called referee credi-
bility) separately. However, since we use the same credibility model for both these
tasks, for the sake of simplicity, henceforth, we shall only describe the evaluation
of witness credibility and how WR can make use of it in this section. The same
procedure is applied for referee credibility.
In more detail, after having an interaction with agent b, agent a records its rating
about b’s performance, denoted by ra (ra = (a,b,ia,c,va)). Now, if agent a previ-
ously received a witness report from agent w about b, it then rates the credibility
of w by comparing the actual performance of b (i.e. va) with w’s rating about
b. The smaller the diﬀerence between the two rating values, the higher agent w
is rated in terms of providing witness reports (mutatis mutandis for bigger diﬀer-
ences). For each rating that a received from w in evaluating the trustworthiness
of b (denoted by rk = (w,b,ik,c,vk)), the credibility rating value vw for agent w
is given in the following formula:
vw =
(
1 − |vk − va| if |vk − va| < ι
−1 if |vk − va| ≥ ι
(6.1)
2It should be noted that the credibility model is not necessarily limited to just using IT
only. Other components of FIRE could equally well be used for the same purpose. For example,
suppose that an agent knows that the reporter belongs to its owner, it can use rules to give a
high credibility to that reporter; or if a witness is known to be reliable, witness reports about
the reporter can also be taken into account.Chapter 6 Handling Inaccurate Reports 88
where ι is the inaccuracy tolerance threshold (0 ≤ ι ≤ 2, 2 is the maximal diﬀerence
since vk,va ∈ [−1,1]). Thus if the diﬀerence between a witness rating value and
the actual performance is higher than ι, the witness is considered to be inaccurate
or lying, and, therefore, receives a negative rating of −1 for its credibility. On the
other hand, if the diﬀerence is within the tolerance threshold, it can be viewed as
resulting from a subjective viewpoint and is deemed acceptable. In this case, the
credibility rating value vw is set to be inversely varied to the diﬀerence (e.g. higher
diﬀerence, lower credibility). Since 0 ≤ |vn−va| ≤ 2, vw is also in the range [−1,1]
regardless of ι. The rating about w’s credibility—rw = (a,w,iw,termWCr,vw)—is
then recorded in a’s rating database, where termWCr is the rating term of providing
witness reports and iw is the interaction of agent w providing agent a the rating
rk about agent b.
Here, as agents whose inaccuracy exceeds the tolerance threshold are considered
lying and are heavily ﬁned (by giving a −1 credibility rating), honest witnesses
may be falsely penalised if their (honest) ratings are too diﬀerent from that of
a (e.g some agents may have substantially varying levels of performance which
result in varying, though honest, ratings). However, since in the case of acceptable
inaccuracy (|vk − va| < ι) an agent’s credibility is also penalised according to the
degree of its inaccuracy (i.e. |vk − va|), it is always safe to set ι to higher values
to reduce the probability of falsely classifying honest witnesses. Nevertheless,
doing so inevitably allows ratings from marginally lying reporters be accepted. In
such cases, although the credibility of such witnesses may be low, it may never
be low enough, or it may take a longer time, for them to be considered lying
and be disregarded (see below). This means, in general, that there will be a
lower performance of the credibility model. Therefore, it is important to choose
a threshold value that closely reﬂects the variability of the agents’ performance
in the target environment and the relative costs of considering lying witnesses
versus falsely classifying them. To this end, Section 7.3 proposes a technique to
automatically tune ι according to the agents’ performance deviation.
Having recorded ratings about w’s performance on providing witness reports, a
can evaluate w’s credibility based on those ratings. As mentioned above, a can
use its own trust model for so doing. Speciﬁcally, here we evaluate a’s trust on
w’s capability of providing accurate reports using the IT component to calculate
the credibility trust value of w from the set of ratings about w’s witness credibil-
ity (called RI(a,w,termWCr), which is retrieved from the rating database as per
Section 3.3). If no such ratings have been recorded, and, thus, the IT value is not




TI(a,w,termWCr) if RI(a,w,termWCr) 6= ∅
TDWCr otherwise
(6.2)
where TWCr(a,w) is the witness credibility of w evaluated by a.
Having deﬁned the credibility measure for witnesses, we extend the WR component
to weight each witness rating received according to the credibility of the witness.
Suppose that agent a is evaluating the WR of agent b and that the rating ri is
collected from witness w, then the weight for ri is obtained as follows:
ωW(ri) =
(
0 if TWCr(a,w) ≤ 0
TWCr(a,w) · ωI(ri) otherwise
(6.3)
This means the new rating weight function disregards any rating provided by wit-
nesses that have negative credibility (by giving 0 as the weight for their ratings).
The rest are taken into account in producing the WR of b, but are weighted by the
credibility of their providers and by their recency (provided by the function ωI(ri)
of the IT component). In so doing, ratings from the more accurate witnesses (as
judged by the accuracy of their past ratings) make a bigger impact on the WR
value than those from the less accurate ones. In cases where all the witness rat-
ings collected are disregarded, due to negative credibility of their providers, the
WR component will produce no trust value (as in the case where it fails to collect
witness ratings). In addition, at ﬁrst, every witness receives the default credibility
value since it has not provided witness ratings to agent a before. Hence, end users
can set the value of TDWCr to reﬂect their policy towards newly encountered wit-
nesses. For example, TDWCr can be set to 0 so that newly encountered witnesses are
disregarded until they prove to be credible (by providing ratings in the acceptable
accuracy threshold) or it can be set to 1 to reﬂect the policy that all witnesses
are considered to be accurate and honest until proven otherwise. However, it can
also automatically adjust based on the general level of witness credibility in the
environment as shown in Section 7.2.
Similarly, we extend the CR component to make use of the credibility model. In
brief, after every interaction, each reference of the target agent is compared with
the actual outcome and a rating is recorded for the referee in terms of providing
accurate references (denoted by termRCr) as in Equation 6.1. Then the refereeChapter 6 Handling Inaccurate Reports 90
credibility of an agent is given by the following formula:
TRCr(a,w) =
(
TI(a,w,termRCr) if RI(a,w,termRCr) 6= ∅
TDRCr otherwise
(6.4)
where TRCr(a,w) is the referee credibility of w evaluated by a, RI(a,w,termRCr) is
the set of credibility ratings of w that a recorded in terms of providing accurate
references, and TDRCr is the default referee credibility which is given when no such
ratings has been recorded. Then the rating weight function for CR is redeﬁned
similar to Equation 6.3:
ωR(ri) =
(
0 if TRCr(a,w) ≤ 0
TRCr(a,w) · ωI(ri) otherwise
(6.5)
6.2 Empirical Evaluation
Having extended FIRE to deal with possible inaccuracy and disinformation in
third-party reports, we now turn to evaluating its performance in such situations
(i.e. those where some agents provide dishonest reports). The main question here
is how the new WR and CR components cope with inaccurate reports. We survey
the eﬀect of them on WR in Section 6.2.1 and on CR in Section 6.2.2, respectively.
6.2.1 The eﬀect of inaccurate reports on WR
In order to evaluate how the WR component copes with inaccurate witness reports,
we need to extend the testbed in Section 4.2 to simulate lying in giving out witness
ratings. Speciﬁcally, we introduce ﬁve types of witnesses: Hon, Pos1, Pos2, Neg1,
and Neg2. Agents in the Hon group always reveal their actual ratings truthfully.
Those in Neg1 and Neg2, however, provide to the querying agent ratings that
are lower than those they actually recorded. Conversely, those in Pos1 and Pos2
give falsely higher ratings. The diﬀerence between an actual rating value and
its fabricated one in Neg1 and Pos1 is randomly set in the range [0.3,1.0] (i.e.
representing marginally inaccurate witnesses) and the respective range of Neg2
and Pos2 is [1.0,2.0] (i.e. representing extremely inaccurate witnesses). In the
testbed, we also deﬁne levels of witness inaccuracy at the level of the overall
system (−100 to 100) so that various conﬁgurations of witness population can
















































































Figure 6.1: The proportions of witness types at various levels of witness inac-
curacy.
each level of witness inaccuracy are given in Figure 6.1 (where vertical dotted lines
represent speciﬁc example conﬁgurations of witnesses). For example, level 0 means
that all the witnesses are of the Hon group (and provide their ratings honestly).
Level +80 means that in the witness population, the proportions of Hon, Pos1,
and Pos2 are 20%, 40%, and 40% respectively. It also means that 80% of the
witness population is providing positively exaggerated reports (because 80% of
the witnesses are either Pos1 or Pos2). Similarly, level −60 means that 60% of the
witness population (30% Neg1, 30% Neg2) is providing falsely negative reports.
In our experiments, there are three groups of consumers: NoTrust, SPORAS, and
WR. As in our previous experiments in Chapter 5, agents in the NoTrust group
select provider agents for interaction randomly, those in SPORAS use the trust
values provided by SPORAS for selecting providers, and those in WR use the WR
and IT components of FIRE. The WR component is extended to make use of the
credibility model as described in Section 6.1. The default witness credibility TDWCr
is set to 0.5 so that all ratings from newly encountered witnesses will be taken into
account in calculating WR, but their weights are smaller than those of any proven
accurate witness (which is typically greater than ι = 0.5, see Equation 6.2) and
larger than that of a proven inaccurate one (which is typically negative). The
value of ι is handpicked based on the actual variability of honest rating values in
the testbed (which never exceeds 0.5).
Now, we look at how various levels of witness inaccuracy aﬀect the performance
of each consumer group using the methodology described in Section 4.1. The ex-
periments are run with the following witness inaccuracy levels: −100, −80, ..., 0,Chapter 6 Handling Inaccurate Reports 92
..., +80, +100. In these experiments, inaccurate witnesses always provide inaccu-
rate reports. After plotting the performance of the three consumer groups in each
experiment (for example, see Figure 6.2), it can be seen that the performance of
NoTrust is consistently low (around −1.0). On the other hand, thanks to the trust
models used, the performance of SPORAS and WR are always higher than that of
NoTrust. However, the performance of WR is always superior to that of SPORAS.
In this experiment, since the performance of all providers are equally exaggerated,
it is still the case that good providers generally have better ratings than others.
Hence, in the ﬁrst few interactions, they are selected by WR, and this accounts
for an increase of WR’s UG in this period. Now, after several interactions with
these providers, WR is able to record their actual performance, which is generally
lower than the reported performance of the remaining providers (calculated only
from falsely positive reports). Thus, remaining providers (i.e. ordinary and bad
ones) are then selected in later interactions. As a result, WR’s UG is decreased.
Nevertheless, because of the witness credibility model, during these interactions,
WR is able to realise that all reports are inaccurate, and, thus, future (false) re-
ports are disregarded. Eﬀectively, WR resorts to the IT component for evaluating
providers’ trustworthiness. As for SPORAS, since it cannot ﬁlter out inaccurate
reports, it cannot improve its performance over time. Now, due to the large num-
ber of experiments and associated settings that were conducted and because we
are interested in the eﬀects of varying levels of inaccuracy on WR, we only present
a general analysis of the experiment’s results. In more detail, the chart in Fig-
ure 6.3 shows the average performance of the three groups in each experiment
with various levels of witness inaccuracy. Here, the average performance of each
group is calculated as the average utility gained in each interaction of an agent
in that group. This average performance is calculated from data of the ﬁrst 200
interactions in each experiment (by which time the average UG of all groups is
stable in all experiments).
From Figure 6.3, it can be seen that the performance of both WR and SPORAS
suﬀer as the witness inaccuracy increases (as we would expect). However, the
performance of WR is more robust. In particular, SPORAS suﬀers greatly from
exaggerated positive ratings (because of the reason mentioned above). On the
other hand, although WR also suﬀers from false positive ratings at the beginning
(see Figure 6.2), it can gradually learn and disregard inaccurate witnesses and,
generally speaking, it maintains a high performance. In the cases of falsely negative
ratings (see Figure 6.3, witness inaccuracy level −100 to −20), SPORAS does not

























































Figure 6.3: Performance of NoTrust, SPORAS, and WR at various levels of
inaccuracy.
that falsely negative ratings not only lower the rating values of good providers,
but also lower those of bad and ordinary ones by similar amounts. Hence, it is
still the case that good providers have better reputations in SPORAS, and, thus,
they are more likely to be selected for interaction. This means that SPORAS can
perform normally in scenarios where all lying witnesses provide negative ratings.
However, this is because of the nature of that speciﬁc lying population rather than
SPORAS’s ability of dealing with inaccurate reports. As for WR, as mentioned
above, its ability to detect and penalise inaccurate witnesses also works in such
scenarios and allows WR to maintain a generally high performance.
Next, we seek to determine whether our model can cope with situations where wit-
nesses have more subtle lying behaviour—they lie sometimes and provide their
honest ratings at other times. Here, we investigate two scenarios: the lying wit-


















































Figure 6.5: Lying 75% of the time.
sometimes) and (2) 75% of the time (i.e. mostly lying, being honest sometimes).
The two cases are interesting because some agents may try to fool a reputation
system by lying only a few times to maintain their credibility (case 1) or by giving
reports honestly to increase its (bad) credibility (case 2). The set of experiments
are re-run for the two scenarios and their results are presented in Figures 6.4 and
6.5. From these, it can be seen that the performance of all groups have a broadly
similar pattern in scenarios of negative lying. However, as in the scenarios of lying
100% of the time, SPORAS suﬀers adversely from exaggerated positive reports
(as in the previous experiment). It can also be seen that SPORAS’s performance
decreases in proportion to the amount of lying (i.e 25%, 75%, 100%). In contrast,
in all scenarios presented, our witness credibility model can learn the witnesses’
lying behaviour (thanks to the adaptive nature of FIRE’s IT component), and this
accounts for the robust performance of WR throughout in these scenarios.Chapter 6 Handling Inaccurate Reports 95
6.2.2 The eﬀect of inaccurate reports on CR
Now, we turn to assessing the eﬀect of inaccurate reports on the CR component.
Similar to the previous section, in order to do so, we also introduce lying behaviours
when providing references into the testbed. However, since references are given
and disclosed directly to the refereed agents, a rational referee typically does not
simply give bad references to its interaction partners. The reasons are that (1)
the badly refereed agent might retaliate and (2) it can disregard such references.
Moreover, a rational referee normally does not give exaggerated references for
everyone. Rather, it is more likely to give them only to certain agents—called its
friend agents (e.g. those from the same organisation or having common interests).
Thus, in each experiment in this section, a consumer agent has a maximum number
of friend providers (NFP) that it may collude with when providing references about
their performance. Such providers are selected randomly from a consumer’s nearby
providers when it enters the testbed. In addition, we introduce ﬁve types of
referees: Hon, Exag1, Exag2, Extr1, and Extr2. Agents in the Hon group always
give out their actual ratings as references (as per Section 6.2.1). Exaggerating
referees in groups Exag1 and Exag2, however, give falsely higher ratings than
those they actually recorded for their friend providers3 (and their actual ratings
for the others). In addition to giving falsely inﬂated references for their friends,
extreme referees in Extr1 and Extr2 also deliberately underrate the other providers.
The diﬀerence between an actual rating value and its inaccurate one in Exag1 and
Extr1 is randomly set in the range [0.3,1.0] (i.e. representing marginally inaccurate
referees) and the respective range of Exag2 and Extr2 is [1.0,2.0] (i.e. representing
extremely inaccurate referees).
In this section, we carry out several experiments to evaluate the new CR compo-
nent in a wide range of environments. In these experiments, there are three groups
of consumer agents: NoTrust, SPORAS, and CR. The NoTrust and SPORAS groups
are deﬁned as in our previous experiments. The CR group consists of agents us-
ing the CR component extended to deal with inaccurate references (Section 6.1).
Similar to the experiments with WR, the default credibility level of referee TDRCr
is 0.5 and the lying threshold ι is 0.5. The consumers in each experiment consist of
honest referees and those from only one of the four colluding referee groups (Exag1,
Exag2, Extr1, and Extr2). Each consumer is set to have a maximum of four friend
providers (NFP = 4). The proportion of colluding referees is set to be 0%, 20%,
40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% in these experiments. For example, Figure 6.6 presents
3This is motivated by examples where referees provided exaggerated reports about their
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Figure 6.7: Performance with exaggerating referees.
the result from the experiment where the consumers consist of 20% honest ref-
erees and 80% colluding referees from the Extr2 group. Since NoTrust performs
consistently poorly in all the experiments, its results are omitted from our charts
for the sake of simplicity. Moreover, instead of providing a detailed result of every
experiment as in Figure 6.6, for an overview of the eﬀect of various proportions of
colluding referees versus honest referees, we plot the average UG per interaction
of SPORAS and CR in each experiment on the summary charts in Figures 6.7 and
6.8. In these charts, the plots are named as GroupName.RefereeType. For example,
SPORAS.Extr1 is the plot for the average UG of agents in the SPORAS group when
the colluding referees in the testbed are of the Extr1 group.
The ﬁrst thing these charts show is that collusion adversely aﬀects the perfor-
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Figure 6.8: Performance with extreme referees.
it takes longer for CR to reach a stable level of performance (i.e. to learn about
the colluding agents) and this performance is also lower than that in an honest
environment (see Figure 5.13, Section 5.3). In such circumstances, SPORAS also
yields a low UG and, without a credibility model, it cannot improve its perfor-
mance over time. We can also see that the average performance of both SPORAS
and CR generally decreases when the number of colluding agents increases (Fig-
ures 6.7 and 6.8). However, CR always outperforms SPORAS except in the case
when 100% of the consumers are Extr2 agents. In this particular experiment, since
all consumers are identiﬁed by CR as lying (because all of them provide highly
distorted references for all the providers), CR stops using their references, thus,
depressing performance. However, this particular case (i.e. 100% extreme collu-
sion) is highly unlikely to happen in practice (and if it did one might just retract
trust from the population altogether). In the remaining experiments, CR can eas-
ily detect referees providing highly distorted references and maintain a generally
high performance (see plots CR.Exag2 and CR.Extr2). CR is less eﬀective in ﬁl-
tering out the colluding agents in Exag1 and Extr1 since their colluded references
are less distorted than in the case of Exag2 and Extr2 (i.e. more diﬃcult to detect
lying). This suggests that the inaccuracy tolerance threshold ι should be carefully
selected to reﬂect the nature of biased behaviours in a particular environment, or
better, learning techniques could be used to enable an agent to adjust this param-
eter according to the prevailing context. In this regard, Chapter 7 presents such a
technique in which FIRE monitors the general level of deviation in the providers’
performance in the environment and accordingly adjust the inaccuracy tolerance
threshold on-the-ﬂy.Chapter 6 Handling Inaccurate Reports 98
In summary, the results shows that the credibility model of CR enables it to
outperform SPORAS in dealing with biased behaviours. Speciﬁcally, it allows
agents using CR to maintain a robust and high performance in a wide variety
of cases, especially when the level of collusion is less than 50% (which is, in our
opinion, the most likely case in realistic scenarios).
6.3 Summary
The basic FIRE model presented in Chapter 3 is not able to recognise inaccurate
third-party reports and, thus, in its evaluation (Chapter 5) we had to assume that
all agents were honest. However, this is not realistic in open MAS (as discussed
in our requirements in Section 2.5). Given this, this chapter describes our novel
model of credibility which extends the basic FIRE model in that it can now detect
such inaccuracy. This is done based solely on an agent’s own experience, and,
therefore, no additional domain knowledge is required. As a result, an agent is
able to keep track of the quality of third-party reports and assess the credibility
of a witness or a referee accordingly. Making use of the credibility model, our
extended WR and CR components take into account the credibility of reporters in
weighing their information. Hence, reports from inaccurate reporters can quickly
be ﬁltered out.
Using empirical evaluation, we have shown that with the credibility model our WR
and CR components perform well in a variety of contexts. In all the experiments
where the percentages of inaccurate reporters are less than 50%, the performance
of the WR and CR components is maintained at a comparable level to that in
honest environments. Therefore, with the addition of the credibility model, FIRE
satisﬁes the requirement R4a on being robust against inaccuracy reports (see
Section 2.5). This completes all our requirements for a trust model in open MAS.
In developing a trust model that satisﬁes our initial requirements, we introduced
various parameters so that FIRE can be adapted and ﬁne tuned for a wide range of
applications. However, choosing the right parameters for FIRE to work eﬃciently
in a particular application currently requires a good understanding of how FIRE
operates and the application domain. To overcome this, we believe it is possible
to use a variety of learning techniques to enable FIRE to adapt to its operating
environment and to automatically adjust its parameters accordingly. This work is
detailed in the next chapter.Chapter 7
Adapting FIRE’s Parameters
FIRE is a parameterised model; that is, its behaviour is deﬁned by a set of pa-
rameters. Such parameterisation is necessary in order to make FIRE customisable
to suit particular environments and/or applications. For example, in environments
where there are a high level of lying agents, the component coeﬃcients for the WR
and CR components should be decreased because third-party information is highly
unreliable; or the recency scaling factor λ (see Section 7.1) can be adjusted to suit
the time unit used in a particular environment. However, choosing the right set of
parameters for FIRE to work eﬃciently in a particular environment or application
currently requires a good understanding of how FIRE operates and also of the
application domain. To overcome this, we believe it is possible to use a variety
of learning techniques to enable FIRE to adapt to its operating environment and
to automatically adjust its parameters accordingly. Having been equipped with
such techniques, FIRE is able to adapt itself to changes in an environment on-the-
ﬂy. The beneﬁt of this is twofold. First, a self-adaptive model requires minimal
administration because parameters which are initially set to wrong values can
be readjusted automatically by the model without requiring human intervention.
Second, such a model is more robust in a dynamic environment like an open MAS
since it can adapt itself to changes that were unforseen by the model’s designer.
This chapter surveys the parameters of FIRE and possible techniques to make it
an adaptive model. In the next section, an analysis of FIRE’s parameters is carried
out to choose the parameters to become adaptive. Sections 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 then
describe our learning algorithms for the chosen parameters. Various experiments
are then carried out to empirically evaluate the proposed techniques in Section 7.5.
Finally, a summary is provided in Section 7.6.
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Parameter Symbol
Rating history size H
Rating reliability scaling factor γK
Recency scaling factor λ
Branching factor nBF
Referral length threshold nRL
Component coeﬃcients WK
Inaccuracy tolerance threshold ι
Default witness credibility TDWCr
Default referee credibility TDRCr
Table 7.1: FIRE’s parameters.
7.1 Determining the Parameters to Adapt
FIRE’s parameters (Table 7.1) are designed to enable end users to control its
behaviours and to allow it to be customised for a particular application. Some of
them can be set according to the end users’ subjective considerations, while the
others need to be set according to the (objective) constraints of the application.
For example, an end user can set FIRE to rely more on the IT component than
the others because he believe IT is more reliable than WR and CR, but he can
only set the rating history size according to the available memory of his agents.
Since objective parameters can only be set according to an agent’s individual
situations that are out of FIRE’s control, they are not suitable to become adaptive.
Therefore, in what follows, we identify the subjective parameters and study how
they can made adaptive in the subsequent sections:
• Rating history size (H): This parameter deﬁnes the maximum number of
ratings of a partner (from direct interactions) that are stored in an agent’s
memory (Section 3.1). Thus, for a given agent, only its latest H ratings are
stored; its older ratings are discarded if the number of its ratings exceeds H.
Generally speaking, the more ratings that are stored, the longer the history,
or the more knowledge, about an interaction partner is retained. However, in
practice, this is constrained by an agent’s memory capacity. Therefore, the
agent’s designers must choose H according to the memory resource available
to it.
• Rating reliability scaling factors (γK
1): Each component of FIRE has its own
rating reliability measure to evaluate the reliability, or the quality, of the
1As in previous chapters, K is one of I, R, W, and C, which represent the IT, RB, WR, and
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ratings it receives (Section 3.2). In each component, the reliability values of
the ratings taken into account are used to calculate the reliability value of the
trust value produced from those ratings. The reliability values of trust values
need to conform to the same kind of representation (i.e. 0 for completely
uncertainty and 1 for total conﬁdence) because they are also used as weights
for trust values produced by the trust components that are combined into
an overall trust value (Section 3.7). However, since end users are free to
replace FIRE’s rating reliability measure with their own (to suit a particular
application) and because there is no constraint on such measures except that
they are required to produce a non-negative reliability value for each rating,
the range of rating reliability values can vary greatly. Therefore, a rating
reliability scaling factor (γK) is devised for each component to scale (and to
normalise) the range of the rating reliability measure it uses; and, thus, it
needs to be set according to the range of the rating reliability measure used
in each component.
• Recency scaling factor (λ): This parameter is devised to scale the time unit
that an application uses (Section 3.3) and, thus, allows FIRE to work with
various time systems. For example, artiﬁcial time ticks might be used in
one application, while real time seconds might be used in another. Hence,
this parameter needs to be set to suit the time system used in a particular
application.
• Branching factor (nBF) and Referral length threshold (nRL): The Witness
Reputation component uses these two parameters to deﬁne the search range
in which it will look for the required witnesses (Section 3.5). The former
limits the breadth of the search range (i.e. how many acquaintances an agent
will pass on a query onto) and the latter limits how far away it is (i.e. to query
agents at how many links away from the querying agent). Although a broader
and further search range potentially yields a better result (i.e. more witnesses
found) than a smaller one, as a trade-oﬀ, it also requires more resources in
terms of (searching) time, communication costs, and, sometimes, information
costs (e.g. a queried agent may request payment for its information). In light
of this, the two parameters above were designed to enable an agent to limit
the number of agents to be contacted in a witness search to suit its resource
constraints. Therefore, these parameters can only be set by the agent or its
designer according to its own situation.
• Component coeﬃcients (WK): In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of an
agent, FIRE uses its four components and combines the trust values thatChapter 7 Adapting FIRE’s Parameters 102
these components produce into an overall value (Section 3.7). Since each
component derives trust values from an independent source of ratings, its
accuracy can diﬀer from the others’. Therefore, trust values from the four
components are not equally taken into account when an overall trust value
is produced, but, rather, they are weighted according to an agent’s belief on
how accurate they are deemed to be (Equation 3.6). For instance, an agent
might believe that the ratings it makes itself are more accurate than third-
party ratings and, thus, it gives more weight to the trust values produced by
the Interaction Trust component than to those produced by the Witness and
Certiﬁed Reputation components. Here, the component coeﬃcients (wK) are
the weights for the components and are set by an agent’s designer according
to such beliefs. However, presetting ﬁxed component coeﬃcients might yield
bad results when the actual situation does not correspond with the agent’s
beliefs. For example, an agent might interact very infrequently and, thus,
might not have suﬃcient ratings for the IT component to produce accurate
trust values. In that situation, relying heavily on IT rather than WR or
CR would possibly give an unreliable overall trust value. Another possible
situation is where the number of inaccurate reporters (i.e. witnesses, refer-
ees) in an agent’s environment increases or decreases; and this will aﬀect the
accuracy of the WR or CR components. In order to deal with such uncer-
tainties, FIRE should be able to adjust the component coeﬃcients to reﬂect
the actual accuracy of the corresponding components.
• Inaccuracy tolerance threshold (ι): In our credibility model (Section 6.1), the
inaccuracy tolerance threshold ι is used to speed up the process of ﬁltering
out clearly unreliable (e.g. lying) witnesses or referees by classifying those
that provide ratings whose inaccuracy exceeds ι as liars and giving them the
minimum credibility rating value (−1). However, incorrect classiﬁcation is
always possible and, if made, can be a signiﬁcant problem. For example,
a provider’s performance can vary so highly that it makes an honest and
accurate recent rating too diﬀerent to that provider’s next performance and
since the diﬀerence is greater than the (low) ι value, the rating’s reporter
is (wrongly) classiﬁed as lying. This would result in that reporter’s future
(honest) ratings be disregarded. Conversely, an unnecessarily high ι value
is also ineﬃcient as it allows lying reporters to ‘get away’ (i.e. to be unde-
tected) and slows down the learning process of FIRE’s credibility model. In
such situations, knowing the typical performance deviation of providers in
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propose to monitor the performance deviation of all the providers an agent
encounters and to use it to adjust the inaccuracy tolerance threshold ι.
• Default witness credibility (TDWCr) and Default referee credibility (TDRCr):
These two parameters are the default values for the credibility of a witness
and a referee, respectively, when FIRE cannot evaluate the credibility of
them because of a lack of past experience (Section 6.1). They are normally
set (by a designer) to reﬂect the policy of the agent for handling information
from a newly encountered witness or referee. Setting TDWCr to 0, for exam-
ple, means that witness information from newly encountered witnesses are
initially believed not to be accurate and, therefore, not used; thus, all wit-
nesses need to prove their credibility by presenting accurate information to
the agent ﬁrst. Conversely, setting the parameter to 1 means that all newly
encountered witnesses are believed to be accurate unless proved otherwise
(i.e. detected giving false ratings). TDRCr is set similarly. However, either
setting can be ineﬃcient. Setting the default credibility to 0 in an honest
environment (where most agents are honest and accurate) will initially ren-
der valued information from newly encountered agents useless, while setting
it to 1 in an environment where there are many lying agents will feed in-
accurate information to FIRE. Therefore, we propose to monitor the level
of inaccurate witnesses/referees in an agent’s environment to calculate the
likely credibility of a newly met agent.
In summary, FIRE’s subjective parameters are: the component coeﬃcients, the
inaccuracy tolerance threshold, and the default witness/referee credibility. In the
subsequent sections (7.2, 7.3, and 7.4), we study present our approaches to make
these parameters adaptive in order to push FIRE towards a self-adaptable trust
model.
7.2 Component Performance Learning
As discussed above, in order for FIRE to eﬃciently make use of the trust values
produced by its components, the component coeﬃcients WK should be set to reﬂect
the accuracy of the corresponding components and they should also be updated
accordingly when the components’ performance changes. To this end, we use FIRE
itself to monitor the performance (i.e. accuracy) of its components. In order to do
so, we introduce four virtual agents into the FIRE model of each agent; they areChapter 7 Adapting FIRE’s Parameters 104
named compI, compR, compW, and compC representing the IT, RB, WR, and CR
components respectively. The performance of each component is then recorded as
the performance of the corresponding agent. It is measured by how accurate its
trust values are in predicting the performance of other agents as follows. Suppose
that agent a uses FIRE to predict the performance of agent b and then interacts
with b. After the interaction, a can observe the actual performance of b and can
use this to determine how accurate each of FIRE’s component was. Speciﬁcally,
let vb
K be the trust value of b that component K produced before the interaction
and vo be b’s actual performance observed by a; the accuracy of component K in
that particular interaction is calculated from the diﬀerence between vb
K and vo:
vi = 1 − |vo − v
b
K| (7.1)
where vi is the accuracy of component K. Since −1 ≤ vo,vb
K ≤ 1, vi is also bound
in [−1,1], where 1 is the maximum possible accuracy (when vo = vb
K) and −1 is
the minimum (when |vo−vb
K| = 2). The accuracy of component K is then recorded
as a rating for compK: ri = (a,compK,tei,termCP,vi), where tei refers to the trust
evaluation that a made using FIRE and termCP is the term for trust component
performance.
Having recorded ratings for each component, FIRE can now evaluate their per-
formance. Since these ratings are the direct experience of agent a, we use the IT
component for this purpose:
TCP(a,compK) = TI(a,compK,termCP) (7.2)
where TCP(a,compK) is the trust agent a has in the performance of compK; or, in
other words, the expected performance of compK given a’s experience (i.e. ratings).
The trust value for compK is then used to adjust the component coeﬃcient of com-
ponent K; the potential value for WK (denoted by W 0
K) is taken from TCP(a,compK)
if it greater than 0 (i.e. the trust values produced by component K are expected
to be somewhat accurate), otherwise (i.e. TCP(a,compK) < 0, component K is too
inaccurate) trust values from component K should be ignored (W 0
K is set to 0):
W
0
K = max{0,TCP(a,compK)} (7.3)
Here, the potential value W 0
K is not assigned directly to WK because it might
ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly from interaction to interaction. This is because the accuracy
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evaluates. For instance, an agent may interact with others frequently and its IT
component generally performs well, but for a target agent it has never interacted
with before, the IT component’s performance can be very low (due to the lack of
direct experience). In order to avoid the situation in which a trust component is
temporarily disabled because of such ﬂuctuations, FIRE partly ‘remembers’ the
previous value of a component coeﬃcient; thus, it adjusts WK towards the potential
value W 0
K instead of using W 0
K directly:
WK = qCPL · W
pre





K is the previous value of WK (i.e. before this update) and qCPL ∈ [0,1] is
the memory parameter for component performance learning deﬁning how strongly
FIRE remembers previous values of WK. If qCPL is set to 0, FIRE will ‘forget’ the
previous value completely; the nearer qCPL is to 1, the less WK is adjusted towards
its potential value W 0
K.
7.3 Inaccuracy Threshold Learning
Classifying a reporter as honest or lying only based on the information it provides is
diﬃcult. Typically, the evaluator’s view in an open MAS is limited (see Section 1.1)
and there is usually no way it can conﬁrm whether the ratings it receives are honest
and based on the actual observation of the target agent’s performance. Thus, in
order to assess the accuracy of such third-party ratings, the evaluator can only
compare them with its own observations of the target agent. In our credibility
model (Section 6.1), the diﬀerence between a third-party rating of the target agent
and the performance the evaluator receives from it serves as the measure of the
reporter’s accuracy. Based on this measure, the reporter is then classiﬁed as
lying/inaccurate or honest/accurate. However, this accuracy measure alone is
not enough. The diﬀerence between a third-party rating and the performance the
evaluator observes can be attributed to many things: (1) the variation of the target
agent’s performance, (2) the reporter’s (in)ability of making accurate ratings, and
(3) the reporter’s intentional manipulation of the rating’s value. Ideally, only
when (2) or (3) is the case should the reporter be classiﬁed as lying/inaccurate
and its future ratings be ﬁltered out (as a result). However, there is no way for the
evaluator to tell whether the diﬀerence is due to (1) or not because it cannot know
the performance the reporter received from the target agent. Therefore, it can
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small and that any inaccuracy greater than the typical performance variation
of providers is deemed to be due to (2) or (3). Here, the inaccuracy tolerance
threshold ι serves as the borderline to separate between cases (1) and cases (2) or
(3) and it needs to be set based on the typical performance variation of providers in
an agent’s environment. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, ﬁxed values
for ι can be ineﬃcient if the agent’s designer chooses a wrong value. Moreover,
an agent can interact with only a small set of providers in an open MAS whose
typical performance variation is diﬀerent to that of another set or that of the
whole open MAS. Hence, in this section, we propose an algorithm to monitor
the performance variation of the providers an agent encounters and to adjust the
inaccuracy tolerance threshold accordingly.
In order to do so, we ﬁrst need to calculate the performance deviations of the
providers that the evaluator, say, agent a, has encountered. The performance
deviation of a provider, say, agent b, in term c is calculated by a as follows:
dv(a,b,c) =
P
ri∈RI(a,b,c) |vi − v|
|RI(a,b,c)|
(7.5)
where dv(a,b,c) is the performance deviation of b in term c that is observed by a,
RI(a,b,c) is the set of ratings of b in term c that a made from past interactions
with b, vi is the value of the rating ri, and v is the mean value of all the rating
values in the set RI(a,b,c). The performance deviation is used to estimate the
variations in providers’ performance only when it is calculated from at least two
ratings. Otherwise, the deviation from one rating is always 0 and does not give
any information regarding the variation of a provider’s performance. Next, the
average performance deviation of all the provider agents a encountered at least
twice (denoted by the set P) is used as the potential value for the inaccuracy







where |P| is the number of agents in the set P. If this number is too small, ι0
may not be representative and the inaccuracy tolerance threshold ι should not
be replaced by it completely. Otherwise, the value of ι can ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly
when an agent has just joined an environment and interacted with a small number




nMD if |P| < nMD
ι0 otherwise
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where nMD is the minimum number of deviation values for ι0 to be considered
representative and ιpre is the previous value of ι (i.e. before this update). In
short, if the potential value ι0 is calculated from the deviation values of suﬃcient
agents (i.e. ≥ nMD) then ι0 is assigned to ι. Otherwise, ι is only partly updated
based on ι0 and the impact of ι0 on the new value of ι is given by the number of
deviation values taken into account (|P|) when ι0 is calculated. The inaccuracy
tolerance threshold ι is updated every time an agent has new information about
the performance variation of its providers. This means that an ι update happens
(after) every time a interacts with a provider agent (i.e. FIRE received a new
direct rating) that it has interacted with before (so that a has at least two ratings
of the rated agent to calculate its performance deviation).
7.4 Default Credibility Learning
In this section, FIRE is extended to monitor the level of inaccuracy of the witnesses
and referees that an agent encounters. It can then adjust the default credibility
values for newly met witnesses and referees so that it does not ignore potentially
good information or use potentially bad information (as discussed in the examples
provided in Section 7.1). In order to do so, the latest credibility of every agent
calculated by the evaluator is stored in a credibility cache. FIRE is equipped with
two such caches; one for witnesses, denoted by WCr, and the other for referees,
denoted by RCr. In our notation here, WCr and RCr are treated as sets of credibility
values and WCr(w) and RCr(r) are used to refer to the latest credibility values of
witness w and referee r, respectively. The process of adjusting the default witness
credibility is as follows:
1. When evaluating the credibility of a witness w, if the evaluator has credibility
ratings of w (see Section 6.1), w’s credibility value can be calculated and is
then stored in WCr (i.e. the evaluator’s witness credibility cache).
2. If the evaluator does not have any credibility ratings of w and, thus, FIRE
cannot calculate the credibility of w. In this case, we would expect that the
credibility of w is similar to that of the witnesses the evaluator had expe-
riences with. Therefore, the default credibility for w should be calculated
as the mean credibility from all the credibility values of the witnesses theChapter 7 Adapting FIRE’s Parameters 108






where WCr is the mean credibility of all witnesses in the set/cache WCr.
3. As in the previous section, WCr can only serve as the potential value for
the default witness credibility TDWCr since it may not be representative if
calculated from a small number of witnesses’ credibility values. Likewise,
we introduce the minimum number of witness credibility values, denoted by
nMWCr, required for WCr to be representative. The default witness credibility











DRCr is the previous value of TDWCr (i.e. before this update).
Similarly, for the default referee credibility (TDRCr), the mean credibility is calcu-






where RCr is the mean credibility of all referees in the set/cache RCr. The default











DRCr is the previous value of TDWCr (i.e. before this update) and nMRCr is
the minimum number of referee credibility values required for calculating RCr so
that it can be considered representative.
7.5 Empirical Evaluation
Having presented the learning techniques to automatically adjust the component
coeﬃcients, the inaccuracy threshold, and the default witness/referee credibility,
we now turn to their evaluation to determine whether these techniques are in factChapter 7 Adapting FIRE’s Parameters 109
eﬀective (i.e. they can choose the right values for the parameters in question in a
variety of changing situations). First, Section 7.5.1 starts with the experiments to
evaluate the learning algorithm for component coeﬃcients. Those for adjusting the
inaccuracy threshold and the default witness/referee credibility are subsequently
presented in Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3, respectively. All the experiments use the
standard settings as deﬁned in Section 4.3 unless otherwise stated.
7.5.1 Component performance learning
In this section, the learning algorithm for FIRE’s component coeﬃcients is evalu-
ated to see whether it helps FIRE to cope with the situation in which a component
that used to function well fails. The WR and CR components are chosen as the tar-
get for the experiments in this section since their performance depends signiﬁcantly
on the inaccuracy of the ratings they receive and this can easily be manipulated
in our testbed. Speciﬁcally, in these experiments, none of the consumer agents
is an honest witness or an honest referee. They all provides both false witness
and certiﬁed ratings. However, their lying percentage can be externally control.
For example, in the ﬁrst experiment, at ﬁrst the WR lying percentage is set to
100% and the CR lying percentage is set to 0%. This means that each consumer
lies 100% of the time when providing witness ratings and always provides honest
certiﬁed ratings (0% lying). This eﬀectively renders the WR component useless
(because all witnesses are lying all the time) and leaves the CR component in tact.
During the experiment, the WR and CR lying percentages are changed often to
create a situation where the components’ performance is aﬀected by the changes in
the agent’s environment. In order to simulate drastic changes in an environment
that can render one trust component useless, the WR and CR lying percentages
are set to be alternating between 100% and 0% every 60 rounds (Figure 7.1). For
example, in the ﬁrst 60 rounds, the WR component is almost useless (because
all witnesses are lying), while all the information the CR component receives is
honest and accurate. The situation of the two components are then switched after
every 60 rounds. It should be noted that this is the worst case scenario which is
somewhat unlikely to happen in practice. However, this case is chosen for our ﬁrst
experiment here to demonstrate the maximum beneﬁt of component performance
learning and to test its ability to cope with such drastic changes.
In order to evaluate the new learning algorithm, we introduce two groups of con-
sumer agents into this experiment. Both of them use FIRE without the IT com-
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Figure 7.2: Component weight learning—Fixed initial weight values.
ponents) with the credibility model extension (to detect lying, Chapter 6) as their
trust models. However, only one of them implements the new learning algorithm.
We name that group WCRL and the other WCR (‘L’ signiﬁes learning abilities).
The performance of both groups are monitored as in our previous experiments. In
addition, we also monitor the average component coeﬃcients of WCRL. The com-
ponent coeﬃcients of both groups are initially set to the same value 0.5 (the mid
value in the range of component coeﬃcients). This means that both the WR and
CR components are initially treated the same (the same initial weights). After the
experiment, the average component coeﬃcients of WCRL are plotted in Figure 7.2
and the performance of both groups is plotted in Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: Learning performance—Fixed initial weight values.
in Figure 7.1 (the WR and CR lying percentages), as we would expect, we can
see that the coeﬃcient for the WR of WCRL (WW) is low when the WR lying
percentage is 100% (i.e. when WR performs badly) and it quickly increases to
near 0.9 (high) when the WR lying percentage is changed to 0%. Similarly, the
coeﬃcient of WCRL’s component (WC) initially goes up because the CR compo-
nent is given accurate information and produces accurate trust values. When the
CR lying percentage is 100% (e.g. from round 61 to 120), WC decreases because
CR cannot produce accurate trust values anymore. Generally, the lines of WW
and WC in Figure 7.2 correspond closely to the changes of the witness and referee
populations in Figure 7.1 that aﬀect the performance of the WR and CR compo-
nents2. This shows the new learning algorithm can eﬀectively track the changes in
the performance of FIRE components and adjust the corresponding weights (i.e.
the component coeﬃcients) accordingly, even though it does not directly track
the level of lying in the testbed. This shows that the method used for learning
component performance is generic and it can reasonably be expected to work with
other types of changes that aﬀect the components’ performance, not just the lying
percentages as in our experiment. As a result, the performance plots in Figure 7.3
and the t-test rankings show that the learning algorithm helps WCRL to cope with
the changes introduced in the testbed and outperforms WCR in most interactions3.
2It should be noted that there is a gradual decrease of WC from round 61 to 120 in Figure 7.2
that does not correspond closely to the abrupt change in the CR lying percentage (in the same
period in Figure 7.1). However, this does not mean that the algorithm cannot track the changes
well. In fact, since providers store references they receive, good (i.e. honest) references (from
the previous period where there is no CR lying) are still stored and presented for a little while
before they are all replaced by false references. Thanks to these (lingering) honest references,
the performance of CR does not drop abruptly and this is reﬂected in the gradual decrease of
WC as shown in Figure 7.2.
3WCRL and WCR have a similar level performance in the bootstrap period (the ﬁrst ﬁve
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Figure 7.5: Learning performance—Randomly initialised weight values.
In order to ensure our learning algorithm still works in various situations, we repeat
the experiment above except that the component coeﬃcients WW and WC of the
group are not initially ﬁxed but randomly initialised in [0,1]. This is to show that
the learned parameters can still converge from random initial values. The results
presented in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 are very similar to that of our ﬁrst experiment and,
thus, it shows our algorithm can work well even when the component coeﬃcients
are wrongly set to arbitrary values.
In the two previous experiments, the abrupt changes introduced in the testbed are
useful for verifying our algorithm’s eﬀectiveness. However, they are not typical in
realistic scenarios because it is unusual that all the agents (of various ownerships)
to switch their behaviours at the same time. Therefore, our ﬁrst experiment is
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Figure 7.7: Component weight learning—Gradual change.
further repeated but the changes in the WR and CR lying percentages are now
made gradually (Figure 7.6). This models the case in which the behaviours of
the agents gradually change through time (which is more likely the case in a real-
world environment). The result plotted in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 again shows that
our algorithm can still track well the (gradual) changes and help FIRE to obtain
better performance than without the algorithm.
7.5.2 Inaccuracy tolerance threshold learning
As discussed in Section 7.3, there are three causes to rating inaccuracy: (1) the
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Figure 7.8: Learning performance—Gradual change.
accurate ratings, and (3) the reporter’s intentional manipulation of the rating’s
value. Given these, the inaccuracy tolerance threshold ι serves as the borderline
for the credibility model to distinguish between inaccurate ratings due to cause (1)
(i.e. honest ratings) and those due to (2) and (3) (i.e. inaccurate/false ratings).
Based on the performance deviation of the providers an agent encounters, the algo-
rithm presented in Section 7.3 is designed to automatically adjust the inaccuracy
tolerance threshold to help the credibility model make an accurate classiﬁcation
of honest and lying reports. Therefore, in this section, we evaluate how this al-
gorithm performs in terms of its improvements to the classiﬁcation’s accuracy. In
order to measure this accuracy, as our testbed knows which ratings are honest
and which are fabricated, we extend the current testbed to count the number of
ratings that are correctly classiﬁed; the percentage of correctly classiﬁed ratings
(over the total number of third-party ratings an agent receives) is then used as the
classiﬁcation accuracy measure.
Generally speaking, if the performance of agents varies signiﬁcantly, a low ι value
would result in a high number of wrongly classiﬁed ratings, and vice versa. There-
fore, in this section, the changes we introduce into the testbed to evaluate the
adaptability of the ι parameter are the various levels of provider’s performance
variations. Since the performance of the providers in our testbed are simulated
following the normal distribution (Section 4.2.1), such changes can simply be ob-
tained by setting the standard deviation σP of the provider’s performance to the
desired values. In this experiment, the σP of all providers are set according to the
chart in Figure 7.9 (the right y-axis); thus there are four levels of performance
deviation: 0.1 (very low), 2.0, 4.0, and 6.04(very high).












































































Figure 7.9: Variation of provider performance and the adaptation of inaccu-
racy threshold.
In this experiment, there are three groups of consumer agents, all of which use
only FIRE’s CR component with the credibility model extension5. The ﬁrst two
groups have ﬁxed ι = 0.5 and ι = 1.0 (i.e. low and high inaccuracy thresholds,
respectively). The agents in the third group (called ι auto) implement the algo-
rithm in Section 7.3 to update their ι parameter automatically. There are also
three proﬁles of referees in the consumer’s population: Hon, Extr1, and Extr2 (see
Section 6.2.2). In order to build a balanced (typical) referee population, the pro-
portions of honest and lying referees are equal (50% are Hon); and among the lying
referees, half of them lie mildly (25% are Extr1) and the other half are extremely
inaccurate (25% are Extr2).
The results of this experiment is plotted in Figure 7.10, which shows the percent-
ages of ratings correctly classiﬁed by each consumer group in each round. Compar-
ing these to the changes of providers’ performance deviation shown in Figure 7.9,
there is a clear correlation. Speciﬁcally, the second group with a ﬁxed ι = 1.0 per-
forms worst in the ﬁrst 100 rounds because the actual variations of the providers’
performance are low. Now, it appears that the group’s classiﬁcation accuracy is
low, because it classiﬁed mildly lied ratings as honest, due to its high value of
ι. It can only achieve its maximum classiﬁcation accuracy when the providers’
performance deviation is raised up in rounds 101 to 200. The situation is reversed
Therefore, σP = 6.0 is a very high level of deviation (about 32% of the time the actual per-
formance of a provider falls outside the range [µP − 6,µP + 6] around its mean performance
µP).
5Since this experiment is to evaluate the accuracy of third-party rating classiﬁcation, the IT
component is not relevant. Both the WR and CR could equally well be used here. However, we
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Figure 7.10: The accuracy of referee classiﬁcation using ﬁxed ι versus using
automatically learned one.
with the ﬁrst consumer group (ﬁxed ι = 0.5). Having a ﬁxed low ι, it performs
best in the ﬁrst 100 rounds (when the providers’ performance variation is low) and
worst in the latter 100 rounds (low inaccuracy threshold, high providers’ perfor-
mance deviation). By having the ability to monitor the actual variations of the
providers’ performance, only the third group manages to maintain a high level of
rating classiﬁcation accuracy throughout the 200 rounds of simulation. Moreover,
its accuracy is always higher than, or at least comparable to, that of the other
two groups. This shows that the algorithm we introduce helps the third group to
eﬀectively adapt its ι parameter according to changes in its environment. This is
conﬁrmed by the experiment’s result, in which the evolution of the automatically
updated ι of the third group (i.e. the black line) plotted in Figure 7.9 corresponds
well to the changes in providers’ performance deviation (i.e. the grey line).
7.5.3 Default credibility learning
We now turn to the evaluation of the last learning algorithm introduced in this
chapter. This algorithm is designed to monitor the general level of credibility of
witnesses or referees in an environment and to update the default witness/referee
credibility value. Hence, the eﬀectiveness of this algorithm is going to be tested
in situations where the general level of lying in the environment changes. In this
experiment, there are two main groups of consumer agents; both of them using the
CR component with the credibility model extension as their trust model. However,




































































Figure 7.12: Learning TDRCr —TDRCr’s evolution.
The other group is called CR. Since the default credibility is only used for referees
that are met for the ﬁrst time, new referees need to be continuously added into
the testbed in order to evaluate this facet of the model. Therefore, we introduce a
dummy group of consumers whose tasks are simply interacting with the providers
and providing references for them. All of the consumers in this group are lying
referees of either Extr1 or Extr2 type. Similar to Section 7.5.1, the level of lying in
the testbed is controlled by using the CR lying percentage, which is set following
the chart in Figure 7.11. To ensure the abundance of new referees in every round,
30% of the agents in the dummy group are replaced by new dummy consumer
agents after each round. Since the dummy consumers do not use a trust model
(they randomly select providers for interaction), we only monitor the performance
of CR and CRL.
The experiment’s results are presented in Figures 7.12 and 7.13. The TDRCr value
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Figure 7.13: Learning TDRCr performance.
lying percentage in Figure 7.11. Thus, TDRCr is raised to its near maximum value
(i.e. 1.0) when the CR lying percentage is minimum and vice versa. It is apparent
here that the default credibility learning algorithm can eﬀectively track the level
of lying/inaccuracy in the environment and update the default referee credibility
accordingly. Figure 7.13 shows that, with the new learning algorithm, CRL can
outperform CR in several instances while it has similar performance with CR in
the other cases. The slight performance improvement is expected because TDRCr
is only used for new referees and, thus, it cannot signiﬁcantly aﬀect the overall
performance of FIRE.
7.6 Summary
This chapter has further extended FIRE towards a more ﬂexible and adaptable
trust model. We have explored several learning techniques and partly automated
the process of choosing the right parameters in order to ensure that FIRE oper-
ate eﬀectively in a range of environments. Speciﬁcally, and most importantly, we
devised an algorithm to monitor the performance of each of FIRE’s components
(based on the accuracy of their trust values). This is a novel approach that al-
lows any changes in an agent’s environment that aﬀect the performance of one or
more components (e.g. lack of ratings or changes in the quality of ratings from
a particular source of information) to be indirectly detected and the weights for
the corresponding components (i.e. the component coeﬃcients) to be accordingly
adjusted. In addition, appropriate algorithms are also devised for choosing the
right values for the inaccuracy tolerance threshold and the default witness/ref-
eree credibility. When taken together, all these new techniques enhance FIRE’sChapter 7 Adapting FIRE’s Parameters 119
robustness and resilience in facing unforeseen circumstances. Through empiri-
cal evaluation, we have shown that the new algorithms are in fact eﬀective and
signiﬁcantly improve FIRE’s adaptability.
This chapter has concluded the research work of designing a generic and adaptable
trust and reputation model for applications in open MAS in the scope of this
thesis. The next chapter will summarise the contributions this research has made
and outline the directions for the future work.Chapter 8
Conclusions
This chapter summarises the ﬁndings of this thesis in enabling agents in an open
multi-agent system to assess the trustworthiness of their peers for selecting good
interaction partners. In order to do so, a novel trust and reputation model—
FIRE—was developed, which takes into account the main characteristics of an
open MAS to ensure its robustness and applicability in such environments. More
speciﬁcally, this thesis presents and evaluates a framework for evaluating trust-
worthiness of agents based on multiple sources of information: direct experience,
role-based relationships, witness reports, and certiﬁed references. By using this
framework, agents in an open MAS are able to obtain the trust values of their
peers in most circumstances. This is possible because FIRE does not rely solely
on one source of information (its four components complement and back up one
another) and particularly because it exploits the high availability of the novel
Certiﬁed Reputation component.
In more detail, Section 8.1 reviews the contributions of this research to the state
of the art. Section 8.2 then discusses the main ways in which this research can be
carried forward in the future.
8.1 Research Contributions
This thesis has presented FIRE, a novel decentralised model for trust evaluation
that is speciﬁcally designed for general applications in open MAS. Before going
on to FIRE’s contributions to the state of the art, we recap the requirements for
a trust model for applications in open MAS (discussed in Section 2.5):
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R1a It should deal with the bootstrapping issue of newly joined agents.
R1b It should make use of role-based trust, interaction trust, and witness reputa-
tion when the required information for these dimensions of trust is available.
R2a Each agent should be able to collect observations and calculate the reputation
values by itself.
R2b The trust model should be scalable to a large number of agents that might
be present in open MAS.
R2c It should reasonably maintain its normal eﬀective operation in situations
where there are various changes in its environment.
R3 It should be adaptable to diﬀerent domains of applications that an open MAS
may have.
R4a It should be robust against possible lying from agents and
R4b the correlated evidence problem.
In what follows, we are going to show how these requirements are met by FIRE
and highlight its novelties. In an overview, the novel mechanisms developed in
this research can be classiﬁed into the following areas:
• evaluating trust: A generic framework is built which allows a variety of
sources of trust information to be integrated to provide a collective and
precise trust measure. The model is able to predict closely the behaviour of
an agent. In addition, Certiﬁed Reputation, a novel type of reputation, is
introduced. (Chapter 3)
• dealing with inaccurate reports: A model of the reporter’s credibility is de-
veloped, allowing FIRE to weight third-party reports according to their
provider’s credibility and ﬁlter out inaccurate reporters. (Chapter 6)
• adapting to the environment: Learning techniques were implemented to
adapt a number of FIRE’s parameters to the prevailing context, allowing
it to operate robustly under unforseen circumstances in the environment.
(Chapter 7)
The remainder of this section discusses the results of the work in this thesis focusing
on the above aspects in turn (in Sections 8.1.1, 8.1.2, and 8.1.3, respectively).Chapter 8 Conclusions 122
8.1.1 Evaluating trust
Enabling agents in open MAS to evaluate the trustworthiness of their peers and,
thus, to be able to select reliable ones for interactions is the main aim of this
thesis. To this end, FIRE was developed based on a number of potential sources
of trust information. These sources include: direct experiences of an agent from
its interactions, witness reports, third-party references, and rules provided by end
users encoding beliefs or knowledge about the environment. This breadth is im-
portant because, given the dynamic factors that inherently exist in an open MAS,
some sources may not be available, or adequate, for deducing trust. Moreover,
the multiple sources are used in FIRE not only to back one another up, but also
to complement one another in order to produce more precise trust values (c.f.
just using one of them). In order to combine trust values derived from diﬀerent
sources of information, a generic framework was developed to standardise trust
calculations. This includes:
• a standardised rating form: to represent trust information from any source
which is used for exchanging trust information. A rating is not given for an
agent for its performance in general, but for its performance in a particular
interaction. Therefore, each rating is linked with a particular interaction,
providing further contextual information (e.g. value of the interaction, ser-
vice provided in that interaction) if needed. Moreover, this also eliminates
the correlated evidence problem (Requirement R4b) because no overall opin-
ion (i.e. opinions given based on results of more than one interaction) is
exchanged.
• a general trust formula: to aggregate the trust information (i.e. ratings)
that a trust component collects, which is used in all FIRE’s components.
However, depending on the information source used, each component can
deﬁne its own weight function to reﬂect the quality of each rating taken into
account.
• reliability measures: to produce reliability values for each trust values based
on the quality of the ratings taken into account and their deviation.
This framework is generic because it works independently of any speciﬁc applica-
tion and it does not rely on any assumption or information which is not widely
available in an open MAS. Thus, FIRE can be instantiated and applied in a wide
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Under this framework, each component of FIRE is developed to process trust
information from each of the sources mentioned above. The components are: In-
teraction Trust, Role-based Trust, Witness Reputation, and Certiﬁed Reputation.
First, based on the principles of Regret’s Direct Trust component, the IT compo-
nent is built to produce trust values from an agent’s own ratings from its direct
interactions. A new rating weight function is devised to calculate the reliability
of a rating based on its recency. Second, a formalisation of role-based rules is
presented in order for the RT to retrieve relevant rules and calculate the role-
based trust based on those rules. Third, the referral process was implemented for
the WR component to locate witness ratings for witness reputation calculations.
Finally, and most importantly, a novel mechanism was developed for making use
of third-party references in the CR component, in which the target agents obtain
references themselves and present those to the evaluator when requested. The ad-
dition of this new type of reputation greatly enhances the serviceability of FIRE,
allowing a trust measure to be available in most circumstances because:
• its mechanism addresses the problem of the lack of direct experience (since
agents can typically collect a large number of references themselves and they
are incentivised to present these to establish new trust relationships) in the
IT component, and
• using the CR component, agents are freed from the various costs involved in
locating witness reports (e.g. resource, time, and communication costs).
Making use of all the four components, FIRE eﬀectively combines their particular
strengths in building a robust trust measure: the reliability of direct experiences,
the domain knowledge from role-based rules, and the abundance of third-party
information via witness reports and certiﬁed references. Moreover, having the
four sources of information at its disposal (especially certiﬁed references thanks
to their high availability) means that FIRE can provide a trust measure that is
suﬃciently precise to be used in a wide range of situations (Requirements R1a
and R1b). Obviously, there are still cases when FIRE cannot produce a trust
value. Speciﬁcally, those are when a service provider newly joins the system.
Hence, it does not have references about its performance and other agents do
not have past experience with it. However, in a realistic scenario, in order to
promote its service, that provider can join a (popular) scheme/organisation that
provides quality assurance about its members’ service. For example, a car dealer
can obtain the title ‘authorised dealer’ from a car manufacturer, or a commercial
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a ‘HackerSafe’ 1 certiﬁcation. Such (popular) memberships (and inherently their
quality assurance) can be recognised by other agents (via rules in FIRE’s RT
component) and, thus, helps the provider to sell its service.
In addition to the above, a notable characteristic of FIRE is that all of its mech-
anisms are decentralised. This means that individual agents can use FIRE to
make trust evaluations without the need of a centralised authority. This is im-
portant for making FIRE compatible with the ‘no central authority’ of open MAS
(Requirement R2a).
In order to verify our claims, empirical evaluation was carried out and it was
demonstrated that:
• Agents using the trust measure provided by FIRE are able to select reliable
partners for interactions and, thus, obtain better utility gain compared to
those using no trust measure. This result was reconﬁrmed with various types
of provider population.
• Each component of FIRE plays an important role in its operation and sig-
niﬁcantly contributes to its overall performance.
• FIRE is able to cope well with the various types of changes in an open
MAS and can maintain its properties despite the dynamism possible in an
environment (Requirement R2c).
• Although decentralised, to suit the requirements of a trust model in open
MAS, FIRE still outperforms, or at worst maintains a comparable perfor-
mance level with SPORAS, a centralised trust model.
• In our experiments (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), 500, 1000, and 1500 agents using
FIRE have been deployed and we observe the execution time of those ex-
periments varies linearly to the number of agents deployed. Thus, given its
decentralised nature, we believe that FIRE is scalable to the large number
of agents that may be present in an open MAS (Requirement R2b).
To sum up, FIRE satisﬁes all our requirements (plus Requirement R4b, which is
dealt with in the following section) for a trust model in open MAS. Its behaviour
can be customised via its set of parameters to suit a particular application. Hence,
FIRE is ready to be used in real world contexts.
1‘HackerSafe’ certiﬁcations are provided by ScanAlert (a security company, www.hackersafe.
com) to certify that the certiﬁed sites’ servers are regularly tested (by real security attacks) and
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8.1.2 Dealing with inaccurate reports
The ability to detect and handle inaccurate reports appropriately is critical in or-
der for the WR and CR components to produce reliable trust values (because these
components rely on third-party reports to work). This is particularly important
in an open MAS where agents that are owned by various stakeholders can dissem-
inate disinformation to their own beneﬁt (Requirement R4b). To this end, this
thesis presented a novel credibility model that allows FIRE to assess the reliability
of information providers (i.e. reporters) and to weight, or to ﬁlter out, their infor-
mation accordingly. More speciﬁcally, using our credibility model, an agent rates
the credibility of a reporter based on the diﬀerence between the reports it receives
and the actual interaction result it observes later. Hence, reporters’ credibility is
not objectively assessed based on how honest they are in revealing the interaction
result they received, but rather it is subjectively judged based on their capability
to give reports close to the actual results that a particular agent would receive.
By so doing, an agent can detect not only inaccurate/false reports, but also hon-
est, but useless, reports that result from the diﬀerent views of the reporters. For
example, one reporter may receive preferential treatment from a particular service
provider and give out good (and honest) ratings about this provider. Such ratings,
though honest and accurate (in the view of that reporter), are not useful for other
agents because they would receive only normal treatment from that provider. By
taking an agent’s individual situation (i.e. the actual performance it receives dur-
ing interactions) into account, our credibility model can deal with cases similar to
the one in this example appropriately. This is the main diﬀerence that separates
our approach from others in the literature where reporters are usually judged on
their honesty (e.g. [Sabater, 2003], [Sen and Sajja, 2002]).
Through empirical evaluation, our credibility model was shown to be eﬀective in
handling inaccurate reports, enabling the WR and CR components to maintain
a stable level of performance in a wide range of situations where various levels
of inaccuracy were introduced. In particular, the WR and CR components were
extended with the credibility model and tested in environments where marginally
inaccurate and extremely inaccurate reporters were introduced at various percent-
ages. The results show that by using the credibility model, the WR and CR
components are able to maintain their performance at a comparable level to that
in honest environments in all the experiments where the percentages of inaccurate
reporters are less than 50%. Furthermore, compared to SPORAS, the extended
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and their performance degrades more gracefully when the level of inaccuracy in
the environment increases.
8.1.3 Adapting to the environment
Given the continuously changing nature of an open MAS, it is desirable that a
trust model can cope well with unforseen changes that might take place in the
environment and that it is able to maintain its normal eﬀective operation under
such circumstances. Therefore, learning techniques have been implemented in or-
der to enhance FIRE’s adaptivity to a number of possible changes in an open
MAS. In particular, FIRE is extended to weight the trust values produced by its
components according to the components’ performance. In order to do so, the per-
formance (i.e. the accuracy) of each component is continuously monitored during
FIRE’s operation. Should there be extraneous factors that aﬀect the performance
of one or more of FIRE’s components (e.g. the lack of ratings or changes in the
quality of ratings from a particular source of information), the corresponding com-
ponent coeﬃcients are automatically adjusted in an appropriate manner. By so
doing, the actual reliability of each of FIRE’s component is taken into account
when FIRE calculates the overall trust values from its components.
In addition, algorithms are also devised for choosing the right values for the inac-
curacy threshold and the default witness/referee credibility (used in the credibility
model). When taken together, all these techniques not only enhance FIRE’s ro-
bustness and resilience in facing unforseen changes, but also reduce FIRE’s admin-
istrative burden since these parameters, if initially wrongly set, can be re-adjusted
automatically by the model without requiring human intervention. Finally, empir-
ical evaluation has shown that the learning techniques implemented are eﬀective
and signiﬁcantly improve FIRE’s adaptability.
8.2 Future Directions
Although FIRE makes a number of advances to the state of the art, there are still
a number of ways in which this work can be further extended. These are now
detailed in the remainder of this subsection.
First, in the RT component, role-based rules need to be entered by agent owners
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trust value (Section 3.4). However, this can be extended to make use dynamic
rules that give trust values based on the prevailing context. An example rule is “if
a provider oﬀers an x-year guarantee for its products then its product reliability is
min{0.2×(x−1),1.0}”, or another one is “if a provider shows y references about
its previous successful interactions whose value exceeds £1000 then its capability
is min{0.1 × y,1.0}”. Here, the ﬁrst rule means that if a provider does not oﬀer
a product guarantee at all (x = 0) then its product reliability is likely to be bad
(trust value is −0.2), a 1-year guarantee is the standard (a neutral trust value,
0.0), and over that, each additional guarantee year oﬀered increases its product’s
reliability by 0.2 up to the maximum of 1.0. Similarly, the second rule means that
the more high-value interactions (i.e. larger than £1000) a provider has ﬁnished
successfully, the more capable that provider is (here each such transaction adds
0.1 to the provider’s capability rating up to the maximum of 1.0). Such rules are
here called “semi-automatic” because they still need to be produced by humans,
but the trust values they give are not ﬁxed, rather they are calculated according
to the context in which they are applied. These rules are more powerful and
expressive than those that are currently accommodated by the RT component,
allowing the agent designer to encode far more complex rules than their current
role-based counterparts. In order to process and apply such semi-automatic rules,
the current RT component needs to be signiﬁcantly extended and new mechanisms
are also needed in order for an agent to understand and to extract data from
contextual information. However, such an extension would greatly enhance the
RT component and, as a result, the FIRE model, in terms of its customisability
since it allows a much wider range of domain knowledge to be encoded and used.
The next potential extension is considered with the CR component. The CR
mechanism presented in this thesis allows a target agent to actively establish trust
relationships with its potential interaction partners by presenting references about
its past performance when requested. Although this works well, this process can
be further improved by introducing an element of negotiation into it. For example,
having examined the references provided by the target agent b, agent a may not
be satisﬁed with the quality or the relevance of these references (e.g. because they
are about a diﬀerent kind of service than the one a needs, because they are too
old, or because the values of the corresponding interactions are insigniﬁcant). In
that case, agent a can explain to b the reasons why the provided references cannot
be accepted and ask b to provide more relevant ones. From the reasons given
by a, agent b can select and present another set of references and tell a why it
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are actually signiﬁcant and relevant to it (e.g. because a particular reference r
was given by a big name company that has a very strict set of standards, and
so on). In this example, compared to our original CR mechanism, the way CR
is calculated from provided references does not change, but a trust relationship
between a and b can be easier to establish because both the agents have the
opportunity to understand the needs of each other and also the opportunity to
correct possible misunderstandings (e.g. from the arguments provided by b, a
might adjust its initial weight for reference r). One of the main concerns over
the use of CR is that the references provided by the target agent itself might be
misleading because it can choose the best references to present. To overcome this,
argumentation-based negotiation [Rahwan et al., 2004] could be used to clear up
the evaluator’s possible doubts on the references it receives. In order to enter
into such a negotiation, however, an agent (or the trust model) needs to be able to
evaluate contextual information associated with a reference and to understand and
generate appropriate arguments. This requires an investigation into the possible
ways to apply the work from the area of argumentation-based negotiation into the
CR component.
Understanding contextual information comes up as one of the main additional re-
quirements for FIRE in both of the above suggested extensions. However, achiev-
ing this is not a simple task because contextual information (which is indeﬁnite
and varies signiﬁcantly) needs not only to be provided, but also to be expressed
in a standardised way. To this end, a suitable ontology2 [Smith, 2003] needs to
be developed to be used as a standardised basis for trust information exchange
between agents. Although the development of an ontology speciﬁcally for trust
information does not directly extend the work in this thesis, its existence would
greatly beneﬁt FIRE in several ways. This is because it allows contextual infor-
mation to be exchanged to accompany ratings (in the interaction component of a
rating), which, in turn, opens up a wide range of possible enhancements in trust
evaluation as demonstrated in our examples above.
Coming back to the CR component, it should be noted that when a referee gives
its references to an interaction partner, it eﬀectively surrenders its privacy with
respect to how it values that partner’s performance. This may lead to various
possible reactions of that partner (e.g. it may retaliate against the referee for a
bad reference or it may treat the referee diﬀerently the next time to get a better
2The term ontology refers to a data model that represents a speciﬁc part of the real-world
and is used to reason about the relationships of objects in the world. Ontologies contain abstract
representations of objects and their relationships [Smith, 2003].Chapter 8 Conclusions 129
reference). However, due to the vast number of possibilities in the reactions of
both agents (i.e. the referee and the referred agent) and the limited scope of
this thesis, the eﬀects of giving up privacy in the CR component have not been
considered. However, a fuller investigation on this is needed in order to understand
the possible problems and to put appropriate measures in place should they have
undesirable eﬀects on the performance of the CR component.
In the RT component, when looking for relevant rules to apply for a given pair of
agents a and b, it is assumed that information about the roles of a and b (and,
thus, their relationships) is already given in some way. Although some types of role
information may actually be readily available from an agent’s knowledge (e.g. b is
owned by the same organisation, b is the seller, b is a ﬁnancial institution), there
are many other cases where such knowledge is less apparent and is not available.
For example, given a rule that says “if b competes with w then opinions of b
about w may not be reliable”, it is not always straighforward to determine how
the ‘competitor’ roles of b and w can be deferred. Since there are no mechanisms
in FIRE to determine the relationships of agents (and their roles), the types of
roles that can be used in such rules are thus limited (to the simple and apparent
ones as mentioned above). Therefore, developing a model for agent relationship
identiﬁcation is also a potential extension to FIRE. Given the ability to determine
high-level relationships, such as competition, collaboration, dependency between
agents, the range of rules that could be used in FIRE would be greatly expanded,
allowing a wider range of knowledge (than currently possible) to be encoded and
used by FIRE. The model presented by Ashri et al. [2005] is an example of such
relationship identiﬁcation models and might provide a promising point of departure
for this line of enquiry.
All the work above focuses on extending the capability of FIRE. In a broader view,
it is not realistic for an agent a to select another agent b for an interaction merely
based on the trustworthiness of b. Agent a also needs to consider other factors
such as the cost requested by b in comparison with others. For example, if there
is another agent c which is marginally less trustworthy than b, but requests a far
lower price, b might not be the best choice. In another example, if the service
that a needs is very critical to a and its failure would mean a catastrophy, b
might be selected because a could not accept the risk of choosing a lesser provider.
Hence, a decision model that takes into account the cost, the utility gain, the risk
(which can be calculated from the potential chosen agent’s trust values and the
corresponding reliability values) involved in an agent’s delegation action is clearly
needed. Simply comparing the trustworthiness of agents may not always suﬃce.Appendix A
Relevant Trust Models
Of the trust models reviewed in Chapter 2, SPORAS [Zacharia and Maes, 2000]
was later used in our experiments (Chapters 5 and 6) as a benchmark and Regret’s
Direct Trust component [Sabater, 2003] was reused in FIRE. Thus, their operations
need to be described in greater detail. However, since our review in Chapter 2
mainly focuses on the characteristics of trust models, these were not discussed.
Therefore, this appendix provides a more detailed survey on the operations of
SPORAS and Regret (Sections A.1 and A.2, respectively).
A.1 SPORAS
SPORAS is a centralised trust model similar to the online reputation models used
on eBay and Amazon (which manage the reputation of all its users in a centralised
manner). However, it extends those online reputation models by introducing a new
method for rating aggregation. Speciﬁcally, instead of storing all the ratings, each
time a rating is received it updates the reputation of the involved party using an
algorithm that satisﬁes the following principles:
1. New users start with a minimum reputation value and they build up repu-
tation during their activity on the system.
2. The reputation value of a user never falls below the reputation of a new user.
3. After each transaction, the reputation values of the involved users are up-
dated according to the feedback provided by the other parties, which reﬂect
their trustworthiness in the latest transaction.
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4. Users with very high reputation values experience much smaller rating changes
after each update.
5. Ratings must be discounted over time so that the most recent ratings have
more weight in the evaluation of a users’s reputation.
A new user a in SPORAS starts with a reputation value Ra
0 = 0. Ra
i is used to
denote user a’s reputation at time i. The range of a reputation value in SPORAS
is D = [0,3000]. The reputation rating for a reported by user b at time i is denoted
by W
a,b
i and ranges from 0.1 to 1.0. The formula for updating reputation at Ra
i
at time i upon receiving the rating W
a,b

















where θ > 1 is the eﬀective number of ratings considered, Ea
i is the expected value
of W
a,b
i (i.e. the expected performance of a) and Θ(Ra
i−1) is the damping function
deﬁned to slow down reputation changes of a user with a very high reputation
(see the principles of SPORAS above). Ea
i and Θ(Ra


















where σ is chosen so that function Θ remains above 0.9 for all users whose repu-
tation is below 3
4 of D.
In addition, SPORAS also introduces a reliability measure based on the reputation
deviation (RD) of the estimated reputations. The reputation deviation of user a




















Hence, the recursively estimated RD of a user is an indication of the predictive
power of SPORAS for that user’s reputation. A high RD can mean either that the
user has not been active enough to be able to make a more accurate prediction for
his/her reputation, or that the user’s behaviour has a lot of variation. The initialAppendix A Relevant Trust Models 132
value of RD is set to D
10.
A.2 Regret
Regret is a reputation model in which the trust evaluation process is decentralised.
Employing Regret, each agent is able to evaluate the reputation of others by itself.
In order to do so, each agent rates its partner’s performance after every interaction
and records its ratings in a local database. The relevant ratings will be queried
from this database when trust evaluation is needed. The trust value derived from
those ratings is termed direct trust.
In more detail, in order to calculate the direct trust of agent b, agent a retrieved
its past ratings about b’s performance. The set of those ratings is called R1. Then




ρ(t,ti) · ri (A.6)
where ri is a rating value in the set R, and ρ(t,ti) is a normalised weight value










where t is the current time and ti is the time the rating ri is recorded. However,
this weight function has some shortcomings on time granularity control. Actually,





Therefore, the weight function depends only on the time values of a particular set
of ratings, rather than the recency of those ratings in comparison with the current
time t. For example, assume that r1 and r2 are ratings about the interactions
that took place at time t1 = 1 and t2 = 2 respectively, and that R = {r1,r2}.
Equation A.9 will give ρ(t,t1) = 1
3 and ρ(t,t2) = 2
3. Hence the diﬀerence of the
1Due to the limited scope of this thesis, Regret and its notation are simpliﬁed here. However,
the main ideas of the model are still retained.Appendix A Relevant Trust Models 133
weights for r1 and r2 is 1
3 in the interaction trust calculation. Suppose that r0
1 and
r0
2 are completely the same ratings to r1 and r2 except that t0
1 = 100 and t0
2 = 101.
The same calculations will give a weight diﬀerence that is now 1
10100. This vast
change in weight diﬀerences is not desirable given that the rating time diﬀerence
in both cases is the same (1 time unit, e.g. second). Moreover, given the same set
of ratings, the weight function produces the same value regardless of the current
time t2 (i.e. the time of calculating the interaction trust).
Like SPORAS, every trust value in Regret comes with a reliability value that
reﬂects the conﬁdence of Regret in that trust value. This reliability value is calcu-
lated from a combination of two measures that are based on the number of ratings
in the set R and the deviation of those ratings. Regret deﬁnes an intimate level
of interactions, denoted by itm, that represents the minimum number of ratings
needed for a close relationship. The reliability degree increases until |R| reaches
this number. After that, more interactions will not increase reliability. The mea-
sures (No for number of ratings and Dv for deviation of ratings) and the reliability





2·itm) |R| ≤ itm





ρ(t,ti) · |ri − DTa→b| (A.11)
DTRLa→b = No(R) · (1 − Dv(R)) (A.12)
In addition, agents are further assumed to be willing to share their opinion about
others. Based on this, Regret develops a witness reputation component along
with a sophisticated method for aggregating witness reports taking into account
the possibility of dishonest reports. The operation of this component depends
on the social network built up by each agent. In particular, Regret uses a social
network to ﬁnd witnesses, to decide which witnesses will be consulted, and how
to weight those witnesses’ opinions. However, Regret does not specify how such
social networks can be built, and, thus, this component is of limited use.
Besides direct trust and witness reputation, Regret also introduces the concepts of
neighbourhood reputation and system reputation. The former is calculated from
2Suppose that r1 and r2 are experiences of some person and the time unit used is year. If the
current time is year 2, r2 should have much more inﬂuence on the trust decision of that person
than r1 since it is much more recent. If the current time is year 20, both r1 and r2 are too old,
and they should have a similarly low levels of inﬂuence on his current trust decision.Appendix A Relevant Trust Models 134
the reputation of the target’s neighbour agents based on fuzzy rules. However,
this again requires a social network to work. The latter is a mechanism to assign
default trust values to the target agent based on its social role in an interaction
(e.g. buyer, seller). This is only useful if additional domain speciﬁc information is
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